The design of a budget-based contract as a tool for incentive motivation to improve efficiency in the allocation of resources in the health care sector : with special reference to the public hospital sector in Spain by Lopez-Casasnovas, Guillermo
THE DESIGN OF A BUDGET-BASED CONTRACT 
AS A TOOL FOR INCENTIVE 190TIVATION TO 
IMPROVE EFFICIENCY IN THE ALLOCATION 
OF RESOURCES IN THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR, 
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE PUBLIC 
HOSPITAL SECTOR 114 SPAIN. 
By 
GUILLERr O LOPEZ-CASASNOVAS 
Thesis submitted for the degree of D. Phil. 
University of York 
Department of Economics and Related Studies 
17 September 1984 
C0N TENT S 
INTRODUCTION 
1. THE GROWTH AND RESTRAINT OF THE HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURE 
IN SPAIN: RATIONALE AND CONSEQUENCES 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 6 
1.2. THE GROWTH OF THE HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURE IN 
SPAIN AND THE RATIONALITY FOR ITS CONTROL. 7 
1.3. AN OVERALL DESCRIPTION OF THE SPANISH HEALTH CARE 
SECTOR. 9 
- The Hospital Sector. 11 
1.3.1. The Health Care Sector in Spain: its 
organisation and funding. 13 
1.3.2. Outline of the revenue allocation process 
in the Health Care Sector in general. 15 
1.4. THE SYSTEM OF BUDGETARY COVERAGE OF HOSPITAL 
EXPENSES IN SPAIN. 17 
1.4.1. The INSALUD funding of the public 
hospitals. 17 
- The wage settlement. 18 
- The allocation of the total hospital 
revenues. 19 
- The budget settlement. 22 
1.4.2. Tentative changes and the need of the 
hospital budgetary reform. 23 
1.5. EFFICIENCY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
AND ALTERNATIVES. 24 
1.5.1. The pressures for change in the hospital 
budget financial arrangements, and existing 
alternatives. 25 
1.5.2. The current policies for financial restraint 
in the Spanish hospital sector and the 
efficiency motivation target. 27 
1.6. SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER AND CONCLUSIONS. 29 
FOOTNOTES 31 
APPENDIX: "The increasing concern about the 
opportunity cost of the Public Sector 
involvement in the Spanish economy" 36 
II 
2. THE ISSUE OF VARIABLE PRODUCTIVITY IN THE SPANISH 
HOSPITAL HEALTH CARE SECTOR: DEFINITION AND SOURCES 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 45 
2.2. STYLISED FACTORS CONCERNING VARIATIONS IN 
PERFORMANCE IN THE SPANISH HOSPITAL SECTOR. 46 
- Variations of performance in the Spanish 
Hospital Sector. 46 
- Some existing problems and caveats. 48 
2.3. DEFINITION OF EFFICIENCY AND VARIABLE PRODUCTIVITY. 50 
2.3.1. A Review of the literature of potential 
relevance to the issue of variable 
productivity. 52 
2.3.2. Behavioural analysis and productivity 
in Public Sector Studies. 56 
2.3.3. Outline of the argument. 60 
2.4. EXPLAINING PRODUCTIVITY VARIABLE: MODELS OF 
HOSPITAL BEHAVIOUR. 61 
2.4.1. Some Questions in modelling institutional 
(hospital) Behaviour. 63 
2.4.2. A model of hospital behaviour suited to 
the Spanish context: The approach adopted. 65, 
2.5. BEHAVIOURAL FACTORS OF POTENTIAL RELEVANCE IN 
EXPLAINING THE EXISTENCE OF VARIABLE PRODUCTIVITY 
IN THE SPANISH HOSPITAL CARE SECTOR. 67 
2.5.1. Mechanisms of operation. 
2.5.2. Relevant behavioural factors. 
69 
73 
2.6. THE PATTERN OF THE ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE, SUMMARY 
OF THE CHAPTER AND INTEREST OF THE FORTHCOMING 
RESEARCH. 76 
FOOTNOTES 79 
APPENDIX 2.1.84 
3. A BUDGET POLICY AIMED AT PROMOTING EFFICIENCY IN THE 
HOSPITAL SECTOR 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 88 
- Outline of the Chapter. 
88 
III 
3.2. FACTORS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN DESIGNING 
A BUDGET POLICY 90 
3.2.1. The appropriate setting for the policy. 91 
3.2.2. Incentive compatibility and the efficient 
reward structure. 92 
3.3. CENTRAL FUNDING AND HOSPITAL PERFORMANCE UNDER 
THE AGENCY RELATIONSHIP. 94 
3.3.1. The optimal reward structure in a single 
Agency relationship. 96 
3.4. AN INCENTIVE REIMBURSEMENT POLICY UNDER 
DIFFERENTIAL LEVELS OF PERFORMANCE. 101 
3.4.1. Outline of the model. 101 
3.4.2. The model at work. 104 
- Mathematical derivation of the 
properties of the model. 106 
- Diagramatical representation of 
the properties of the formula. 109 
3.4.3. Some other general considerations. 111 
3.5. THE POTENTIAL EFFECT OF AN 'OUTPUT-SHARING' 
BUDGET SYSTEM ON THE AGENCIES' PERFORMANCE. 112 
3.5.1. A simulation approach to the solution. 117 
3.5.2. Potential hypothesis and policy testing. 121 
3.6. CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY 123 
FOOTNOTES 124 
4. ISSUES IN THE DESIGN OF A PROSPECTIVE REVENUE 
ALLOCATION POLICY 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 128 
4.1.1. Determinants of Health Care Expenditure, 
Cost-Containment Strategies and Budget- 
based Policies. 128 
4.1.2. Considerations to be taken into account in 
designing a budget-based Prospective Revenue 
Allocation Policy (PRAP). 131 
4.2. DESCRIPTION OF A PRAP AND ITS WORKINGS 132 
4.2.1. Basic idea and potential utilization of 
A PRAP. 132 
4.2.2. Approach adopted in designing a PRAP in 
our context. 134 
IV 
4.3. COST FUNCTIONS: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 135 
4.3.1. The definition of the basic relationship 
analysed 135 
4.3.2. The definition of the components of the 
basic relationship 136 
4.4. OPERATIONISING THE COST FUNCTION: BEHAVIOURAL 
ANALYSIS AND HOSPITAL OUTPUT 138 
4.4.1. Behavioural Cost functions and Hospital 
Output. 138 
4.4.2. Increasing Hospital homogeneity. 140 
- The use of cluster analysis to increase 
subsample homogeneity. 141 
- The use of direct output-mix adjustments. 143 
4.4.3. Operationalisation of the cost relationship: 
Behavioural explanatory variables used in 
the literature to date. 145 
4.5. THE SELECTION AND MEASUREMENT OF THE VARIABLE 
INCLUDED IN THE COST RELATIONSHIP. 149 
4.5.1. The selection of the average dependent 
variable. 149 
4.5.2. The cost explanatory variables: Institutional, 
characteristic and utilization variables. 153 
4.6. ESTIMATING THE COST FUNCTION: SOME RELEVANT ISSUES 158 
4.6.1. General methodological problems and responses. 159 
4.6.2. Econometric problems. 162 
4.7. CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY 167 
FOOTNOTES 170 
5. THE CONSTRUCTION OF A COST BASE LINE FOR PURPOSES OF 
ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIVE EFFICIENCY IN HOSPITAL EXPENDITURE 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 176 
- Outline of the chapter. 
176 
5.2. DESCRIPTION OF THE HOSPITAL DATA AVAILABLE 177 
- The bases for its Reform 
178 
5.3. THE SELECTION OF THE SAMPLE FOR THE ANALYSIS 180 
5.3.1. Some initial groupings. 181 
5.3.2. Resulting. subgroups from cluster analysis. 183 
- Selection of the variables. 183 
- The use of cluster analysis to increase 
subsample homogeneity. 185 
- The sequence of the exercise. 188 
V 
5.4. DESCRIPTION OF THE COST EQUATION AND RESULTS 
OF THE ESTIMATION. 198 
5.4.1. Empirical results of the estimation of 
the cost function. 200 
5.4.2. The results of the prediction. 210 
5.5. ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS OF THE PREDICTION. 210 
5.5.1. The need of a geographical relative price 
adjustment. 212 
5.5.2. The simulation of a PRAP 1979-1981. 216 
5.6. TESTS 221 
- The institutional pattern of variable productivities. 221 
- The hypothesis of cumulative causation vs self- 
correcting mechanisms. 222 
5.7. SUMMARY 229 
FOOTNOTES 225 
APPENDIX: 1,11 233 
SUBAPPENDIX: I, II 268 
6. CONCLUSION 
6.1. Conclusion 277 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 280 
VI 
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES. 
TABLES 
I. 1: Social Security Health Care Expenditure 
1.2: Provincial Inequalities in Health Care Provision 
(1978-79) 
1.3: A picture of the Spanish Health Care Sector and 
some international comparisons 
1.4: The evolution of Hospital Health Care Services 
in Spain (1963-1981) 
1.5: The Distribution of Spanish physicians according 
to the place of work and working time (hours/day) 
1. A: Share of PE to GDP in current prices 
(three years average) 
2. A: Some elasticities of taxation w. r. t. GDP 
(period average) 
3. A: Public Expenditure/GDP and Taxation/GDP 
4. A: Nominal and real perspective of Public 
Expenditure Growth in Spain 
II. 1: Some variations of performance in the Spanish 
Hospital Sector (1979) 
11.2: Wagerest rain and the evolution of some hospital 
indicators 
11.3: Components and increase in the overall 
remuneration of hospital physicians 
1. A: Values of the coefficient of variation under 
increasing hospital Subsample homogeneity 
2. A: Range of indicators of the sample finally 
selected 
3. A: Analysis of some performance indicators 
per hospital staff 
IV. 1: The operational context of Hospital Budget 
Review and Expenditure Evaluation Policy 
V. 1: Cluster results (Continuous Variables) 
V. 2: Cluster results 
V. 3: Cluster results " 
V. 4: Cluster Results (Binary Variables) 
V. 5: 
V. 6: 
Cluster Results 11 11 
Results of the regression analysis 
7 
8 
10 
12 
39 
39 
40 
41 
47 
75 
83 
84 
85 
86 
129 
191 
193 
194 
196 
196 
201 
203 
VII 
V. 7: Analysis of the results: Actual and 
Predicted Revenue Allocation 211 
V. 8: Distribution of the relative index of 
the cost of living (1979) 213 
V. 9: The influence of the hospital location 
variable on average costs 215 
V. 10: The prediction and similation exercise 
(1979-81) 217 
V. 11: Analysis of some work-load indicators w. r. t. 
the relatively 'high spending' hospital group 219 
220 
1. A: The impact on costs of the utilization variables 264 
2. A: Geographical variables of the sample considered 271 
3. A: Map of the geographical location of hospitals 
selected 272 
4. A: Code of the variables utilized 273 
5. A: Overall Sample of Spanish Hospitals selected 274 
FIGURES 
II. 1: Efficiency and performance comparisons 51 
11.2: Variable productivity: Mechanisms of 
operation 71 
111.1: Diagramatical representation of the 
properties of the formula 104 
111.2: Diagramatical representation of the 
properties of the formula 110 
111.3: Diagramatical representation of the 
properties of the formula 110 
V. 1: Hospital functional forms 206 
A. 1. /A. 13: Appendix of figures from cluster results 235 
249 
G. 1/G. 8: Appendix of Graphs from the regression results 249 
256 
1. A: Optimum Plant and Scale Economies 257 
VIII 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The present thesis is the result of four years of intensive 
research in the field of Public Economics at the University of 
York and my interest on the subject, arised from the start of my 
MSc course. 
I am indebted to my supervisors Ron Akehurst, Bernard Stafford 
and Professor Alan Williams, who with a blend of friendliness and 
toughness have not only been a great help in the realization of 
this thesis, but, more importantly, have shown me what research in 
public economics is about. 
I am grateful too to some of my British friends who have gone 
through various chapters of this thesis and helped me to produce 
a more readable text. 
I would like to thank, for financial support, the Spanish 
Ministry of Education and the Fundaciön Oriol-Urquijo, and, 
in the final stages of my stay in England, the FundaciO de 
Cultura Catalana and the Department of Health and Social Security 
of the Genera! i tat de Cata l unya . 
My special thanks are also due to Professors Alexandre Pedros- 
Abello and Francisco Dominguez Del Brio, who made the first suggestions 
for this research and continued to encourage me in it, and who have 
accepted me as a member of the Department of Public Finance in the 
Faculty of Economics in the University of Barcelona. 
IX 
ABSTRACT 
The following research develops from the seminal studies 
by M. S. Feldstein on Hospital Efficiency and by R. Evans on 
Incentive Reimbursement in the Hospital Sector. 
Within this field, the thesis aims to analyse the present 
and potential role of public hospital funding policies for 
incentive promotion and the implementation of efficiency guides 
in allocating health resources. 
Regarding present budget mechanisms in the Spanish Hospital 
Sector, at no stage of the decision-making process can we find 
any rationale favouring an efficient allocation. Indeed, actual 
financial arrangements appear to maintain 'system-inefficiency', 
which the currently-debated 'poor' performance of the sector 
appears to reflect. 
Our analysis shows, that, in addition to the fact that the 
system as a whole seems to operate in an inefficient manner, some 
parts seem to behave more inefficiently than others. This observed 
issue is examined in the context of 'variable productivity' and its 
behavioural implications on the institutional performance are then 
expounded. 
Thus we conclude that present policies of financial restraint, 
which follow a previously expansionary era, are not only well addressed 
to tackle both former problems - failing to insert efficiency motivation 
targets - but they actually create 'perverse' effects in terms of 
vertical equity, as a result of applying spending limits across the 
board on individual past hospital expenditure. Therefore, and 
confliciting with the principles postulated by most of these policies, 
no rational elements of efficiency motivation (holding 'output' constant) 
exist in reality to achieve cost-saving targets. 
X 
This thesis recognises in detail the actual setting of system- 
inefficiency and of 'variable productivity' in the Hospital Sector 
and provides an operational approach, tackling the aforesaid problems, 
aimed to correct them through a change in the present budget arrange- 
ments. 
A prospective Revenue Allocation Policy, (PRAP) is thus designed 
which: 
(i) establishes the budget relationship involved between the Central 
Funding Authority and the Hospital Board, in terms of an 'Agency' 
relationship from which an 'optimal' budget-based contract is defined; 
(ii) recognises differential levels of performance, on which differ- 
entiated reimbursement levels can be advanced, under objectively 
verifiable conditions by both parts of the relation, for the prior 
commitment of the total amount of resources available for distribution 
within the sector; 
(iii) proves its effects in promoting incentives for the efficient 
performance of the institution over time; 
(iv) finally, the actual construction of the PRAP enables us moreover 
to test some hypothesis put forward in the thesis, such as the 
absence of self-correcting mechanisms and a cummulative causation 
effect on hospital performance over time. 
XI 
INTRODUCTION 
Our interest in the field of the promotion of incentives which 
would introduce efficiency-guides in the allocation of resources in 
public sector activities goes back to the initial reading for an 
MSc project. Indeed, at that time I became very involved in the 
literature on the private-versus-public provision debate, concerning 
certain service activities for which an 'appealing' picture of the 
poor public sector performance was presented. 
Having returned for a brief period to Spain, I realized that 
what seemed initially to me to be literature which was merely 
jumping on the political band-wagon in Great Britain, with the 
revival of the old Smithian views on national wealth, was being 
imported wholesale by some Spanish colleagues in almost identical 
terms. 
At first it appeared that these views on the 'catastrophic' 
performance of the Public Sector for most of its activities could 
be considered extrapolable- everywhere at different periods and 
under quite different conditions. But obviously, this must be 
over-simplification. In fact, any analysis of this whole area 
must be undertaken with care and precision, the case must be 
supported by the detailed study of particular bits of public 
activity, and centred on space and time coordinates. 
The second issue which came to mind was that the conclusions 
derived from this debate should prove the legitimacy of any 
comparison between two different sectors in producing identical 
outputs, under, at the very least, similar conditions of 
provision. 
After detailed analysis of local public services, it had to 
be considered that, again, such premises were grounded in 
over-simplification: too many terms of the comparison were 
postulated rather than tested, remaining, in our view, in unrealistic 
domains. 
It then became evident that an effort to reverse the issues 
of controversy for analysis on pure economic grounds should lead 
us to some other more solid arena. We therefore focussed our 
interest towards those aspects related to the performance of 
public sector activities which could be treated in a positive 
way. We redressed attention towards some infra-sector public 
activities which were being produced by statutorily designed 
identical units on decentralized bases, under explicitly regulated 
conditions of provision. At a first glance, the obvious feature 
which appeared from an exploration of empirical analyses was that, 
in this more restricted set, a wide range of variation in most 
of the performance indicators could be observed, even after adjusting 
for various exogenous factors which might make for some differences 
in the conditions of provision. 
In searching for the reasons which could explain this 
phenomenon of so-called 'variable productivity', we felt that 
preferential attention should be devoted to the way in which 
revenues are allocated to those decentralized institutions, 
ultimately encharged of provision of the service. 
Examination of those budget arrangements suggested then, a 
first explanation: lack of incentives at any stage of the decision- 
making process, which run parallel to a guarantee of reimbursement 
for all claimed spending. Thus, no intrinsic motivation was installed 
in an effort to improve performance over time. On the contrary, 
because of the utilization of the historical pattern of expenditure 
-2- 
for revenue allocation purposes, single 'decisional' variables 
are allowed to affect all levels of the management performance 
of the institution. 
If this had been the case in an expansionary age, in which 
any budget request of the institution was bound, finally, to be 
reimbursed, the result, once financial restraints have started 
to be imposed on the sector, usually under the form of cash-limits 
with across-the-board increases, may be particularly 'perverse'. 
Although the rationale of these policies is justified particularly 
in grounds of 'efficiency', our conclusion in the former context 
As- just the opposite: These policies are, in fact, penalising 
those previously 'cost-conscious' units and rewarding, in relative 
terms, the high spenders. In addition, these policies once more 
encouraged indulgence in strategic budgetary games and the search 
for ways to breach the budget iteration process at its weaker 
points. 
The question to which this thesis is adressed then became 
obvious: How can an alternative budget policy, which takes into 
account the phenomenon of differential performance, be designed 
for purposes of providing incentive motivation and inserting 
efficiency-guides in the allocation of public resources? 
The context for the operationalisation of our research is 
henceforth straightforward. Given our purpose of undertaking the 
analysis of some area within public sector activity, and, optimally, 
to a single branch of activity, and given our stay in York, we 
decided to take profit of this 'locatio nal. rent' and apply our 
research to the Public Health Care Sector, in particular to the 
Hospital inpatient care. 
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In addition, we were committed to seek a contribution to 
the field of Health Economics in Spain, despite the constant 
threat of inadequate statistical data. 
Hospital health care and health care expenditure otherwise 
fitted well with our initial objectives. In point of fact, this 
sector enjoyed very rapid expansion in Spain until the end of 
the seventies, a sort of 'black hole' which has constantly claimed 
additional resources and which has been the subject of a large 
amount of literature concerning its very poor performance record. 
This sector has, as have other parts of the public sector 
in Spain, been recently stringently tightened under policies of 
financial restraint and the threat of expenditure cuts. This has 
increased the disruption in hospital activity and the dissatisfaction 
of the users; all of which comes, apparently, to validate arguments 
in favour of alternative systems of provision on behalf of 
efficiency'targets. 
-4- 
CHAPTER I THE GROWTH AND RESTRAINT OF HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURE IN 
SPAIN: RATIONALE AND CONSEQUENCES 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
1.2. THE GROWTH OF HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURE IN SPAIN AND THE 
RATIONALITY FOR ITS CONTROL. 
1.3. AN OVERALL DESCRIPTION OF THE SPANISH HEALTH CARE SECTOR. 
- The Hospital Sector. 
1.3.1. The Health Care Sector in Spain: its organisation and 
funding. 
1-. 3.2. Outline of the revenue allocation process in the Health 
Care Sector in general. 
1.4. THE SYSTEM OF BUDGETARY COVERAGE OF HOSPITAL EXPENSES 
IN SPAIN. 
1.4.1. INSALUD funding of public hospitals. 
- The Wage settlement. 
- The allocation of total hospital revenues. 
- The budget settlement. 
1.4.2. Tentative changes and the need for hospital budgetary 
reform. 
1.5. EFFICIENCY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM AND ALTERNATIVES. 
1.5.1. The pressures for change in hospital budget financial 
arrangements, and existing alternatives. 
1.5.2. The current policies for financial restraint in the 
Spanish hospital sector and the efficiency motivation 
target. 
1.6. SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER AND CONCLUSIONS. 
FOOTNOTES. 
APPENDIX: "The increasing concern about the opportunity cost of 
Public Sector involvement in the Spanish economy" 
- 5- 
CHAPTERI THE GROWTH AND RESTRAINT OF HEALTH CARE 
EXPENDITURE IN SPAIN: RATIONALE AND CONSEQUENCES. 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
During this last decade there has been a growing concern about 
the rise of health care expenditure in advanced economies. In 
Spain, as in many other European countries, this concern has been, 
in practice, put in the context of a more general issue: the 
increase in the share of the Gross Domestic Product absorbed by public 
expenditure in the economy. Upon this matter we must (i) distinguish 
the inferences raised from value judgements and the tested features, 
on purely economic grounds, of observed reality (see, in this sense, 
the analysis presented in the Appendix to this Chapter), and (ii) we 
must recognize that, strictly speaking, the former phenomenon has 
appeared under different systems of health care provision in various 
countries. 
In relation to this concern, a set of control policies for expen- 
diture restraint has been recently proposed. This Chapter deals with 
the contribution that past and present policies for the control of 
health care expenditure in Spain have exerted and can exert on the 
efficiency motivation, which is the most commonly cited justification 
for a more cost-conscious allocation of resources in the Health Care 
Sector. 
(1) 
In introducing the contents of this Chapter, we will first present 
a picture of the Spanish Health Care system. In fact, while much of 
the work that follows may be of interest to other countries, attention 
is here focussed on the study of the specific budgetary policies for 
controlling health care expenditure in the Spanish context. Thus we 
will examine the system of resource allocation from the Central 
Health Authority mainly in the hospital sector - our research is 
limited to this area - and its potential contribution to the 
efficiency motivation in the allocation of health resources in the 
sector.. 
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1.2. THE GROWTH OF HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURE IN SPAIN AND THE 
RATIONALITY FOR ITS CONTROL 
As it can be seen in Table 1.1, health care expenditure has increased 
rapidly in Spain over the course of the last decade. This has been the 
case although it is not clear that today health policy objectives have 
come any closer to being achieved as a result of this growth. 
For instance, the observed levels of geographical inequalities in health 
care provision have not diminished (see Table 1.2. ) and at the same time 
the cost-quality relationship achieved is still seriously questioned. 
(2) 
TABLE 1.1 
Social Sec. Health Care Expenditure a 
Year Public Phameceutical Govern. GDP Implicit Gral. Ratios 
Health Care Expenditure Public price index 1/3 1/4 Expenditure Expendit. deflator GDP 
-1- % -2- % (*)-3- % -4- % (**) (mkt. pr. ) 
1967 20.78 - 10.57 - 213.04 - 1817.8 - 72.50 72.50 9.7 1.143 
68 95.55 23 12.86 3 4 275 1 
0 
2 12 
55: 85 
1 1ý. 
8 1: 
V 
32 65 28 18.44 6 . 
6 317. 93. 
70 . 44 06 35 23.43 27 307.24 11 2576.2 11 100.00 100.00 14.3 17.10 
71 . 74 56 29 30.73 31 374.48 22 2920.0 13 112.35 108.00 15.2 1.943 
72 . 76 33 35 37.46 22 418.40 12 3432.3 17 127.64 117.39 18.2 2.223 
73 . 105 09 38 49.28 32 483.44 15 4139.7 21 143.00 131.27 21.7 2.538 
74 . 133.70 27 57.21 16 589.14 22 5102.0 23 167.90 153.03 22.7 2.620 
75 11 177 32 68.05 19 689.47 27 6018.3 18 185.32 178.56 25.7 2.942 
76 . 221 93 25 81.36 20 824.88 20 7234.2 20 225.19 208.36 26.9 3.067 
77 . 319 65 44 94.87 17 1068.12 29 9178.4 27 273.77 255.92 29.4 
3.482 
78 . 410 78 29 104.67 10 1377.87 29 11332.8 23 372.29 307.10 29.9 
3.624 
79 . 441 E6 8 105.11 0.4 1668.89 21 13226.6 17 370.47 358.52 26.5 
3.340 
80 . 96 500 13 116.39 11 2047.23 23 14932.1 13 415.41 404.75 
24.5 3.354 
81 . 591 07 12 136.55 17 2360.45 15 16918.0 13 474.90 458.58 
25.0 3.493 
82 . 673 82 14 161.12 18 2902.30 23 19736.0 17 550.88 521.41 
23.3 3.414 
83 . 844.80 25 164.96 7. 3460.00 12 22778.0 15 628.01 582.291 
24.4 
1 
3.709 
375 3 
84b 875.22 4 149.95 -9. 3638.44 5 25934.7 13 
691.44 651.72 24. . 
(*) - PE excludes here transfers to other Public k ninistrations. (**) - Index of consumption prices of Health and Nrdical Services 
from the Spanish National Accounts. 
(Soc. Sec. Health Care Expenditure does include pharneceutical expenditure). 
a -Soc. Sec. Health Care Expenditure represented in 1980 and 
90.3% of total Public Health 
Care Expenditure and 68.3 % of Total Health Care Expenditure according to the Spanish 
National Accounts. 
b- Estimated figures. 
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TABLE 1.2 
Provincial inequalities in Health Care provision (1978-1979) 
Social Total no. Total no. of Life Nbrbidity Child 
Security of beds per physicians expectancy rate (per mortality 
coverage thousand (per thousand (years) thousand) rate (per (%) population population) thousand) 
Max. 93 8.22 3.01 73.8 9.74 22.68 
Min. 68 4.66 1.29 67.7 5.83 13.46 
Max. /Min. 1.37 1.76 2.33 1.08 1.67 1.68 
Source: INSALUD and own calculations. 
An analysis of the recent growth in health care expenditure 
illustrates that this has been one of the most dynamic items in 
public expenditure in Spain during the last two decades (1967-79). 
This past record, and the persistent claim for additional resources 
in the present age of financial restraint, is perhaps at the source 
of the general concern about health care expenditure and the interest 
in various features surrounding its control. 
Moreover, the following aspects give rise to our interest from 
a pure public economics point of view: 
(i) The nature of the output "health", and the internal 
characteristics of the health care industry in general 
(and the character of the technological advances in 
particular) which appear to be mixed with "output" 
and are usually mistaken for some of the other 
quality related aspects of its provision. 
(ii) The way in which the public provision of health care is 
actually organized in Spain on territorial and 
institutional grounds (as described in the following 
pages). 
Among the factors that contribute to (i) and (ii), we would 
point out here: 
a) the nature of the output provided, with its fundamental 
aspects of a public good nature 
(3), 
and its income elasticity 
of demand generally greater than one. 
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In fact, health care possesses characteristics of 'merit goods' 
based on the view that a citizen has an analienable right to health, 
but features other aspects: 
- its contribution to the economic productivity and community welfare; 
- its provision in a context of market failure, given the degree of 
externalities, lack of consumer information, etc; 
- its ultimate effects, strongly related to distribution goals. 
b) The characteristics of the output produced, with some of the 
features of the 'service' activities, such as: 
- its relatively labour intensive nature and its 'quality' proxies; 
- its limited range of variation in the elasticity of substitution 
between labour and capital inputs: generally technical innovation 
tends to move both factors in the same direction; 
- its inclusion in the category of service activities which manifest 
a general contemporaneous flow of consumption and provision. 
c) Its actual provision through decentralized units under the 
domain of professional influences, with the supply influenced 
by demand and marked by the presence of vested monopolistic 
interests in the sector. Combined they make for frequent 
assertions about behavioural inefficiency, unnecessary util- 
ization, treatments of dubious value and waste. 
In order to put our principal interest in the appropriate 
context, we will provide in the following section an introductory 
picture of the Spanish Health Care system. 
1.3. AN OVERALL DESCRIPTION OF THE SPANISH HEALTH CARE SECTOR. 
The Spanish Health Care Sector is predominantly publicly 
financed with the public sector accounting for a little over 
70% of total health care consumption. 
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TABLE 1.3 
A picture of the Spanish Health Care Sector 
Total Health Care provision 
- from which public consumption on Health services represent. . . 72% 
of which Social Security institutions ............ . 60% 
of which Central Administration (Army and Education 
Departments). ... . 6% 
of which Local Public Sector ................. . 6% 
Social Security institutions 
- Revenues financed by employers and employees contribution ... . 85% (this component is being reduced) 
- Revenues financed from direct State transfers (increasing) .. . 15% 
- Expenditure on Health Care .................. . 30% 
from which INSALUD - Central Authority represents ...... . . 87% 
Hospital Health Care provision 
-PS involvement in total inpatient cape (number of beds) ... . 64% 
from which INSALUD owns directly ............... . 
42% 
and under private-public agreement .............. . 
22% 
- Social Security Health care expenditure on inpatient 
care (over total) ...... . 54% from which INSALUD own hospitals ............... . 
40% 
and under private-public arangement ............. . . 
14% 
- Population Coverage (total) ................. . . 
85% 
in terms of inpatient cases (over total) ........... . 
73% 
Hospital Care Units 
- "Health Residence': standard 
hea(Uh care across the country 
involve 50% of total INSALUD Hospital expenditure 
imply 53% of total INSALUD own beds 
- "Health Cities": more sophisticated 
teaitk care at a regional level 
- "National Centres": some few specialized hospitals 
(Tuberculosis, elc. ) 
Source: Spanish National Accounts; National Institute of Statistics (If 
and INSALUD data. 
(1Q7Q) 
Some International comparisons (1978) 
Public Expenditure Total Health Public Health Private Health 
Consumption Consumption Consumption 
EE. UU 33.1 8.62 1.14 7.48 
France 45.2 7.10 - - 
Italy 46.1 5.75 3.30 2.45 
Denmark 50.6 6.70 - - 
U. K. 43.7 5.10 4.50 0.60 
Spain 29.3 5.20 4.00 1.20 
Source: National Accounts 0ECD countries (1978). 
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From Table 1.3 it can be seen that the Spanish Health Care sector 
is dominated largely by the hospital sector. In fact, hospital 
expenditure absorbs a large proportion of public and private health 
care spending and, as in many other industrilized countries, expenditure 
on inpatient care has been the fastest growing component of total health 
care expenditure over the last ten to twenty years. Its expansionary 
evolution in Spain can be seen in Table 1.4. 
TABLE 1.4 
The evolution of Hospital Health Care Services in Spain (1963-1981) 
year number of nurrter of number of ratio health number of number of number of 
centres beds personel personel/beds physicians nurses ancilary 
workers 
1963 1561 141259 58616 0.41 14416 25370 18830 
1971 1332 157150 117123 0.74 2387 47989 45347 
1976 1229 194097 214881 1.11 40939 104465 67255 
1981* 1054 193895 278582 1.44 52185 140382 81912 
year ratio beds/ ratio beds/ 
physcicians nurses 
1963 8.8 5.2 
1971 6.6 3.3 
1976 4.7 1.9 
1981* 3.7 1.4 
Source: National Institute of Statistics (INE) and own composition. 
*- Last year available ("Encuesta de Establecimientos sanitarios en regimen de 
internado") 
- The hospital sector. 
The hospital sector represents half of total Social Security Health 
Care exepnditure. Public sector involvement in inpatient care represents 
almost two thirds of the existing beds, three quarters of which are 
owned by the National Institute of Health - (INSALUD) 
(4) 
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the rest being managed under agreements (or "conciertos")with other 
hospitals, privately owned or dependent upon other public institutions. 
The private sector is thus reasonably prominent in a system of health 
care provision predominantly of the public type. Indeed, the private 
sector accounts almost for 30% of total health care consumption, a 
little over 45% of the hospitals, and about 17% of all beds and 
16% of the total manpower in the sector. 
In short, the public and private sectors co-exist in the Spanish 
Health Care system. One remarkable behavioural feature of this 
structure is the phenomenon of "pluriempleo": i. e. Spanish physicians 
can hold appointments simultaneously in the public and private sectors. 
This is not unusual, and holds true for most physicians in Spain. 
Statistics from INSALUD (see Table 5) indicate that Spanish doctors 
hold on average 2.4 appointments, 1.3 of which are in the public 
sector. In addition, a recent survey showed that, on average, 
62.1% of doctors have more than one job in the health care sector. 
(5) 
TABLE 1.5 
The Distribution of Spanish physicians according to the place of work 
and working time (hours/day). 
type of job Proportion Working Number of Percentage 
of time per jobs physicians 
physicians physician 
Social Security 
Private practice 
Private insurance 
Public Medical Serv. 
Other public 
institutions 
Other private 
institutions 
81% 4.3 one 
58% 3.4 two 
42% 2.2 three 
24% 3.0 four 
18% 4.3 five or more 
17% 3.0 (no answer) 
240% 8.4 
35.8% 
34.7% 
19.7% 
6.1% 
1.6% 
2.1% 
Source: "Investigacidn sobre la Asistencia Farmaceutica en Espana", 
INP 1977. 
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This phenomenon of so called "pluriempleo" has never been fully 
challenged (at least until the present proposed reforms) 
(6) 
by the 
public Health Authorities. This aspect of the Spanish Health Care 
Sector - whether it really is a cause of the relative importance of 
the private sector or whether the consequence of its existence are 
open to debate - will be subsequently considered when we examine 
the rationalisation of the health care sector in Spain, but it must 
be borne in mind in the ensuing discussion concerning hospital 
efficiency. 
In addition to this behavioural aspect of the health care 
system, some other aspects of the hospital organization and funding 
of the system need to be considered, which may prove to be relevant 
to the management of the whole sector. These-are explored below. 
1.3.1. The Hospital Health Care Sector in Spain: its organisation 
and funding. 
The organisation of the hospital public sector in Spain can be 
described by the following stylised facts: 
(i) Its organisation is strongly centralized not otherwise well 
supported by an efficient hierarchical network for its management. 
(7) 
Indeed, INSALUD is a highly centralized Institute. Rules are executed 
at the provincial and institutional level by politically responsible 
bureaucrats (e. g. Provincial Delegates and Hospital Directors) and 
under a hierarchical set of formal authorisations and innocuous 
controls. However, political changes have traditionally interfered 
with the running of its structures. Financial policies depend 
separately on the funding Authority (the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Security) and the managing Authority (the Ministry of Health 
and Consumption). 
(8) 
(ii) Obsolete regulation rules the internal organization of 
the hospitals. 
(9) 
Most of these rules refer to the nineteen sixties 
and they reflect an authoritarian regime and a non-participative 
organization. In addition, the workings of its structures are 
hindered by corporatist attitudes, facing a more flexible 
management. This regulation gives, moreover, absolute predominance 
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to the self-interested 'agents' in the sector with regard to the 
decentralized stages of the decision-making process. 
(iii) In more general terms, eligibility for health care 
coverage of the Spanish population is still restricted. 
(10) 
In 
addition, as explained before, the 'compatibility' principle 
between the private and medical practices enjoys general acceptance 
amongst Spanish physicians. 
(iv) Some changes have been proposed during the last year 
(1983) in accordance with the desire to implement a National Health 
Service type of health care provision. These system changes try to 
tackle in the former field, the obsolete regulation concerning 
working conditions in the sector by allocating greater autonomy at 
the regional and institutional level, to face the singularity of the 
semi-administrative contractual nature of the physicians' working 
status, and to reinforce greater discipline in the fulfilment of 
their contractual duties. These changes are being assisted by 
rising unemployment amongst young medical professionals, which seems 
to have broken the formerly compact corporative behaviour of the 
medical organization - with respect, in particular, to the existing 
level of "pluriempleo" amongst some professionals in the sector. 
(v) In addition to the organizational-behavioural factors 
described, the nature of funding in the hospital sphere has supported 
the absence of concern for a more cost-conscious management of the 
resources in the sector. In fact, as we will see in the next sub- 
section, the current method of revenue allocation of resources from 
the Central Health Authority to the hospital units has not provided 
an explicit and objective financial constraint with which questions 
of operational efficiency in the hospital sector should be in 
principle confronted. 
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1.3.2. Outline of the revenue allocation process in the Health 
Care Sector in general. 
The mechanism of revenue allocation to the decentralized 
health care units (the providers of services) can be analysed 
in three stages: 
a) in relation to the determination of the global sum of 
expenditure available to the Health sector in general; 
b) in relation to the distribution of monies to each health 
care subsector in particular (say curative vs. preventive care, 
hospital vs. ambulatory care, inpatient vs. outpatient treatment); 
and, finally, c) in relation to the distribution amongst the 
specific units charged with the provision of that particular form 
of health care. 
The first decision is usually faced at the Governmental level 
after inter-ministerial negotiation between the Ministry of Finance 
and the Ministry of Health (i. e. equivalent to the role of the 
British 'Public Expenditure Survey Committee'), taking into account 
the aggregate expenditure figures of the joint decisions from all 
Departments. This planning or forecasting exercise can be carried 
out in accordance with some explicit factor (existing public 
pressures, political lobbies, etc. ), or fixed guidelines (such as 
the percentage rise of the GDP). The control problem here can 
obviously be located in the need, finally, to adjust the total 
amount of resources available to the set of aggregate decentralized 
claims by the subsidiary units charged with service provision. 
The second decision is solved at the Department of Health 
level, and is influenced by the politics of the Party Manifesto, 
so that health care system as a whole becomes in some way a 
reflection of the philosophy of the party in power. 
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Finally, the third step in the decision-making process, and 
the one in which we are mostly interested here, refers to the way 
in which the previously settled amount is to be distributed amongst 
the decentralized units-providers of the services within each 
particular subsector of health care. 
In countries with a certain degree of decentralization, an 
initial distribution in favour of the States or Regional Authorities 
usually precedes the final allocation of resources, although the 
criteria for the manner of assignment has to be determined in 
principle in a fashion consistent with the implementation of 
globally-stated planning policies. 
Demographic variables - such as population, number of persons 
affilliated, or beneficiaries in the region, are mostly considered 
in this intermediate stage, with account taken of some territorial 
or social inequality factors. 
(12) 
However, in practice, other 
implicit criteria may also be present, such as those based on pure 
incrementalistic patterns, political lobbies, public minimization 
of complaints, or some other "passing money around" element - 
which offer a generous treatment one year and restrictive the next. 
Whenever no explicit criteria are set for the latter re- 
distribution, the previous years' expenditure or what has already 
been actually spent in the current year take on an unsystematic 
nature: one which in reality leads to some form of cost-based re- 
imbursement. This may fail to translate the financial environment 
of resource limitation into the internal behaviour of health 
organizations in order to give the agents an incentive for 
improving performance over time. 
Most of these features will be found in the system of budget 
'coverage' for hospital expenses in Spain. 
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1.4. THE SYSTEM OF BUDGET COVERAGE FOR HOSPITAL EXPENSES IN SPAIN. 
The hospital sector in Spain is centrally funded. No de- 
centralized stages for the planning and allocation of health 
resources on a regional basis exist (although this system is bound 
to disappear in the future as the decentralization process becomes 
more wide spread). 
(13) 
In this context, the decentralised hospital unit network has 
been managed under a type of bureaucratic pattern, typical of a 
hierarchical administration. INSALUD Central Authority, built 
as a separate institute for management within the Department of 
Health and Consumption, has ruled the provision of inpatient care 
with a set of instructions, reinforced by the support of the 
Provincial Delegated Authorities. 
The central funding of the decentralised units encharged of 
inpatient care provision is set up, at least theoretically, within 
an interacting framework, upon which a prospective system of 
revenue allocation of their budgets is meant to be based. In 
actual fact, hospital budget requests follow in outline an 
administrative sequence from preliminary proceedings, central 
approval and decentralized execution, up to the final budget 
settlement. 
However, as we will see in the next pages, the results have 
come to be based, in practice, on a retrospective system, or cost- 
based reimbursement, on the basis of the reported actual expenses, 
which ultimately results in already-incurred expenditure being re- 
imbursed. 
1.4.1. The INSALUD funding of the public hospitals. 
For the sake of a brief description of the_INSALUD Central 
funding system, three different stages can be distinguished re- 
garding the final determination of the allocation of revenue for 
hospital expenses. 
-17- 
1. The determination of the wage settlement and hence the 
hospital wage bill; 
2. the allocation of the overall hospital revenues; and, 
3. the final settlement of the executed budget, as the actual 
expression of the financial constraint. 
1. The wage settlement 
Since almost 67% of total hospital expenses are manpower costs, 
the prior wage settlement is bound to have a crucial importance. 
This step could be expected to be framed, in principle, as a 
bargaining exercise under the postulated terms of a bilateral mono- 
poly between INSALUD (the main employer in the hospital sector) and 
the representative organisations of the hospital staff: mainly the 
Medical Association and the respective branches of the two biggest 
Spanish Trade Unions. 
For historical and institutional reasons not pursued further, 
no explicit bargaining has occurred in the sector for these purposes 
until recent years. 
(14) 
In fact, hospital agents have accepted 
rather passively an unfavourable central wage determination which 
has left wage increases far behind the general rise in the cost of 
living (as shown in the second chapter). 
(15) 
In order to understand 
the passive attitude of physicians, until recently absent from a 
bargaining table, we have to consider the whole system of budget 
reimbursement. In fact, the system has allowed, ultimately, a 
strategic 'retreat' from the physicians' main interest towards the 
domain of influence of other variables which have also decisively 
affected real wages, in precisely those fields of hospital activity 
where central audits and monitoring controls have been especially 
weak: 
(16) 
i. e. the real time devoted to public activity and its 
compatibility with private sector practice. This point will be 
further analysed in the next Chapter. 
As a result, this type of income policy approach to hospital 
expenditure restraint has achieved some short term results, 
relatively satisfactory as far as the Central Board of Hospitals is 
concerned, although it has left the real problems of the sector un- 
faced. 
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In sum, the process for the determination of the wage bill starts 
with the settlement at the beginning of each budgetary year by the 
Health Department of the level of wages and other related payments per 
each hospital staff category. Wage rates are mainly attached to jobs 
rather than to workers, with no relation in principle to the external 
wage level in the private sector nor the agents' levels of perform- 
ance, but to a complex set of administrative procedures, based mostly 
on job allocation, which is to some extent dependent on seniority in 
the buraucratic hierarchy and experience, together with some other 
formal qualifications. 
If one assumes significant job skills are acquired simply by 
experience on the job, this solution in favour of a wage hierarchy 
can, in theory, reduce potential bargaining costs, particularly in 
those sectors with high information assymmetries. 
However, it also provides a constant perverse incentive 
structure, since it is based on job promotion for life (mostly 
achieved by not "blotting ones copybook"), and, in simple terms, 
this may perhaps explain the general lack of incentives for efficient 
performance over time. 
2. The allocation_of hospital revenues. 
A second step in the process of budget reimbursement is given 
by the allocation_of the overall revenue to_the_hospital units, 
once the wage bill is known. 
Basic proceedings start with requests put forward by each 
Hospital Board, and usually submitted six months in advance of the 
beginning of the fiscal year, to INSALUD - Provincial Authorities. 
These 'bids' or 'Anteproyectos' are budget forecasts statutorily 
based on the probable expenditure in the current year, adjusted 
for cost increases as experienced during recent years, or as 
anticipated from expected hospital activity. In reality, they 
contain much pure guesswork. 
For each item of expenditure, the forecasted figure has to 
. be accompanied by the 
'probable expenditure in the present year'. 
It is then easy to understand how these amounts are going to be 
seen as the basis for an increnentalistic pattern instead of the 
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result of a full expenditure reapprisal. 
Formally, the Hospital Board has to assess whether the 
current evolution of hospital expenses will continue in a similar 
direction and volume, allocating the expected cost increases 
correspondingly. 
A statement of proposals (or'Memoria') must justify these 
considerations for each of the so called 'spending elements', 
e. g. in terms of the relative price increases, output or work- 
load changes, or any related quality improvement with respect to 
the previous year's amounts. But, in practice, most of these 
'Memorias' reflect no more than a general guess about the fore- 
casted evolution of past expenditures, with little or no justifi- 
cation concerning their increases. 
In general terms the forecasting exercise has two parts: 
one relates to current expenditure (or Economic Plan) and one to 
new investment (or Plan of Needs). Standarized procedures for 
the presentation of information (up to 13 Appendices) are 
requested for these purposes. They are essentially constructed 
according to certain administrative formalities rather than 
forming a specific functional design for budget evaluation 
objectives. A set of guidelines are issued annually for this, 
providing codes, definitions, delimiting the scope of the 
particular items to be included, certain criteria for arithmetical 
calculations (e. g. fixing the coefficients and estimated values 
for the depreciation policies), and pointing out priorities for 
the replacement of investments, rebuilding and equipment. 
(17) 
Manpower expenses are determined according to the staff 
levels approved by the Health Department and the announced wage 
settlement. The rest of the budgetary items (medical and non- 
medical inputs) are left to the hospital's discretion. Hospital 
expenditure on outpatient services are formally separated from 
overall hospital spending. Since no clear-cut criteria exist for 
ascertaining this service, it is left to each hospital administrator 
to establish the size of this service by the use of ratios such as 
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the share of manpower time devoted to outpatient activities, 
inputed utilization of certain material inputs to specific 
departments, etc.. This then introduces the question of data 
reliability for analysis in this field. 
In summary, the budget request is formally adopted in May 
by the Governing Board of the Hospital and transmitted by the 
end of May at the latest to the Provincial Delegation of 
INSALUD for the initial proceedings. From this moment, the 
rest of the budget iteration involves no more than some admin- 
istrative controls at the provincial level. Although INSALUD 
Provincial Boards are in theory charged with the responsibility 
of examining those assessed criteria, forecasting the evolution 
of current expenditure (e. g. with regard to the utilization of 
human and material inputs) and checking whether the bases of the 
distribution of planned hospital expenditure are consistent with 
respect to the priorities assigned, nothing seems, up to the 
present, to validate the fulfilment of these duties. In fact, 
the Provincial Services of General Accountancy (or 'Intervenciön'), 
with few resources and lacking explicit standards for evaluation 
purposes, have supervised the fulfillment of the budget instructions 
through a rather cursory glance, rubber-stamping the set of budget 
proposals and passing them up to the INSALUD Provincial Director 
for formal approval and, to some extent, further political support 
for the rest of the budget iteration. In this sense, it should 
be noted that until quite recently, Provincial Directors, although 
appointed by the Central INSALUD Authority, have more or less been 
direct representatives of the predominant sectorial interests in 
the province. In this way, they have acted as supporters of any 
spending proposal raised from the hospital health units in the 
province. 
Once the 'Anteproyectos' are signed by the INSALUD Provincial 
Authority, they become budget projections and are sent to the Sub- 
General Direction of Administration of INSALUD, and 'Service of 
Budget and Expenditure Evaluation'. Subsequently, they are 
considered for approval. 
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Some minor legal administrative controls and statistical 
accountancy procedures have been employed up to this stage for 
purposes of expenditure control, prior to the final aggregation, 
in order to confront the budget proposals with the overall 
figures available for spending in the Hospital Health Care 
Sector. In this field, the discretion of INSALUD Authorities 
has been almost complete. Until recent years (1978-79) all 
these expenditure proposals seem to have been approved quasi- 
automatically. However, increasing concern about health 
expenditure growth has, more recently, made that approval 
conditional upon reaching certain targets, mainly linked to the 
global growth of the economy(18) or to some other general 'cash 
limit' stated for anti-inflationary purposes. 
The absence of a more complete budget appraisal and ex- 
penditure evaluation on which to link those general restraints 
might well have led to chaos. But as we explain intte next few 
paragraphs, no external disruption has apparently occurred. In 
fact, the method has, overall, sufficient mechanisms to weaken 
any direct effect of those administratively set "prospective" 
constraints on the hospital activity. 
3. The budget settlement 
The approval of the budget has not been felt as the final 
expression of the financial constraint according to which the 
hospital activity has to be carried out. 
Although there have been constant warnings from the INSALUD 
Direction Board that 'no expenditure can be made above the figures 
approved and credited for each specific budgetary item' and that 
'prudence and balance have to be paramount in conducting the 
budget execution' 
(19) 
, the overrunning of the 
budget has been a 
rather common practice in most Spanish hospitals. 
No specific pattern can be demonstrated at this stage in the 
sequential process of budget submission, approval and execution, 
with reference to their initial and final outcomes in terms of 
the level of reduction, degree of overrun and the future use of 
any of the former budget bases for new planned expenditure. 
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However, some tentative hypotheses will be formulated in the course 
of this research about the nature of this incrementalistic pattern. 
1.4.2. Tentative changes and the need of the hospital budgetary reform. 
A proof of the fragile situation which involves the budget 
procedures today in Spain can be seen in the continuous changes in 
the technical formalities required for the elaboration of the budget 
requests, rather than the establishment of a more solid basis in 
which a consistent evaluation policy should be permanently grounded. 
For example, following some tentative reforms in 1980 which 
took steps towards Program Budgeting, INSALUD Authorities today 
request, in an optional way, three different levels of expenditure 
forecasts: for each elementary "program unit", a 'minimum', 
'current' and 'additional' level of effort can be set down according 
to the planned expenditure targets. 
(20) 
The minimum level is defined as the amount "strictly indispensible" 
to run the hospital programs as statutorily regulated; normal levels 
allow for additional amounts, once it is proved the possibility of 
"reaching a more favourable combination of means for a greater 
output"; and, finally, the maximum level requires the consequences 
of the additional allocation of resources in terms of the quantity 
and quality effects achieved with respect to the initial levels of 
provision to be shown. Corresponding to this approach, a table of 
priorities amongst programs and levels of effort has to be put 
forward in a consistent fashion with the targets already stated 
in the "Memorandum of Intent". But given the nature of the 
exercise, to the best of our knowledge, few Hospital Boards seem 
to have opted for this system. They argue, in fact, that "the 
level of effort required for the completion of a request for each 
of those budget levels is very high and the expected probability 
assigned today to something other than the allocation of the minimum 
amounts does not make it worth-while". 
21) 
In the absence of a complete reform of the hospital budgetary 
methods, the system runs under the influence of the pressures 
exerted by hospital Directors on the basis of current levels of 
expenditure. In theory, in order initially to prevent such results, 
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Hospital Boards are ordered to follow the budget execution monthly. 
But if under"exceptional circumstances", problems of overspending 
appear, the Board is entitled, "exceptionally", to present, once 
for all, additional financial proposals. Although the justifi- 
cation of the causes involved must be "clear, concise and 
sufficient" and it is reminded that "no pressumption should exist 
of automatical approval", this stipulation recognizes and provides 
a formal procedure to contend with common budgetary overruns. 
Lobbies and public pressures are thereafter exercised for the 
full coverage of the over-expenses incurred and for the recognition 
of the current expenditure levels for future requests. The final 
outcome depends on subjective factors such as the forecasting- 
mistakes of the hospital administrators, the personal abilities of 
the hospital directors to achieve additional funds, the risk- 
aversiveness of the hospital staff when commiting additional 
amount to those initially budgeted, the influencial power of some 
local Authorities, etc. 
In conclusion, the system comes to operate, in practice, as 
a retrospective reimbursement. In this context it is hard to 
think of any general motivation for a cost-conscious management, 
other than that derived from certain variables "ad hoc". 
The efficiency implications of the process will be analysed 
in the next section. 
1.5. EFFICIENCY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM AND ALTERNATIVES. 
In brief, this description of the allocation of revenues to 
the Spanish public hospitals illustrates, in our view, the core 
of the problems involved in the present system of health care 
delivery. That is, the absence of a proper budget restraint from 
which operational efficiency and a cost-conscious management of 
resources could be expected. 
In other words, the way in which the revenue allocation 
process operates in the Spanish hospital sector would explain the 
lack of systematic incentives for an efficient performance in the 
sector. 
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In this context, the research described in subsequent chapters 
is explicitly orientated towards answering the following relevant 
questions with regard to the analysis of the operational character- 
istics of the hospital health care sector in Spain, with the 
ultimate aim of providing an outline for its reform. They are: 
a) Why should the patient covered by public assistance be concerned 
about utilization costs instead of the "best" quality care? 
b) What reasons has the physician to select a less costly 
alternative to what he considers a proper (but expensive) mode of 
hospital treatment? 
c) Why should a hospital be managed cost-consciously considering 
its revenues are obtained from a central reimburser who pays without 
regard to costs? 
1.5.1. The pressures for change in the budget financial arrangements 
and existing alternatives. 
We have seen so far that as the budget revenue allocation 
methods have been operated in the past in Spain, no effort for 
efficiency can be expected from rational self-interested agents in 
the sector. 
However, the current cost-based retrospective reimbursement 
system has been distorted during the last five years. In fact, 
external pressures from the general economic situation have imposed 
a tough financial restraint on public expenditure and on health 
care expenditure in particular. This is, moreover, being pursued 
at a time when the political aim is that of extending the coverage 
of health care provision to the entire Spanish population by the 
construction of the Spanish National Health Service. There seems 
little doubt that in order to succeed on both fronts, a serious 
effort for expenditure rationalisation will have to be made. 
(22) 
This effort for expenditure rationalization that accompanies 
policies of financial restraint is, by no means, a feature unique 
to the Spanish Health Care System. Identical proposals can be 
found in several cost-containment policies put forward by different 
countries. UNIVEg 
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In general terms, these policies try to tackle any of the 
following three elements involved in cost increases in health care: 
(i) consumers' behaviour. A common view is that the presence 
of consumers' full insurance and the absence of prices are the 
"causa generandi" in a demand-pushing model leading to cost 
increases. In this context, policies which insert financial 
motivation - together, in some cases, with others that influence 
the supply side - and consumer education for a behavioural change 
for a more appropriate use of the Health Care System, have been 
proposed under the form of cost-sharing propositions (coinsurance, 
charges and deductibles) of the type of the United States 
'Consumer Choice Health Plan' of 1978. 
(ii) Demand induced supply of the agents providing health care. 
Here the concern is with the absence of financial motivation at the 
micro levels of the decision-making process and the lack of training 
of health agents as effective managers of health resources as the 
main factor in a cost-pulling model of cost increases. The cost- 
containment policies proposed usually try to relate performance, and 
the allocation of overall or specific responsibility in resource 
utilization, with a fixed financial constraint, and they introduce 
some type of incentive behavioural change of health care agents. 
We can note here the present policies in the U. K. on depart- 
mental and clinical budgeting, and the implementation of basic or 
intensive training on the economics of health resources. Other 
policies in this field try to control directly the utilization of 
the inputs available: for instance, labour policies on manpower 
increases of the French type and programs of wage control 
(US 'Economic Stabilization Program', or the Spanish type of 
incomes policy), non-labour inputs and major investment (planning 
equipment and the US 'Certificate of Needs', control of technological 
innovations of the West Germany type); and with reference to some 
other factors in an operationally-related approach, regarding, 
for instance, input utilization, appropriateness of admissions and 
continued stay through Utilization Review Policies (such as the US 
Professional Standard Review Organization, Second Surgical Opinion 
Programs, etc. ) 
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(iii) finally, and more generally, expenditure rationalization 
policies attempt to tackle the financial environment in which Health 
Care delivery is organized and, specifically, the particular system 
of provision. These policies try to implement at the institutional 
level some major changes in the way in which resources are allocated; 
in the direction of a clearer revenue planning, prospective funding 
or any other initially: commited reimbursement policy. They pursue 
ultimately the goal of translating the external financial constraints 
into the institutional performance by forcing the implementation of 
managerial techniques (whichever they are at the disaggregated 
level) in the decision-making process. In this vein, we can point 
out some revenue allocation strategies such as vertical budgeting 
(i. e. pre-paid group practices, pre-fixed rate settings and target 
ceilings) and horizontal budgeting methods (from intra-group perform- 
ance comparisons); in both cases, at clinical, departmental or global 
budgetary levels, among others. 
It is still difficult at this stage to offer a full validity 
test with regard to the mechanisms through which the former factors 
are supposed to operate in each of those policies. Probably, these 
sort of tests are impossible if our aim is to derive extrapolative 
conclusions to apply to systems other than those for which they were 
designed. 
In the next section, we will examine how the general financial 
restraint on public expenditure has been translated in practice 
into the Spanish Hospital sector, which elements of rationality have 
been put forward, how this restraint has operated up to the present, 
which effects can be forecasted from it, and which alternative methods 
are most consistent with the aims for which these policies are designed. 
1.5.2. Current policies for financial restraint in the Spanish 
hospital sector and the efficiency motivation target. 
The historical record illustrated in Table 1 shows that Health 
care expenditure has been expanding rapidly over and above the 
general evolution of the other economic indicators up to the end of 
the last decade. In fact, the total consumption of health services 
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as a proportion of the GDP rose from 3.76 in 1976 to 5.93 in 1978. 
However, 1978 seems to point to the end of this expansionary age, 
and the beginning of the imposition of strong financial restraints 
in hospital sector expansion. 
In Spain, macroeconomic constraints on public expenditure have 
been translated into the health care field mostly through the im- 
plementation of general cash limits and "across-the-board" increases 
with respect to past expenditure amounts. 
These financial policies for expenditure restraint have been 
justified initially by "efficiency principles". This rationale 
has been adopted from the assumption that the resulting imposed 
cost-savings must imply parellel improvements in resource utilization. 
By holding "output" constant, this leads to a rather automatic 
result in "efficiency terms", which follows from the new balance 
achieved between expenditure and the constrained revenue reimbursed. 
(23) 
Whether these policies imposing a general "across-the-board" 
increase can actually help achieve improvements in efficiency is a 
different matter. 
Firstly, what is to be understood for efficiency in this context 
is not always clear. If the former conventional approach is 
considered - roughly speaking that which consists of doing "the same 
but cheaper" - it needs to be proved that the same outcome is 
actually achieved, and for this purpose we would be best advised to 
account for the varying circumstances from which this result can be 
plausibly expected. If the "same" refers to what someone else does, 
it needs to be proved that similar circumstances are involved in the 
comparison, especially if, from the alternative provisions compared, 
we expect identical performance. 
(24) 
Although the main attention 
has shifted from the assumption rather than the proof of such 
results, these questions still remain relatively unexplored in the 
literature. 
Secondly, what this policy for expenditure restraint in fact 
does is to validate the past level of hospital expenses, since it 
comes to use them as the bases for future projections. We have seen 
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that those bases are the result of factors such a budget revenue 
allocation grounded in the current retrospective system. There- 
fore, this is a very weak basis for expenditure rationalisation, 
since it reflects the consequences of a perverse set of institutional 
arrangements. Past levels of expenditure cannot provide a sound 
present base for an expenditure rationalisation policy projected to 
the future. 
Thirdly, the implementation of a general cash-limit with 
"across-the-board" increases tends to deal with potential "unequals" 
as "equals". In this sense, it penalizes former cost-conscious 
spenders and rewards high spenders, which are left relatively better- 
off after the implementation of the policy, given the different basis 
of application of those general increases. 
As a result, this policy introduces questions of comparative 
justice and a certain dislocation effect in favouring the return to 
some strategic budgetary games in order that the initially prospective 
financial constraints can be evaded. 
Therefore, whereas past reimbursement policies have not 
provided any effective incentive motivation for a cost-conscious 
management of health resources, present policies for expenditure 
restraint in the hospital health care field fail equally in ad- 
dressing the efficiency problems in whose name they are usually 
justified. In short, "across-the-board" increases based on self- 
reported actual costs, in a context of inadequate monitoring and 
expenditure evaluation, cannot intrinsically contribute to the 
expenditure-rationalization targets, required if a serious and constant 
effort for improvement in the allocation of public resources is to be 
pursued in the hospital health care sector. Moreover, this policy 
introduces a set of distortions against a more rational basis for 
the development of hospital activity. 
1.6. SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER AND CONCLUSION 
This first Chapter has been devoted to an introduction of the 
system of health care provision in Spain and to focussing attention 
on the objectives of this thesis. For this purpose, at this initial 
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stage, we have pointed out a set of behavioural and organizational 
factors related to the provision of inpatient care in Spain, which 
are postulated to be at the root of the poor performance of the 
sector. 
As far as the former is concerned, we have focussed on the 
influence of the budget funding method on the allocation of hospital 
revenues, emphasizing its efficiency implications from a hospital- 
operational view. We could conclude from this that, in the presence 
of a cost-based reimbursement system, no incentive for a cost- 
conscious management of health resources can appear in any stage of 
the decision-making process involved in the utilization of the 
hospital resources. On the contrary, 'system inefficiency' becomes 
established in hospital performance and in current levels of ex- 
penditure, since they collect the record of the operational 
efficiency from the management of the hospital resources over time. 
As we will analyse in the Second Chapter, in designing 
alternative budgetary techniques as a means of promoting efficiency 
in the hospital sector we need to account not only for a different 
basis to that which results from the evolution of past expenditure, 
but also for the issue of "variable productivity". That is, we 
need to account for the existing levels of differential performance 
within the hospital sector in order that we may provide an efficiency- 
related benchmark for reimbursement. 
On both grounds, an alternative budget policy will be con- 
structed in this thesis, providing a more sensible extension of the 
global financial constraint imposed on the sector, and it is one 
that can be translated into the hospital decision-making process in 
a more cost-conscious management of health resources. 
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FOOTNOTES. 
(1) Here we should distinguish between the arguments for control 
of Public expenditure and those propositions for a pure 
expenditure restraint, or its simple reduction in real terms, 
given a submission to some more wider anti-inflationary policy 
targets. (See for these purposes the Appendix to this first 
Chapter). 
(2) See on this issue, "Seguridad Social". Papeles de Economia 
Espanola, no. 12/13.1982 (page 442). Obra Social ea 
Confederacion de Cajas de Ahorro; the so called "pink book" 
on Health Care in Spain: "La asistencia farmaceutica en 
Espana. Estudio Socio-econdmico sobre el conjunto de la 
asistencia sanitaria espanola". Instituto Nacional de 
Previsiön, Ministerio de Trabajo, Madrid 1977; or the small 
booklet of critical reports collected under the title of the 
'Black book of the Spanish Social Security': "Apuntes para un 
libro negro de la Seguridad Social" YUSTE GRIJALBA, Javier. 
Aka edit. 1982. 
(3) See in this line of argument A. CULYER, A. MAYNARD and 
A. WILLIAMS in "Alternative Systems of Health Care Provision: 
An Essay on motes and beams" in M. Olson (ed) "A New Approach 
to the Economics of Health Care. " A. E. I., Washington, 1981. 
(4) Organically, the "Instituto Nacional de la Salud" is a body of 
management depending on the Department of Health, but funded 
by the Department of Labour and Social Security - since, as 
noted before, the Social Security Scheme is still the main 
financial funder of public health care provision in Spain 
(although an 'out of taxation' coverage is today being proposed). 
(5) See further comments on the results of this survey in "Pluri- 
empleo y conciencia de paro en la profesion medica. " 
MARTIN LOPEZ Enrique. Revista Espanola de la Seguridad 
Social. 1982. 
(6) In this sense, what has been called the new 'Law of incompati- 
bilities' (Law 20/ 1982 of 9th June) views exclusively the 
cases of pluri-empleo within the Public Sector in which an 
identical professional possesses two jobs under identical time 
schedules M. 
(7) The National Institute of Health (INSALUD) was created in 
1977 as a Board of Management of the Social Security Health 
Care. In most of its functions, it replaces the old 
"Instituto Nacional de Prevision", framed up to that date 
within the Department of Labour and Social Security. 
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The specific position of the INSALUD can be seen in the following organization tree. 
National-level:, Department of j-lealth and Consumption 
Subsecretary of Consumption Sub fcretary of Health 
Institutional INSALUD` - -General Board 
Administration I` -Execut. Commissic 
of Health 
Provincial_Level: Territ orial Delegätions Provincial 
of the Department of Office -- -Execut. Commiss: Health and Consumption 
Local Level: Local Authorities ....... ...... Local Health Authorit: 
(8) The setting of the Health Care Administration has suffered several 
changes since the implementation of the first Social Security 
public Schemes (1942). In fact, most of the public health 
Administration was initially structured as a branch of the Home 
affairs Department. Later, , 
it was attached as a Section to 
the Department of Labour and Social Security. In 19771twas 
reorganized within the Department of 'Labour, Health and Social 
Security', to become, finally, a new and separate Ministry of Health 
and Consumption (Dec. 1981). Only during the Spanish Second 
Republique (1931-1936) existed a modern Department of Health as 
such. 
(9) In fact, the internal operational regulation (for the "Regimen, 
Gobierno y Servicios") of the Social Security Health Institutions 
was established in 1972. 
At the beginning of the same decade, the working conditions 
of physicians were regulated ("Estatuto Juridico del Personal 
Medico". 1971), of the Auxiliar Personnel (1973) and Ancillary 
workers (1971). All of these regulations result from the 
development of the Social Security Law of 1966. 
(10) In this sense is formulated the first draft of the "Anteproyecto 
de Ley General de Sanidad", January 84, as published in 'Tribuna 
Medica' no. 1018 (page 18-20). 
This new law tries to introduce openly a National Health 
Service system (art 1.2) under clear influences of the British 
and Italian experiences. 
(11) In this direction, the particular organization of the proposed 
National Health Service, according to the recently announced 
bill of Reform of the Hospital System (1984), is asserted. 
With regard to the proposed changes, Pedro Sabando, 
Subsecretary of Health, declared to an Spanish magazine 
quite recently: We are committed to have hospital physicians 
working exclusively in only one job. We understand however 
-32- 
that for doing this we need to remunerate properly those 
professionals according to their status in our society" ('Cambio 16no. 595). The proposed 'Law of Hospital Reform' follows similar lines. 
(12) See for this purpose the RAWP formula for England (1976) 
and the comments on its workings in the study of Townsend 
and Davidson (1982) on the Black Report (pages 146-151). 
(13) Only the Catalan autonomous Community today enjoys a full decentralization of health services. However, the final 
generalization of the process for the rest of the Spanish 
regions is purportedly to be concluded around the middle 
of 1986. 
(14) In principle, labour relations between INSALUD and the 
professionals in the public health care sector do not 
statutorily allow for explicit bargaining formulae for 
the determination of wages. In fact, only since 1982 
has a certain bargaining procedure been set up for these 
effects, although as far as legal obligations go, its 
strength is one merely of moral pressure. According to 
the Social Security Law of 1966, it is an internal ruling 
of INSALUD which entails the final wage settlement, with 
or without the agreement between the parties. 
(15) As we will further analyse the Second Chapter, the central 
wage settlement has imposed a tight approach to physician's 
wage increases which has left wages far behind the general 
rise in the cost of living. In-contrast, the auxiliary 
personnel reached higher increases, although from relatively 
lower basic levels. Ancillary workers, on the other hand, 
achieved a closer adjustment to the general increase in the 
cost of living. 
(16) In this way can be explained, for instance, the exaggerated 
growth of expenditure on overnight duties, which have been 
viewed by the physicians as a relatively easy way of com- 
plementing the basic wage level. This feature is widely 
recognized by the Administration (see "Medicina Amarga". 
'Cambio 16' no. 595). 
(17) For instance, the set of instructions for the 1982 budget 
fixes the rate of depreciation at 2.5% for buildings 
(such as valued at 31-XII-1980 by the proper central 
services) and at 15% for equipment and clinical material 
over the value of the second year prior to that of the 
budget forecast. 
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(18) Without apparent justiciation, the set of instructions from 
the INSALUD Central Board for the 1978 'Plan of Needs' 
budget allowed for a general maximum increase of 15% with 
respect to last year amounts. 
Otherwise it established that the total capital 
expenditure of 1979 should be equal to that approved for 
1978 adjusted for the general price increase. 
A general cash limit was openly put forward by the 
general Director of INSALUD for 1983 budgets. The 
purpose of limiting the growth of the health care expenditure 
to the general growth of the economy was also formally 
announced by the former Minister of Labour and Social 
Security (see "El Pais" 30th of January 1982). 
(19) From INSALUD internal instructions to the Hospital Boards 
(1979); in the same direction, the 'Real Decreto Ley' 
no. 24/1982 29 Deciembre, Disposicidn Adicional 4a. 
(20) The differences given as examples in the INSALUD initial 
instructions for 1983 offered the following illustrative 
benchmarks; Max/minim. level = 1i5; Normal/minim. level = 1.09; 
and Max/normal level = 1.06. 
(21) From different conversations with hospital administrators 
in Spain. 
(22) Thus we can describe the present budget process in Spain: 
"The experience shows, on one hand, the systematic utili- 
zation of a coefficient with an homogeneous increase for all 
the cases ...., and, on the other hand, that it is the 
persistence of some bureaucrats which makes for a final settle- 
ment over the amounts stipulated. In consequence, the so 
called 'budgetary rationalization' is still today an abstract 
concept in Spain" (in Alfonso GONZALEZ FINET and Angel DIEZ 
GONZALEZ. "Racionalizacion Presupuestaria: Algunas 
reflexiones". Revista de Hacienda Püblica Espanola, 1982. 
(23) Very germane, in our view, to this purpose is the paper of 
P. M. JACKSON "The public expenditure cuts: Rationale and 
consequences". Institute of Fiscal Studies. 1979. 
In the managerial applied field this approach can be seen 
in R. BANYARD "Efficiency savings in the NHS". ` Hospital and 
Health Services Review. Nov. /Dec. 1982, or in D. POYNTON, 
R. ALLAN and M. RIDLEY "Managing in a time of financial 
restraint" in Public Finance and Accountancy, Oct. 1983. 
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(24) In the Spanish Health care context, see the communcation 
of A. DURAN "Comparando lo incomparable", presented to 
the first meeting of the Spanish Health Economists' Group, 
Barcelona 1980. 
(25) It could however be argued that any form of tight overall 
financial restraint may reinforce the necessity to 
evaluate decisions by sharpening the debate about the need 
of choice. But this would not change the strength of our 
argument, since this form of constraint cannot sustain a 
long term effort for an efficiency improvement in the 
sector. In some way or another it is based on the actual 
performance and it does not intrinsically remove the 
perverse institutional incentives which surround the 
provision of the service. 
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APPENDIX. 
The increasing concern about the 'opportunity cost' of Public 
Sector involvement on the Spanish economy. 
Most of the literature supporting the need to impose a tighter 
restraint on public expenditure has been outlined from the ultimate 
argument that a rising 'opportunity cost' results from the Public 
sector involvement in the economic activity. 
This assertion has been mostly derived from some over simpli- 
field models (*) which postulate some type of economic interference 
between both private and public sectors in the economy. 
The question of the 'rising opportunity cost' and the derived 
need to restrain the relative increase in Public sector activities 
has to be initially distinguished from that more general view of 
the need to control public expenditure. For this second proposit- 
ion, theoretical support can be found from several economic views. 
In short, the neoliberal and monetarist approach develop those 
prepositions from some type of financial 'crowding-out' effect, 
whereas Keynesian and post-Keynesian theories view the need to 
control public expenditure as an important part of the management 
of the overall demand in the economy, or on the grounds of improv- 
ing the productive basis of the general economic performance. 
Therefore 'control' 
, and not 'pure restraint', make for the 
relevance of the distinction, with regard to their consequences 
in terms of the policies to be instrumented. 
-- It seems otherwise difficult to validate the specific 
mechanisms of the operation of those propositions on pure economic 
grounds and, therefore, any of the inferences derived on them 
about the potential rise of an opportunity cost from the relative 
'overdimension' of the Spanish health sector in particular. 
(*) - In this sense, those models which derive a real or financial 
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Looking at the evidence available - the historical evolution 
of the Spanish public expenditure, the approach to its real size, 
its manning policies and their corresponding effects on the revenue 
side of the public sector budgets (e. g. taxation elasticities with 
respect to GDP, charging policies, etc. ), as surveyed in the 
following pages - those assertions do not seem to be proved un- 
ambiguously; indeed such suggestions would actually run counter to 
most of the data we have. In fact, the Spanish Public Sector appears 
to be relatively small and takes a smaller share than could be pre- 
dicted on population, per capita income basis and type of economic 
system amongst the OECD countries (TAIT, 1982) - always assuming 
that these factors alone could be considered satisfactory guide- 
lines. 
In explaining a potential rise of concern around some notion of 
'opportunity cost' of the Public Sector involvement in the Spanish 
economy, we need to go back to some other fiscal-sociological factors 
which may have helped to engender this concern. Among these factors, 
we would probably find: (i) the implementation of some necessary 
taxation reforms in a period of economic decline (such as that of 
1974,1976 and 1980), facing mostly the set of unsatisfied social 
claims which have accompanied the new democratic process; and 
(ii) the argument of the traditional inefficiency of the Spanish 
bureaucracy. 
Nevertheless, and independent of the empirical support which 
could be argued for each of the former assertions, this phenomenon 
is likely to persist in an age of general economic recession (such 
as the present) and hence these inferences about the relative size 
of the Public Sector will arise. 
(... ) crowding-out, either from the interference of two sectors 
with different 'tradeability characteristics' or their more or 
less 'industrial', 'marketable', 'progressive' or 'productive' 
components are illustrative (see for example R. BACON and W. ELTIS 
(1976) and, originally, W. BAUMOL (1966)). 
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Some available evidence. 
The growth of Public expenditure in Spain has followed a 
broadly similar trend to that of other developing economies. 
Historically, public expenditure in current prices during the 
XXth century can be recorded under three main stages: 
a) A rather moderate expansion between 1900 and 1935, with an 
average increase of 6% although under some evolving fluctuations 
(particularly around the period of the First World War); 
b) a more generalized rise after the Spanish Civil War, up to the 
beginning of the 'Stabilization Program' (1959), with an average 
rate of growth close to 13%; and, finally, 
c) a more resolute increase, with rates of growth close to an 
average value of 17%, during the most recent period (1959-80). 
In constant prices, this general view changes little, except during 
the First War period and the post Spanish Civil War period, with no 
increases in real terms given the more rapid general increase of 
prices. 
The most relevant periods for our analytical purpose are the 
one which follows the 1957 Taxation Reform and lasts until 1974, 
and from the latter year to the present, since they accompany the 
main structural changes of the modern Spanish economy. 
As it can be seen in Table 1A, total expenditure increased 
relatively faster in Spain than in most other European countries, 
although obviously from lower initial levels. Certainly, this 
does not say very much about the concerned 'opportunity costs' of 
the Public sector involvement in the economy, since no account is 
made about the levels of services provided and the extended 
benefits from such activity. 
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This picture may give then a first indication of a relative 
'catching up' effort, raising revenue against the increasing public 
expenditure needs, particularly notorious in the period between 1972 and 
1976. Data availability does not allow, however, for a comparable 
study for a more recent period. 
However, the global evalution of Public Expenditure and Taxation 
ratios to G. D. P. can be pointed out: 
TABLE 3-A 
Public Expenditure/G. D. P. (%) 
1977 1978 1979 1980 
Spain 27.5 29.3 30.5 32.4 
Taxation/G. D. P. 
1977 1978 1979 1980 
36.5 27.1 28.3 28.6 
U. K. 44.1 43.7 43.5 44.6 39.4 38.2 39.0 40.4 
O. E. C. D. 37.7 38.2 38.6 39.4 35.0 35.1 35.9 36.8 
Source: O. E. C. D. Economic Outlook no. 32 December 1982. Paris O. E. C. D. 
The question of the real size of the Public expenditure growth has 
been raised recently by M. BECK (1976), accounting specifically for 
the notion of the relative price effect in public service activities. 
This effect may be defined here as the ratio between the average price 
increase of goods and services in the Public Sector over the price 
increase in the rest of the economy. 
Our results obtained by adopting Becks's approach to the real 
growth of the Spanish public expenditure are presented in Table 4A. 
Contrary to his conclusion with respect to the most developed 
economies (which indicates for the ätt years recorded an inflexion 
point in their real expenditure growth -hypothesis which was refined 
later (BECK, 1979) in assessing a real decline for the final 
consumption although with a real increase for the transfers, once a 
differential deflation is considered) - the Spanish case does not seem 
to support either a real decrease for the total figure nor for the 
final consumption. This result is otherwise more similar to 
PLUTA's findings (1981) for most of the developing countries studied 
by him. 
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TORT F4A 
Nominal and real perspective of Public Expenditure growth in_Spain_ 
Total government expenditure (including transfers 
from Social Security) 1968 1978 
in current prices a) Index of amount 100 971 
b) as % of GDP 15.7 27.5 
in constant prices (1970) 
a) Index of volume 100 286 
b) as % of GDP 15.7 22.8 
weighted deflator 100 469.4 
Government Consumption Expenditure (compensation 
of employees and intermediate consumption) 
in current prices a) Index of amount 100 791 
b) as % of GDP 8.6 12.5 
in constant prices (1970) 
a) Index of volume 100 238 
b) as % of GDP 8.6 10.4 
Deflator (government consumption expenditure) 100 496 
Government Transfer Expenditure (transfers, subsidies 
and Social Security benefits) 
in current prices a) Index of amount 100 1146 
b) as % of GDP 7.1 12.4 
in constant prices (1970) 
a) Index of volume 100 1146 
b) as % of GDP 7.1 12.4 
Deflator (private final Consumption expenditure) 100 443.5 
Gross Domestic Product 
in current prices a) Index of amount 100 364 
in constant prices (1970) 
a) Index of volume 100 161 
Deflator GDP 100 381 
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However, the evidence provides greater support to BECK's 
proposition about a differential trend in the rate of growth between 
the general Government final consumption and the current transfers. 
The present level of aggregation would not, however, make it an 
unambiguous conclusion to state that this differential trend in 
their growth already collects a supposed reaction to an adverse 
relative price effect with respect to the more controlable parts 
of Government consumption. In this sense, any potential veri- 
fication in the terms of the proposition about a 'taxpayer revoluttotl 
may be, in fact, misplaced. 
The exercise provides, above all, the ou Lu jaj, that any macro- 
economic analysis of the governmental budget constraint which tries 
to account for total expenditure with respect to some notion of a 
'tolerable level of taxation' needs to focus attention on the different 
categories of the public expenditure included: (i) the resource-using 
side of public expenditure (general) government final consumption and 
investment; (ii) debt interest payments and net lending; and (iii) 
current grants, subsidies and capital transfers, -more correlated to 
the exogenous general economic circumstances. 
Therefore, the question 'How justified is the argument about 
a rise of concern in the opportunity cost of the public sector 
involvement in the economy, is a question which cannot be justified 
today on economic grounds only. In the absence of appropriate 
measures in the overall incidence of the budget, we have tried to 
put that claim in context. We have seen, from the revenue side, some 
factors which may have affected, at least from a social-psychological 
point of view, potential changes in the state of this concern such as 
those resulting from some taxation changes carried out in a period of 
economic decline. However, no definitive answer seems today sensible 
concerning the accuracy of the bases of this concern, without accounting 
for the expenditure side of the public services provided and the degree 
of progressivity of the fiscal system as a whole. (See on this point 
J. K. GALBRAITH, 1981). 
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If the current pressures on Government expenditure 
in Spain, resulting from a greater attention to the unsatisfied social 
needs and from the negative effect due to the present general economic 
situation, are to be faced, it can be forseen that claims about an 
increasing opportunity cost from the 'public sector activity' seem 
bound to continue, at least for those economic groups mostly affected 
by the tax redistribution policies which will be required in order 
to finance that expenditure. 
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CHAPTERII 
THE ISSUE OF VARIABLE PRODUCTIVITY IN THE SPANISH HOSPITAL HEALTH 
CARE SECTOR: DEFINITION AND SOURCES. 
2.1. INTRODUCTION. 
In the first Chapter we studied the general setting of the 
question of system inefficiency in the performance of the Spanish 
hospital sector. In this second Chapter we will explore, the 
question of why, some hospitals appear to be more inefficient than 
others. 
The line of argument in this chapter starts from the 
recognition of some stylised factors concerning hospital variations 
in performance, its importance and the problems and caveats which 
appear in its analysis. Given our interest in studying the extent 
of their relevance against the current implementation of some general 
'across-the-board' strategies for financial restraint, we will review 
the existing literature on the subject, providing some basic defini- 
tions for a more consistent approach to the phenomenon of variable 
productivity. 
In the line of other behavioural studies in productivity in 
Public Sector analysis, we will focus on the role of the budget 
financial restraint in explaining the motivation for efficiency, 
and hence on its differential effects in terms of institutional 
performance, according to some basic behavioural postulates. 
A model of hospital behaviour suited to the Spanish context is 
presented in this chapter and some behavioural factors of potential 
relevance in explaining the existence of variable productivity are 
correspondingly pointed out. These factors, and their mechanisms 
of operation, are then analysed and to a certain extent validated 
according to the existing data available. In the conclusion of 
the chapter we argue the need for introducing major changes in the 
organisational framework and the financial arrangements existing 
today in the hospital sector, focussing on the direction of the 
research described in subsequent chapters. 
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2.2. STYLISED FACTORS CONCERNING VARIATIONS IN PERFORMANCE IN THE 
SPANISH HOSPITAL SECTOR. 
It was argued in the previous chapter that under a system of 
hospital revenue allocation based on retrospective spending, agents 
in the hospital sector have no incentive to manage resources in a 
cost-conscious manner. Furthermore, it was pointed out that existing 
policies for expenditure restraint which provide 'across-the-board' 
increases in hospital budgets, according to some externally imposed 
cash limits on the basis of hospital past expenses, cannot support 
a 'rational' constraint aimed at the improvement in the allocation of 
hospital resources. 
One strategy for encouraging cost-conscious management would be 
to undertake experiments to examine how efficient the hospital system 
could be made and, therefore, to provide a benchmark against which the 
present system could be compared. However, such a strategy, which 
involves the estimation of what the hospital could do under a set of 
trial-controlled circumstances - which are deemed to reflect ideal 
operating conditions - is likely to be highly costly and not practical 
in the present context (see Dillon, 1979, and Lusk and Lusk, 1979). 
Instead, attention will be focussed, in the present thesis, on the 
potential efficiency motivation raised from instrumenting a budget 
control policy, aimed to reduce variations in the relative efficiency 
of hospitals, through a prospective revenue allocation system. 
Variations in performance in the Spanish Hospital Sector. 
It is clear that as a result of the set of 'perverse' financial 
arrangements which surround hospital reimbursement in Spain, one 
could expect that the system in its entirety to be inefficient. 
But it is also becoming increasingly recognized that some parts of 
the system seem to behave in a less efficient way than others. 
The considerable variation which can be observed in the per- 
formance of comparable hospitals may indicate that such variations 
cannot be justified by the single notion of 'hospital uniqueness'. 
Therefore, some mechanisms for its control are required. 
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A crude indication of the existence of these variations in the 
Spanish Hospital Sector can be seen in Table II. 1 below. 
(1) 
Similar variations have been recently studied by Rothberg (1982) 
for the United States and illustrated by Akehurst and Haycox (1982), 
among others, for the United Kingdom. 
TABLE II. 1 
Some variations of 'performance' in the Spanish Hospital Sector (1979) 
Subsample selected under criteria for increasing homogeneity 
Values-of the Coefficient of-variation: (Standard Deviation/Mean ) 
-------------------------------- 
Average length of stay 
Bed Occupancy rate 
Number of cases per 
-total personnel 
-per physician 
17.11 
18.60 
27.1 
Average cost per bed 32.0 
Average cost per patient day 20.3 
Average cost per case 
-total 23.2 
-per nurse 
no. of beds available 
per ancillary worker 
28.3 -pharmacy inputs 63.0 
27.7 -laboratory inputs 58.5 
20.6 -radiology inputs 54.3 
-surgical inputs 95.3 
Subsamples with greater within group_homogeneity_(*)_(Coef_ of_variation) 
Subsample Only teach- Non teach- Hospitals Hospitals 
selected ing hospitals ing with without 
(total) hospitals outpatient outpatient 
services services 
Beds/Physic. 27.6 21.6 30.6 24.0 45.5 
Nurses/physic. 27.4 19.3 31.3 24.9 38.9 
Cost per case 23.2 19.8 25.9 20.8 23.3 
Cost per 20.3 16.3 23.3 17.2 18.6 
patient-day 
(*) The description of this selection can be found in chapter V. 
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Large degrees of variation are to be found for most of the 
indicators of hospital performance utilized. This can be seen for 
the Spanish hospitals in the tables included in the appendix to this 
chapter. Moreover, this substantial variation remains when one 
confines one's attention to comparatively small groups or relatively 
homogeneous hospitals (see table 2 in the Appendix). 
Some existing problems and caveats. 
There are those who may argue, however, that because of the 
peculiarities of hospital output such comparisons are not valid. 
In chapter five of the present thesis it is shown that even after 
controlling for a large number of variables which might be construed 
as having an effect on the nature of the hospital output, a good deal 
of variation in hospital performance remains. It seems unlikely 
therefore, that one can account for these apparent differentials in 
performance only on the basis of differences in the nature of 
hospital output. 
Having said this, it should be recognised that these are 
crude indicators of hospital performance: For instance, the ultimate 
output of hospitals, namely 'health', is a multidimensional concept 
and one that is extraordinarily difficult to measure, even in 
principle, let alone in practice when one considers all the 
limitations of available hospital statistics. 
In relation to this issue, we would like to make clear the 
following points: 
Firstly, the true definition of hospital output would be 
related to some notion of patients' health states. In fact, as 
Fuchs (1973) has pointed out, the contribution to health of health 
services, provided by the health industry in general, should be 
ultimately referred to the utility derived from the status of being 
"healthy" or from having improved the individuals' health state. 
In this sense, "health" appears as an objective, and the production 
of health care is just one method of attaining that objective 
(Williams, 1983). 
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But 'health' as an ideal state, such as that defined by the 
WHO from a broad welfare notion, involves substantial difficulties 
for its valuation and measurement. 
A relative concept has been preferently instrumented in which 
"health" has been defined "in relation to the essential possibility 
and existencial reality of disease" (Stacey, 1977). 
Thus, '. health'- has been defined with regard to some social, 
physical and mental dimensions such as "functional fitness", "absence 
of pain and distress", "capacity to engage roles and tasks in social 
life, "self-care", etc.. In this sense, health appears as a relative 
concept which may vary among different societies over time and even 
between different social classes. Illustrating this, Culyer (1981) 
has pointed out the fact that lower back pain appears as a part of 
every day existence of women in low social classes. -` Consequently, 
and to certain extent, the definition of health becomes a part of a 
"social norm" within the larger concept of a group and cultural 
definition (Twaddle, 1974). 
In sum, the dominant concept of health is the one of 'ill- 
health'. According to this notion, a conceptual framework for the 
measurement of health services output has been given by Culyer, Lavers 
and Williams (1971), and some related methods have been developed and 
used. (A full review of the issues in relation to the measurement of 
health indicators - with regard to the different purposes for which 
they are designed - can be seen in R, O: s: ser (1981)). For our purposes 
- the empirical approach to hospital output - the issue is discussed 
at some length in chapter four of the present thesis. 
Secondly, the apportionment of the set of relevant inputs to be 
considered (and the external quasi-inputs in some cases), and its 
attribution to those multidimensional aspects which in practice constitute 
the output of the health care industry 
(2) 
is not an easy task, due, 
largely, to the relevance of joint production in the hospital sector. 
Thirdly, the types of performance indicators mentioned so far can 
even be missleading because they may fail to reflect real improvements 
in patients' health states. This is particularly true in the context 
of technological change. For example, medical innovations which permit, 
for the first time, postponment of death or the compensation for the 
impairments of particular diseases - rather than curing or preventing 
such diseases - will be reflected in the conventional performance 
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indicators as reductions in hospital productivity. It should also 
be born in mind that such statistics, unless used carefully, may 
conci'lefreal increases in output associated with increased case- 
mix complexity, brought about by the introduction of new medical 
treatments (Wadley, 1972). 
Bearing these points in mind, the fact remains that there do 
appear to be considerable differentials in hospital performance, 
which need to be explained. 
The remaining, of the chapter is concerned with the issue of how 
such apparent variations in efficiency might be analysed. Prior to 
this, however, some definitions concerning 'efficiency' and 'variable 
productivity' are offered with a view to clarifying the ensuing dis- 
cussion. 
2.3. DEFINITION OF EFFICIENCY AND VARIABLE PRODUCTIVITY. 
In the present thesis, 'efficiency' is defined in the sense of 
'production efficiency' as used in standar,! "microeconomic theory (see 
Layard and Walters, page 12). 
(3) 
Consequently, efficiency in 
performance is defined in terms of a production unit producing the 
maximum output with a given set of inputs, or equally, producing a 
given level of output at minimum cost. This notion of efficiency 
can be used to provide the basis for definitions of relative_efficiency 
and improvements in efficiency. 
---------------- 
A production unit is considered to be relatively efficient if it 
produces the same output as another production unit but with a smaller 
set of inputs, or if it produces the same level of output as another 
production unit but with a lower cost. The existence of variations 
in efficiency (i. e. some producers being more efficient than others) 
can be termed a situation in which variable productivity exists. 
Efficiency improvements (productivity gains) occur when a 
producer increases her output without increasing correspondingly the 
level of inputs utilized, or equivalently, produces the same level of 
output at a lower cost. The notion of efficiency and one factor 
productivity improvements can be seen in figure II on the following 
page: 
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FIGURE II. 1 
K 
K 
I 
L 
Efficiency improvement: Movement from 
A is B. This is, identical output with 
less cost through a different input com- 
bination. (I isoquant; mm, nn, isocost 
lines, from higher to lower levels, holding 
identical relative input prices): 
Avoidance of costs incurred by operating 
on an inferior isocost line. 
One factor productivity improvement: 
Movement from Ä to B. This is, identical 
output withalecser amount of one of the input 
utilised holding the amount of the other 
input constant. (I and II represent 
isoquants of an identical level of output: 
K and L Capital and Labour inputs). 
Factorial Productivity_Improvement: 
Movement from A to C, or any other point 
onBD. L 
The terms 'efficiency improvements' and 'productivity gains' 
will, in the following pages, be taken as identical concepts. This 
is particularly acceptable in a comparative static approach, although in 
more rigorous applications, specific assumptions about perfect price 
competition and constant returns to scale are required (Denny and Fuss, 
1980). 
(4) 
In a practical sense, 'productivity' is a relative concept with 
respect to which 'efficiency' constitutes a simple guideline for 
analysing performance. 
(5) According to this view, three variants of 
these notions can be accounted for stating performance comparisons. 
These are those derived from: - 
a) Achieving the same as before under a different set of 
circumstances. 
b) Doing the same as someone else in a similar position under 
similar circumstances, but outside this sector. 
c) Doing the same as someone else in a similar position within 
the sector under similar circumstances. 
Efficiency_comparisons_ on a cross-section basis in the past have 
mostly referred to the public-and-private-institutions debate 
(a) 
(0 
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(e. g. Borcherding, 1975 and Spann, 1977 et al. ). In general, this 
exercise has proved useless in our view, since it involves attempting 
to compare incomparables, due to (r) the failure to estimate accurately 
all the dimensions in the value of the public output, for instance, in 
terms of 'equality' and not just of 'efficiency' targets, and from the 
analysis of both expenditure and income sides of the Public sector 
activity; (ii) the conditions imposed in the public context by 
outside regulators, such as minimum standards, extent of geographical 
and social coverage, etc. This in practice distorts the comparison 
(Lindsay, 1976); (iii) the lack of realism in the proposed alternative 
systems of provision: one based mainly on the principles of market 
competition and Pareto efficiency postulates, against another built in 
a set of prejudiced assumptions about the behaviour of bureaucracy 
in public administrations. 
(6) 
The public-versus-private provision debate can also be refuted 
however 'ab initio'ý7) on the grounds that the question of the entitlement 
of a public service must be solved on grounds of principles, independ- 
ently of features such as the actual production characteristics 
(features which should be controlled by other measures, for 
example, through internal policies or direct regulation). 
But as we will see in the next section, less attention has been 
devoted to the analysis of the relative efficiency of an activity in 
one unit as compared with the same activity in another similar unit 
-------------------------------- 
withinone industry or branch of activity. The reasons for this will 
-------------------- 
be explored in the next section. A review of the literature of 
potential relevance to the issue of variable productivity will be 
for these purposes presented. 
2.3.1. A review of the literature of potential relevance to the 
issue of variable productivity. 
Neoclassical economists have not pursued the analysis of variable 
productivity very vigorously. This has been probably due to the fact 
that, according to neoclassical theory, factors leading to differential 
productivity levels within the industry - such as those derived from 
the level of technological implementation and rate of input utilization - 
should be regarded as momentary distortions in market resource 
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allocation, which sooner or later would be corrected by the operation 
of markets. In this sense, either the production technological 
posibility frontier is reached, or market prices will result by 
pushing the firms that failed to attain it out of business. 
This logic is at the core of the neoclassical argument stemmed 
from the notion of a production 'black box' in the context of fully 
efficient market mechanisms, in which output appears as an automatic 
and direct result of the inputs available. Although some sort of 
productivity gap could rise due to the induced bias of innovation 
(see to this respect the Ahmad-Kennedy controversy, quoted from 
Ferguson, 1967), any recurrent feature of variable productivity 
was bound to be inconsistent with the workings of the market, according 
to neoclassical theory. 
This view has been correspondingly translated into practical 
policy terms by devoting attention primarily to the design of policy 
instruments derived from first principles and under the assumption 
that they would have the desired impact. They have neglected therefore 
both the issues associated with the implementation of policies and 
the question of whether they would be automatically addressed in 
the manner intended. As Heald (1983) and other authors have pointed 
out, such implementation would require altrustic public officials, 
maximizers of social welfare and untainted by self-interest, who 
are omniniscent about cost and demand conditions, skilled in the 
use of analytical techniques and committed to their underlying value 
judgements. Only the homogeneity of all these factors could then 
make, in practice, for similar levels of performance. 
This lack of recognition of the issues of variable productivity 
(8) 
has consequently left unexplored the potential interrelationship 
between the static and dynamic components of productivity gains. 
Except in the case of the Theory of Cumulative Causation 
(9), 
the 
effects that different levels of productivity can have on their 
sequential rate of growth, over and above the single intensity change 
element stemming from the increase in the amount of inputs available 
or in their rate of utilization, have remained unexplored. 
In this context, intersectorial studies of productivity have 
been analysed on some spatial references - across nations, across 
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regions- and over time. They have focussed mostly on the account- 
ancy rather than on the behavioural aspects in explaining productivity 
difference, with some minor exceptions (Jorgenson and Nishimizu, 
1978). These studies do not provide, however, much insight into 
the issue of relative efficiency or variable productivity from an 
intra-sector intra-industry approach to the analysis of the institut- 
ional activity. This is mainly due to the degree of sectorial aggre- 
gation of this type of studies and the extent of the problems 
involved in comparing different sectors in practice, such as the lack 
of input and output homogeneity in the data compared and, in the case 
of the international studies, due to the problems which affect the 
vector of prices in order to reflect the relative purchasing 
capacities (Kravis, 1976). 
Leibenstein's X-efficiency Theory stands aside of the former view 
and, questioning some of those basic neoclassical postulates, comes to 
recognise the problem of relative efficiency in most of the economic 
activities in reality, over the pure issues of theoretical allocative 
efficiency. In-Ah. lsssense, he argues for the possibility of'living 
with'an eventually persistent failure to reach the production possi- 
bility frontier in some economic activities due, for instance, to 
social and psychological factors which surround their production 
processes. Generally, this would appear to be the case in those 
productive activities which take place through real time, involving 
individuals who try to shift constraints in their own interest, who 
'learn' about processes and goals, and perform in an environment 
where production takes place in a climate of conflict, uncertainty 
and information assymmetries. But other organisational factors may 
have a role too: This has been pointed out by some theories of 
industrial sociology and job design (Lawler et al. ), structure of 
organisations and networks within bureaux (Breton and Wintrobe, 1982), 
and workers' participation and industrial democracy (Hodgson, 1982). 
More fundamentally for our purposes, one of the factors pointed 
out by Leibenstein in explaining X-efficiency is precisely that of 
the absence of concern in the firms' management for financial 
restraint. In fact, Leibenstein analyses the influence of the 
budget financial concern on the agents' behaviour, and hence on the 
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institutional performance, through the interaction between constraint 
concern, exerted effort, performance levels and external financial 
pressures. In the terms seen in the first Chapter this interrelation- 
ship is particularly relevant in causing X-inefficiency in those contexts 
in which agents have the power to choose the pace at which the activity 
has to be carried out per unit of time (effort), quality, time pattern 
and length. In these circumstances the predetermination of the 
boundaries for job specification and agents' activity are not externally 
imposable by reinforcing contracts on separate individual units. 
Information assymmetries, uncertainty, demand inducement and the nature 
of the output in itself come to support, and ultimately to strengthen, 
discretionary powers in the hands of the agents, in preference to any 
other institutionally assigned objectives. 
Most of the features mentioned above have been seen in the 
hospital care sector in Spain: in particular, the absence of financial 
concern on the utilization of health resources, as a result of a system 
of revenue allocation based on retrospective costing which does not 
provide incentives for a cost-conscious management to the self interested 
agents in the sector; agents who are moreover vested with a set of dis- 
cretional powers granted by their professional knowledge. . 
This view seems to be in accordance with the set of suggestions 
which are, it is argued, to be found in those type of contexts where 
the X-inefficiency postulates are present (such as a lack of evaluation 
feedbacks, absence of economic trade-offs in operative choices, etc. ) 
and which are reflected in the hospital literature by a set of inferences 
about organisational slackness (lack of services co-ordination, 
duplication and mrsutilization of some hospital facilities, absence of 
monitoring and allocation or responsibilities in resource management, 
and an absence of scrutiny in confronting an excessive rate of techno- 
logical implementation - which are biased towards product rather than 
process innovation, etc. ). 
However, the relevance of the budget financial restraint for 
purposes of a behavioural analysis of the performance of some public 
institutions has been only recently considered in the public sector 
literature. Thus, only in the general field of Public Choice theory, 
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the 'median voter' model, the institutional approach to the Grants 
Theory and the supply theories of public government output have 
attention been focussed partly on this issue, in the next sub- 
section we will review those approaches regarding the role they 
assign to the budget restraint as the 'price' element towards 
efficiency motivation targets in the public sector activity. 
2.3.2. Behavioural analysis and Productivity in Public Sector Studies. 
The role of the budget restraint in any constrained optimization 
exercise is to reflect the resource limitation in the Agent's 
decision-making process. That involves, in a conventional manner, 
the maximization of a function f (X1), subject to the financial restraint 
that M> (X1), from which first order conditions are derived: i. e. 
(i) fi - hi <0 
X1 > 0, and 
(ii) M-h (Xi) >0 
Xi > 0, where the budget constraint 
M reflects the amount of resources to be spent in order to produce a 
maximum return, either expressed in terms of satisfaction from con- 
sumption, output production or profit. The nature of this role does not 
change if the resource limitation is imposed over time, that is, whether 
it is considered as a revenue stream which in a planning horizon context 
gives the feasible set of points for a constrained economic optimization 
behaviour. 
In the Public sector context the lack of markets and a competitive 
pricing system prevents, in principle, that sector from reaching a 
private goods type of solution. However, in some areas of the public 
activity, a pseudo-market interpretation has been postulated to simulate 
that result, once allowance has been made for some special characteristic 
of social goods and the revenue process involved in its provision. 
Two main types of decentralized public agencies could be distinguished 
for these purposes: 
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a) Agencies at least partly funded from their 
own revenue raising capacity. 
b) Agencies under general fund financing techniques 
or external budget-based arrangements from a re- 
imbursing Authority. 
This distinction is important so far as the first type a) of 
Agencies incorporate, or can incorporate, an implict watchdog for 
efficiency in the revenue side of their budgets, whereas for the 
second type b) of Agencies, global revenues come out of general taxes 
on the population, without having expenditure coupled to a tax to 
finance it. 
Public Choice theories have viewed the problem involved in a) 
either from the median voter type of models or from the more general 
view of the institutional Approach to Grants Theory. 
Accounting for a tax-price notion 
(10) 
for some Public sector 
activities where the output is not sold on a market in any way, median 
voter models allow for the introduction of a 'price component' which 
can translate directly the role of the budget restraint in the organ- 
isation's performance. This component can then play the role of an 
indirect watchdog for efficiency on the sequential decision-making 
process of the public agency expenditures. In this sense, the derived 
price effect, even in those cases collecting primarily a productivity 
gap notion (Beck, 1982) may, afterall, exert a positive influence for 
any ex-post potential improvement in productivity levels, by forcing 
changes in the Agency's behaviour. In other words, the magnitude of the 
price elasticity of demand for some specific output services can have a 
direct effect on additional future expenditure and on further cost-conscious 
management. As Baumol foresaw in his model (1967), this price component 
can be in itself a regulatory mechanism for trading-off unbalanced 
productivity gains with unbalanced revenues. 
In consequence, as far as differences in price elasticities of 
demand could reflect differences in the mechanisms through which the 
revenue of the Agency is raised, this could be in itself a source of 
differences in productivity levels, given its differential impact on 
the cost-conscious managment of resources. 
No further work has been done to link the general fund financing 
. methods with 
those behavioural-related productivity factors on the 
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performance of the public institutions. The institutional approach 
to the_Grants Theory (Gramlich, McGuire, Oates et al. ) represents 
however, a significant approach to this issue. In fact, this approach 
emphasizes the importance of the reimbursement processes on the 
decentralized behaviour of the institutions, drawing attention to 
those questions of policy implementation. That is, it analyses 
the impact of the different types of grants, or of the revenue allocation 
process in general, on the local decision-making process and the in- 
stitutions' performance, instead of examining their effects purely 
in abstract. 
(11) 
As a result, questions of potential simultaneous 
causation between central transfers and local expenditure, the 
strength of the behavioural mechanisms for self-regulation(12) and 
the need of a prior adjustment for some interterritorial needs, etc. 
can be, under this approach, only then analysed. 
Although similarities between the institutional approach to the 
Grants Theory and the issues in this section are strictly limited by the 
'local resources element' which surrounds fiscal federalism, this 
approach provides a significant point of departure for further research 
on productivity and behavoural analysis in Public sector studies, 
so far as it searches, for modelling purposes, for the influence of the 
budgetary reimbursement methods on the agents' and institutions' 
behaviour. In other words, it searches for the analysis of their 
consequences in terms of agents who use inputs to produce outputs 
according to some assigned targets, but who try above all to maximize 
some sort of welfare or utility function within some boundary limits, 
by adjusting their position with respect to the production opportunity 
lines, once they are faced with different spending restraints. 
On the contrary, for those type b) of public decentralized Agencies 
with central revenue coverage of expenditure, no direct link appears 
between the institutional effects of the revenue and expenditure sides 
of their activity. In this case, the 'illusion' of a central budget 
reimbursement made as a 'third party' payment may lead citizens and/or 
bureaucrats (Niskanen, 1974) to exhaust to zero the marginal benefits 
derived from the demand (and/or supply) of the Agencies' output. This 
can happen in theory as the result of two different patterns of behaviour: 
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(i) On one hand, citizens may behave as accounting initially 
for some notion of the (average) tax-revenue raised on their 
income sources as a 'pre-paid' tax. From this initial position, 
an argument of the following type can be put forward: "If I were 
not going to pay so much for these public services, say health care 
services, I would be happy enough to buy this other bundle of goods 
(say, private health insurance). But in the current situation, my 
best choice consists in taking advantage of the actual free provision 
up to the exhaustion of the marginal benefits which they produce to me". 
No predictable pattern of individual rational behaviour would 
be, under these circumstances, easily reconciliable with the aggregate 
factual behaviour. It may involve, in addition, a "composite effect 
trap" for increasing public expenditure throughout the chains of 
'increase of output demanded' - 'need of increased revenue allocation' - 
'additional revenue raised' - 'successive increases of demand', etc., 
assuming that the citizen constantly fails to discount the costs implied 
in those sequential decisions, suffering fiscal illusion from viewing 
the institutional expenses as a third-party payment. 
(ii) It should be recognized that, obviously, no direct effect 
in this way is produced in reality, since some sort of control is 
laid down by public regulation, and central management restraints 
come to operate over the short-run influences in each stage of planning 
expenditure. However, in those contexts in which agent supplier 
behaviour can dominate the external regulations by shaping the citizens' 
demand, this type of pattern of behaviour gives to the institution 
some discretionary powers which may be put into play on behalf of some 
notion of a potential 'citizens' reservation demand' (Breton and 
Wintrobe, 1982). In this way, wherever no direct link appears between 
the revenue and expenditure side of the activity and supply influences 
demand, the domain for the entrance of additional 'segments of demand' 
can be used by the agents for reaching their own specific targets, 
affecting correspondingly the institutions' performance. 
(University 
and hospital admissions could be examples which illustrate the features 
above mentioned). Thus no single internal factor for a cost-conscious 
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management may be able to face this strategic game leading to 
pressures for increasing output-activity with ultimate effects on 
the performance of the institutions. This can be in itself, in our 
context, a source of variable productivity given the characteristics 
of the Agency's decision-making process for resource allocation and, 
particularly, given the possibilities of translating the financial 
consequences of these decisions into the external constraints 
throughout the budget reimbursement process. 
In sum, not many analyses have been developed in Public Economics 
on the issue of the influence of the revenue allocation methods on current 
operational behaviour of public institutions. However, from the most 
general view of these studies, it appears that the following point can be 
stressed: Whenever the budget restraint can reflect somehow a 'price' 
component on the institutional activity, budget revenues can have a role 
as implicit watchdogs for efficiency and make for some major behavioural 
changes in public institutions. But where this is not the case, and 
agents' supply factors influence demand conditions-and in this way the 
institutions' performance - the possibility to link budget reimbursements 
to pre-stated levels of performance constitute, in our view, the only control 
policy which may provide an efficiency motivation 'rationale' against 
factual pressures for sequential expenditure increases. (This 
possibility will in fact be studied in the third chapter of this thesis). 
2.3.3. Outline of the argument. 
The essence of the argument outlined so far in this section can be 
summarized as follows: 
1. In a competitive market system, productive efficiency is 
ensured by the fact that all firms produce similar products, 
facing the same factor markets, and hence any high-cost producer 
will be squeezed out. In the absence of strong competition, X- 
inefficiency may arise and persist. The reasons for this have been 
analysed by Leibenstein et al., and the influence of the financial 
budget restraint concern on institutional behaviour has been suggested. 
2. In those parts of Public sector where the output is not sold on a 
market and revenue is not systematically linked to performance, 
additional scope for the exercise of managerial discretion can be 
present. 
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3. As we have pointed out, the Spanish hospital system manifests 
the aforementioned properties. Hence, one could expect 
(i) the whole system to be inefficient, and (ii) some parts 
to be more inefficient than others. 
The foregoing exposition has framed the context in which the budgetary 
process operates in general in the Spanish hospital sector. In this 
sense, its analysis provides a common basis for explaining the hospital 
activity and namely, the system inefficiency postulates which surround 
the provision of health care. It cannot predict in itself: the 
reasons for a differential impact on individual performance, here 
collected under the notion of variable productivity. Thus in 
order to explain and predict 'relative efficiency' in hospital 
operation, and to propose some appropriate mechanisms for its control, 
we require a model of hospital behaviour. Some considerations for 
this purpose are presented below. 
2.4. EXPLAINING VARIABLE PRODUCTIVITY: MODELS OF HOSPITAL BEHAVIOUR 
There is a relatively extensive literature on behavioural models 
of hospitals, a useful survey of which is contained in Jacobs (1974). 
In general, we could split the existing models on hospital behaviour into 
the following groups: 
a) Models which treat the hospital as "organism" in itself, 
focussing on the behavioural-organizational aspects, either from 
the view of hospitals as "bureaux" (Migue and Belanger, 1974), non- 
profit institutions (Newhouse, 1970) and monopolies (Paul. y, 1974; 
GoldfArb et al., 1980), or from a bargaining type of approach based 
on the property rights of the hospital agents (Clarkson., 1972; 
Harris, 1977). 
b) Models which focus on hospital agents' behaviour - either doctors, 
administrators or trustees. These models usually frame the set of 
variables influencing individuals' behaviour into profit, output or 
utility maximization functions - here with arguments such as 
'sophistication' of equipment, discretion, power, etc. (Lee, 1971; 
Bongaert$ and Carriný 1982). This maximization exercise is commonly 
constrained by some function defining the convex set of feasible 
points for equilibrium, being mainly specified in terms of: 
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(i) a certain level of income, exogenously given or depending 
on the income of some reference group (Feldstein, 1970), or 
some function which comes to incorporate the marginal valuation 
of the individuals own input time, which may also depend on 
income (Sloan, 1974), in order to lead to certain labour leisure 
trade-off; 
(ii) some less-well defined notion of "professional ethics" in 
terms, for instance, of the "best practice" and "patient welfare" 
(Murray, 1974), which usually allows for a less clear-cut deriv- 
ation of arithmetical results. 
As it is now clear from the first chapter, model (a) fails to account 
for the reality of Spanish hospitals. They are, in our view mostly, dominated 
by doctors who feel their role is to do everything they think to be 
"scientifically" needed for their patients without reference to price. 
In Harris' view, doctors have aimed at enjoying access to hospital inputs 
without getting told what to do. But in our context, and contrary to what 
models of "property rights" assume, there has not existed an effective 
"supply division" in hospital management: indeed, hospital administrators 
have had little stake in opposing physicians and they have found their own 
job security tied to their ability to satisfy the demands of the medical 
staff, pushing thereafter for the "third party reimbursement" of total 
hospital expenses. 
Model (b) has been splendidly discussed by Evans (1974), bvtin our 
context, it fails to account for the actual mechanisms through which 
hospital agents operate; this is, a situation where doctors are professional 
'salaries', face a general wage settlement - taken as given for a notional 
working time - and "shirking" is a common feature in relation to the 
accepted compatibility principle in the medical practice. Indeed, this 
situation does not seem to offer support for the formulation of a general 
profit objective nor for other ouput maximization targets. As we will 
develop in the next section, it makes more sense to formulate a general 
utility function, in terms of "satisfaction" with relation to a "given" rate 
of earnings per effective working-time. 
In_conclusion, whereas most of the existing models may be of use in 
some institutional settings, they have little useful application in the 
Spanish context, given the characteristics which surround the provision of 
hospital care. However, their study and cross-comparison enable us to 
derive some general considerations in order to model hospital behaviour in 
a way more adjusted to reality. 
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2.4.1. Some Questions in modelling. hospital behaviour. 
In our opinion, the following questions need to be answered first in 
modelling institutional hospital behaviour: 
a) With regard to the unit of analysis: 
(i) Does the hospital as an organization involve in itself a 
single consistent set of behavioural features which allow 
for a joint analysis for the purposes of modelling?. 
(ii)Can these postulates be constructed only 
the individuals - which ultimately shape 
organization - and, if this is the case, 
of interrelations among the agents or is 
sub-group of them which explains the cor 
aggregate behaviour of the organization? 
from the behaviour of 
the performance of the 
is it the full network 
it that of some specific 
e of the resulting 
Our view in the Spanish context is that, goals are set by individuals 
rather than by organizations, and that the allocation of health resources 
within hospitals is mainly derminated by physicians, acting according to 
a set of dominant factors, which have their roots in the technological 
information and professional knowledge available to them. 
This view is derived from the study of the rules which conform hospital 
organization and management ('Reglamento interno de funcionamiento') and 
the particular status which determines the working conditions of physicians 
(against the 'Estatuto Laboral Unico'). 
b) In addition, four significant aspects have to be considered in order to 
achieve a better understanding of the relevant features for modelling 
purposes, which surround the hospital health care sector: 
1. First and foremost, the Qwnership of the hospitals. 
This is, whether the hospital is a private profit-making organisation 
(i. e. within the corporate sector), a private non-profit institution 
(i. e. ) under Charity funding or Trustee) or a public Agency within, say, a 
decentralized Public Sector. 
2. The system or remuneration of the hospital staff, and mainly that 
of the physicians in particular: For instance, either as share-holders of 
the hospital financial results or receiving fees per medical act, or having 
some type of profit-sharing in addition to a minimum level of earnings or 
as simple employees with a fixed wage. 
3. The reimbursement method of the hospitals global expenses: 
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Ui) this can either be cost based a) retrospective or prospectively; 
b) with or without incentive mechanisms in operation; c) with or 
without a budget link to the individual performance, and (ii) with 
the payment made a) per unit utilized (day of stay, case treated, etc. ) 
or b) by some other broader notion which takes into account the total 
value reimbursed (e. g. per ward, per department orglobal budget). 
4. Finally, the nature of the hospital in itself due to its location 
(e. g. whether the hospital is situated in a rural area having to provide a 
minimum standard of care on a geographical basis) and status (whether it 
has to supply teaching, medical research, etc. ). 
c) Furthermore, within the framework set by the former combined factors,. we 
need to pick up those more sensible assumptions about the orientation 
objectives in the activity of the staff and its potential identification 
with the institutional goals of the hospital authorities. 
Among these orientations we can point out here (See Friss and White, 1977): 
(i) A view of physicians purely as professionals, with ocupational 
targets such as the improvement of job skills, the interest for 
being aware of technological advances, etc.. 
(ii) Physicians as goal orientated individuals, pursuing their specific 
objectives, instead of following, for instance, a conventional 
set of standard procedures or "cliches" in the medical activity, 
(iii) Physicians as bureaucrats who value, above all, job security, 
social status and a steadily increasing income. 
(iv) With physicians viewing their role as an instrumental one, 
never regarding the work situation as a matter of realization 
in itself. 
(v) With physicians viewing themselves as "servants" of the community, 
or receivers of a social command, having a strong "medical ethos" 
(reflected into the hippocratic oath) which requires a paramount 
concern for the patient as a person in need. 
It can certainly be argued that reality is usually a mix of these 
propositions. In general, the dominance of one of the former points needs 
to be considered at some stage of the behavioural analysis. 
d) Finally, the medical role orientation has to be balanced against the 
professional motivation with regard to the material rewards (salary, wage 
differentials, fringe benefits or any specific employer incentive plan) and 
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non-material rewards (service and professional recognition). These 
components can, in practice, shape the agents' incentives in order to 
qualify as postulated in the modelling exercise. 
In sum, accounting for the former considerations and with respect to 
the specific sample of Spanish General Hospitals here analysed, the 
particular approach outlined for the analysis of hospital behaviour is 
next presented. 
2.4.2. A model of hospital behaviour suited to the Spanish context: 
The approach adopted. 
The outline of a model of hospital behaviour suited to the Spanish 
context can be defined in the following terms: 
The approximation adopted here for the analysis of the economic behaviour 
of our specific sample of General Hospitals, which are providers of a set 
of standard inpatient care according, in principle, to their status and 
location, and which are owned and administered by the National Health 
Institute through central direction, funding and decentralized management, 
is the following. The hospitals are neither in reality, closed organiz- 
ations with their own goals, nor do they reflect a single internally consis- 
tent decision-making process which might be analysed according to some 
standard homogeneous postulates of the organisational theory. We believe 
that they may be better viewed as decentralized public agencies with a 
particular type of bureaucratic pattern of organisational behaviour, 
which is ultimately influenced by physicians as the dominant agents in the 
sector, given the nature of the ouput provided and the impact of the 
medical decisions on the utilization of the hospital resources. This 
pattern has seemed to allow in practice neither for a direct hierarchical 
authority imposed from outside the organisation, nor for the application 
of a set of rules widely accepted in themselves for purposes of hospital 
management. 
This means, in fact, that hospital agents cannot be considered as 
'prototypes' of bureaucrats performing within centrally stated constraints. 
In reality, hospital agents are able to influence these constraints in 
order to adjust some parameters of the hospital production function which 
remain under their exclusive control, and which can then be orientated 
towards their own advantage. They can be better defined, therefore, as 
'selective rational agents' who'satisfice' rather than 'maximize' some 
-internal goals within the Agency activity with regard to certain guide- 
lines (such as social status, remuneration, recognition.. ). 
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The following are the reasons for the adoption of this_approach. 
(i) The particular organisation of INSALUD, highly 
centralized despite its proved incapacity to monitor 
the performance of their hospitals, and lacking an 
efficient communication network. 
(ii) The specific system of hospital reimbursement, 
mostly cost-based, with the Central INSALUD 
Authorities struggling to control expenditure 
through an unrealistic incomes policy, in isolation 
from the monitoring of the remaining elements of the 
system. 
(iii) The statutory nature of the Hospital Boards, 
primarily representative of the interests of the 
predominant hospital agents within the medical 
profession at any particular moment in time. 
The absence of consumers' direct representation 
and of any other form of citizens' presence in the 
Hospital Boards, have consequently enabled Medical 
Directors to pursue their objectives rather freely. 
(iv) The statutory nature of the role of hospital 
administrators, which makes them civil servants, 
'clerks' of the Hospital Board rather than 
effective managers of the hospital resources. 
Under the prevailing reimbursement system, Admin- 
istrators have had in fact little stake in 
opposing the dominance of the physicians. On 
the contrary, they have found their own job 
security most closely tied to satisfying the 
demands of the medical staff. 
(v) Finally, the generalisation of public and private 
medical practices made 'compatible' in the health 
care sector. This comes to offer an extra remun- 
eration or a compensation in kind over the pure 
wage level, given the financial externalities 
derived, either on other public activities or on 
their respective private practices. 
In our view, these joint factors help the understanding of the 
apparent neglect of the Medical Corporation as a body of open bargaining 
against the type of wage restraint imposed by the 
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Department of Health, and the search for more basic levels in the 
process of allocation of resources within the hospital, where physicians' 
particular interests better merge with the general interests of the 
hospital as a whole and with those of the citizens by extension. 
The possibility of influencing ultimately the financial constraints 
on these bases has been to some extent permitted, as we have seen, 
by the nature of the budget reimbursement process. The influence 
that these joint features can have in the generation of variable 
productivity can be consequently analysed from the observation of the 
two following factors: a) An increasing pressure for recruiting 
additional levels of staff in response to variations in the effective 
job remuneration; and b) the actual level of utilization of the 
existing medical inputs. 
The examination of both factors, in accordance with their 
potential relevance for explaining the relative efficiency in the 
performance of the individual institutions in the Spanish Hospital 
Health Care Sector, will be introduced in the next section. 
2.5. BEHAVIOURAL FACTORS OF POTENTIAL RELEVANCE IN EXPLAINING THE 
EXISTENCE OF VARIABLE PRODUCTIVITY IN THE SPANISH HOSPITAL 
HEALTH CARE SECTOR. 
The literature review contained in the previous sections (together 
with the institutional details of the Spanish Health Care System 
pointed out for purposes of a behavioural analysis in the 
first Chapter) permit the construction of an operational hypothesis- 
on the issue of variable productivity in the following terms: The 
differential impact on hospital performance can be postulated from 
the way in which agents proceed to adjust their effective rate of 
earnings through changes in the working time in principle scheduled. 
This can be considered, in süm, the bounded rational answer of the 
hospital agents to the wage settlement centrally imposed up to recent 
years in the sector. Hence, the adjustment is postulated to follow 
a guideline, given to a great extent by the opportunity cost of the 
public activity, in terms of the alternative earnings raised from 
-67- 
possible given private practice. This strategic adjustment is doe to 
the difficulty in monitoring the relationship between the individuals' work- 
effort and the level of output produced. This absence of monitoring 
makes possible the degree of differential 'shirking' required to obtain 
a relatively similar remuneration for a given work-effort from both 
fields of overlapping medical activity. Indeed, only two variables 
remain in practice under physicians' control: 
(i) The level of effort or effective working tune. 
Changes in this variable are the result of pursuing the minimization 
of the effects of the wage policy centrally imposed and, given the character 
istics of the hospital reimbursement system, the recruitment of additional 
levels of staff in order to hold 'output' unchanged. The adjustment 
follows the notion of a private opportunity cost which takes place 
through the labour-leisure trade-off or throughout a constrained joint 
utility maximization, given the postulated principles of medical compatibilil 
The adjustment does not, however, allow the pursuit of maximization 
but just of satisfaction. This is due to the fact that maximization 
postulates would lead towards the provision of zero levels of effort, which 
are incompatible with calling public support for one's position. In 
this sense, there must exist a common interest in keeping some minimum 
levels of provision. 
(13) 
In practice, they can result from differential 
factors (such as the agents' risk aversion to public complaints, the 
level of estimated needs and the concern in avoiding unwanted direct 
intervention). 
(ii) The level of_utilization_of the existing medical_inputs. 
Changes in this variable can be expected once it is postulated that certain 
levels of utility derive from the exercise of some 'property rights' in 
the hospitals' activity. This can be ultimately the consequence of 
the physicians' own consideration as part of a contract which enables 
them to get what they think at each moment as 'scientifically indicated' 
independently of its costs. In other words, this is due to the fact that 
once doctors become members of the 'hospital firm' they get assured 
access to hospital inputs without getting told what to do, when, 
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or how to use them (Harris, 1977). 
This factor goes back at times to the claim to purchase of 
more sophisticated, or just newer, medical equipment. Independently 
of their potential levels of utilization in practice and of an 
economic evaluation of its contribution with respect to the level of 
utilization of the existing alternative medical inputs. It can also 
be reflected in the search for overcapacity, looking for some suitable 
levels of slackness or safety margins against work-load fluctuations, 
and with respect to existing inferences about the deviation of hospital 
inputs for their use for private purposes. 
Both factors can be consequently found in the over-stocking of 
resources - including manpower - in excess of those required to produce 
a given output stream and, therefore, behind the generation of insti- 
tutional variable productivity. 
2.5.1. Mechanisms of operation. 
In practice, the 
been sustained by the 
by the patients' dema 
translated thereafter 
process as variations 
which otherwise would 
provided. 
operation of the factors mentioned above have 
nature of the developement of technologies and 
nd induced by physicians. Both elements have been 
by the hospital agents into the hospital budgetary 
in work-loads, highlighting the potential pressures 
be created on the amount and quality of the care 
By postulating that throughput measures are to remain constant, the 
argument can be put forward in favour of additional resources (say levels 
of medical staff), which will allow finally for the adjustment in the 
utilization of the existing inputs and, particularly, in the supply 
of the physicians' own input time. 
The rationality of this hypothesis stems from the examination of 
Table 11.2. and the suggestion formulated by Macchia (1979) that 
successive increases of manpower in the hospital field have been the 
consequence of a reduction in the actual working-time of the existing 
staff, holding work-load and throughput measures constant; 
in our 
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terms, they would have been the result of the effort in closing the 
gap between the private and public remuneration of the hospital 
agents by adjusting the effective working-time supplied. This can be 
sustained from the observation of the evolution of the wage bill of 
hospital registrar physicians and the growth of hospital physicians in 
relation to some conventional indicators of hospital activity. The 
carnal relationship between both is the hypothesis we try to show here. 
This hypothesis has also been recently put forward in Spain from a 
sociological point of view by Perez-Diaz (1982). He observes, in fact, 
the search for the proportionality between the public and private 
remuneration as the behavioural regulator of the physicians' actual 
working time in the Public sector. The notion of a minimum level of earning 
for a given work-effort seems to be viewed by physicians as a sort of 
moral imperative over any stated level of notional working time for 
which they might be in principle remunerated. This benchmark in fixing 
the amount 'to be earned' would be based in principle on social con- 
siderations about status and professional capacity, such as they are 
reflected from the earnings in the private practice. 
(14) 
Perez-Diaz has calculated through a survey of physician earnings 
for 1980, a gap between 60% and 53% with regard to the difference 
between what "should" be earned from the completion of the full 
notional working time established in the public practice - given what 
would be earned for an equal working time in the private practice - and 
what "is" the actual remuneration in the Public sector. Therefore, in 
order to equalize, in our terms, the price of the effective working time 
between the public and private practices, the notional working day in 
the hospital would have to be dropped by between 1/3 and 2/5. That is, 
to four or three and a half hours instead of the six hours per day fixed 
legally. (These figures could then provide a first indication of the 
size of the slackheras inserted into the current hospital performance). 
In formalising in simple terms the postulated mechanism described above 
(i. e. including only labour inputs), we can assume that hospital output (Q) 
is the result of the interaction between hospital physician manpower (M) 
and other hospital labour inputs (X) (including nurses and ancillary workers). 
The corresponding isoquant of production for the hospital output can then 
be defined from Q=Q (M, X) as; 
aQ/DM. dM+aQ/DX. dX=0 
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However, as argued in earlier sections of this chapter, in 
those contexts where the pace of the work-effort remains under the 
individual's discretion and information assymetries do not 
allow for a close monitoring of the performance of the existing 
labour inputs, a variable which takes into account the degree of 
utilization of these inputs may prove relevant, 
In fact, in our context, the level of medical labour input can 
be considered to be composed ca nominal component (i. e. the total 
number of physicians) Ms and the intensity with which this input is 
utilized MS (or effective supply of physicians' working time). The 
marginal price of the first element is obviously the wage settled w, 
whereas the contribution of the second element has been assumed to follow 
the guideline given by the relationship between w and c, or opportunity 
cost of the physician's time spent in the hospital (e. g. its ratio c/w, 
according to our hypothesis). Hence, a given labour input in terms 
of'units' of effective work-effort can be achieved either from increasing 
these units as a result of the incentives derived from an appropriate 
price remuneration. or from increasing the total amount of manpower, 
holding the. level of work-effort per unit of labour constant. 
By assuming that an equilibrium state is associated initially with 
a given value of the parameters w and c, say (c/w)o, we can explore 
the comparative statics which result from an increase in the gap between 
c and w of the nature shown in table 11.2. (e. g. from an unrealistic 
wage increase of the type described there). 
In] fact, as it can be seen in the diagram below, Ms, being a negative 
function of the ratio c/w, will drop to MSS for a given level of physicians, 
Mso, as we move to (c/w)1. 
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In order to remain in an identical position on the same 
isoquant (Qo), we can either increase the supply of alternative 
inputs up to (X51), or shift forwards the amount of hospital physician 
manpower available up to Mss (i. e. keep the overall level of effective 
working-time supplied constant). 
A cost-effective analysis of this choice would have to evaluate, 
therefore, the trade-off between the costs derived from (A Ms . w) and 
from (A Xs . Price of X) and, foremost, between (A Ms . w) and 
(Ms Q w), 
given the initial increase in c. 
As argued in earlier paragraphs, this substitution does not operate 
in our context according to efficiency guides, say from substituting 
lower cost inputs for the higher costs of physicians' working time, given 
the existing interests involved in hospitals' management. 
This result has to be put into the context of the nature of the 
reimbursement system and of the central policies followed on physicians' 
wage increases. Thus, pressures for sequential increases in the levels 
of medical staff have been preferently used in order to keep 'output' 
and 'quality' on line. These pressures have been favoured by the Hospital 
Boards as a way of dealing with the operational problems of the sector, and 
by the Medical Corporations as a way of reducing the increasing levels of 
medical unemployment without altering substantially the 'status quo' 
amongst the medical profession. 
Moreover this view has been supported by the fact that once central 
approval of staff increases is made (probably after the threat of public 
complaints and patients' distress is considered at the bargaining table) 
expenditure can be put forward, allowing for an automatic enlargement of 
the external financial constraints imposed on the hospitals. Chances 
of job promotion and grading drifts can consequently increase too. 
Through the budget reimbursement system the process ends by 
transfering any conflict of resource allocation within the hospital 
sector onto changes in the amount and utilization of labour and 
material inputs. Given the boundaries within which the process 
operates at the institutional level, and given the workings of the 
budget reimbursement system in itself, the phenomenon of variable 
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productivity can be seen then as a natural outcome. 
2.5.2. Relevant Behavioural Factors. 
According to the previous analysis, the following behavioural 
factors appear to have potential relevance for explaining the 
issue of variable productivity in the Spanish Hospital Health Care 
Sector. 
a) The relative level of physicians' earnings in the particular area 
where the hospital is located. Although no precise figures are 
available in this respect, the geographical variation in the index of 
provincial cost of living, and the evidence available in this direction 
derived from the survey of physicians' earnings before mentioned, seem 
to support the importance of this factor. 
b) The differential extent of the possibility for hospital physicians 
to exercise different forms of compatible medical practice. 
Both former factors would account for the level of earnings from 
the private practice and, consequently, they would be reflected into 
differences in the opportunity cost from exercising public activity. 
c) The initial level of slackness in hospital expenditure, on which 
successive budget increases come to operate, with regard to the whole 
set of individual responses of the Hospital Boards in facing budget 
restraints. Mainly, this relates to such factors as the degree of 
managerial habit formation, which notion prevails as the "maximum 
allowable request", the degree of risk-aversiveness of the Medical Director 
and Hospital Administrator to commit additional levels of expenditure, how 
strong are the bargaining powers of the territorial Health Authorities, etc. 
This is obviously due to the fact that the impact of those behavioural 
factors depend on the levels of 'discretion' allowed by current levels of 
expenditure on which budget increases apply. 
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Since an 'engineering' approach testing for the influence of 
these joint factors on the hospital performance is obviously 
difficult, and given that definitive conclusions would require very 
detailed analysis and managerial experimentation, we explore at this 
stage of our research only some suggestions in support of the former 
factors in a tentative way.. This is, 
(i) with respect to the wide range of variation in some 
ratios of utilization of hospital inputs, throughout 
measures or some simple workload indicators, as done in the Appendix to this Chapter, and which can serve 
to point out the extent of the issue of variable 
productivity; 
(ii) with regard to the operational mechanisms of variable 
hospital productivity; this is, about some changes in 
manpower inputs over time with reference to the 
evolution of some work-load indicators, and with (15) 
regard to the differential gap between wage increases 
and the increases in the cost of living or in the implicit 
deflator for private health care expenditure (as altern- 
ative proxies used for collecting the actual increase in 
the physicians' private earnings). 
The evidence provided in Table 11.2, although still limited, can be used 
in support of this last point. 
Therefore, the suggestion advanced earlier with regard to the 
mechanisms of the generation of variable productivity seems to be 
well grounded in reality. As it can be seen in Table 11.2, the 
increase in wages of hospital registrar doctors (who constitute the 
most important category of hospital physicians - although the utilis 
ation of other categories does not change the validity of these results - 
see table of footnote 15) - have left far behind the general increases in 
the index of cost of living and of the implicit deflator of health care 
consumption for the periods studied. At the same time, the increase 
in the number of hospital physicians has risen far more quickly than 
the total number of beds, patients or patient-days, both in the case 
of the total Social Security Hospitals and of the General Hospitals 
included in the sample studied for the periods between 1975 and 1980, 
and from 1977 to 1980, respectively. 
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TABLE 11.2 
Wage_restrain 
_and 
the evolution of some 
_hospital 
indicators 
Increase in the total Increase in the Increase in 
_ 
wage bill of hospital general cost of the implicit 
r. egistcar', physicians, living. deflator for 
in percentage terms, (consumption health care 
over the former year. prices). consumption 1-2 2-3 
(1) (2) (3) 
1974 11.5 15.7 17.4 -4.2 -5.2 
1975 19.2 17.0 10.4 2.2 2.2 
1976 13.3 17.7 21.5 -4.4 -3.0 
1977 20.5 24.6 21.5 -4.1 -4.6 
1978 16.0 19.8 17.7 -3.8 -4.1 
1979 11.0 15.7 15.0 -4.7 -4.0 
1980 12.5 15.5 12.1 -3.0 0.4 
1981 12.5 14.6 14.3 -2.1 -1.8 
Evolution of-some hospital-indicators 
----------------- 
1975/1980: Total Social Security 1977/1980: Social Security 
General Hospitals. 
-Percentage increases- -Percentage increases- 
Number of: 
patients 27.3 16.52 
Bed-days 27.9 16.58 
Beds 34.3 14.23 
Hospital 47.1 21.82 
physicians 
total hospital 33.0 14.34 
manpower 
Total S. Security 23.7 - physicians 
INSALUD 
hospital nurses 22.8* - & other clinical 
auxiliars 
*- Given data available, figures refer here to eriod 1976-81 
Source: INE, INSALUD, National Accounts Statistics. 
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2.6. THE PATTERN OF THE ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE AND SUMMARY OF 
THE CHAPTER. 
The phenomenon of variable productivity, in the sense defined 
in this Chapter, is an extended feature -not always recognised in 
the literature- of the performance of institutions, and it appears 
to be particularly relevant to the Spanish hospital Health Care sector. 
This Chapter has offered first a definition of 'relative efficiency' 
in operational terms - which provides thereafter a well grounded empirical 
approach for its analysis - and it has explored a set of behavioural 
factors which can explain the issue of variable productivity in the 
Spanish hospital sector and their mechanisms of operation. Although 
an appropriate test for the workings of these factors is still difficult 
at this stage, we have provided some evidence that seems to support the 
basic line of the argument. 
In sum, we conclude that in the absence of a rational objective 
and an explicitly stated budget constraint imposed on hospital 
activity, hospital expenditure has been mostly controlled by a short- 
X sighted incomes policy. This has left physicians' wage increases 
far behind the general rise in the cost of living. At the same time, 
the existing problems in the sector have been left untackled. 
A situation has existed where there is an extended lack of monitoring 
of the working-time schedule and disregard of any detailed evaluation 
of hospital expenses. In this context, the phenomenon of variable 
productivity can be seen to be a natural result of the agents' 
selective rational behaviour. In fact, hospital agents and physicians 
in particular may have responded to these central policies of restrain 
by relaxing their work-effort, following to some extent the external 
guidelines given by the opportunity costs of exercising the public practice 
in terms of the earnings achieved from private practice. 
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The way in which hospitals have obtained their revenues has also 
been decisive for this result. Thus, the actual levels of slackness 
have been consolidated over-time by lobbying from the current expenditure 
positions, and by using demand factors to influence the supply of hospital 
inputs by arguing for changes in the manpower levels of staff employed. 
In this context, a change in the present organisational features 
and budget arrangements is needed in order to provide a rational framework 
for efficiency motivation in the decision-making process of hospital 
allocation of resources, and hence in hospital performance. 
Some changes at the institutional level have been recently proposed 
in the first draft of the Spanish Bill for Hospital Reform (see footnote 11 
in Chapter I) and, in short, these consist of: 
(i) Facing the peculiar relationship between the financers of 
hospitals (INSALUD) and the hospitals themselves (mainly, 
because INSALUD is a highly centralized body, unable to 
monitor the performance of the hospitals) by: - Basing any institutional change on the new regionally decentralised 
INSALUD organization and on the constitution of an Area 
Health Council with a representative Area Health Director 
and an effective Area Health Manager. 
- Framing the hospital management aspects into the 
attribution of full autonomy and responsibility to the 
Directive-Management-Technical Team of the Hospital 
(section 3.1 of the Bill). 
- Allocating the responsibility for setting monitoring 
controls at the subcentral level, basically through a 
hospital information system adjusted to management 
orientated goals, and the implementation of analytical 
accountancy for cost centers. 
(ii} Confronting the exclusive dominance of the physician in the 
hospital decision-making process (i. e. against the fact that 
Hospital Boards are dominated by the medical profession, with 
administrators as clerks of the Hospital Boards, not vested 
with any significant role in the decision-making process) through: 
- the separation of the lines of Medical 
Direction and Hospital 
Management, assigning a supra-role to the Hospital manager 
responsible for the achievement of the institutional targets 
on the basis of the means centrally allocated. 
- The restatement of the 
functions of the 'Chiefs of Department' 
in the direction of assuming administrative tasks and financial 
responsibilities in their Departments for limited time periods 
and never for life. 
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- The inclusion of political and citizens' representatives in the Area Health Council. 
- The presentation of a Chart of the Users' rights and duties (Sept. 1983). 
(iii)Proposals against the widespread existence of 'pluriempleo' 
amongst the medical profession (the existence of which has 
enabled physicians, according to our hypothesis, to vary their total remuneration by varying the hours of work in the public and private sector): 
- The Bill for the Hospital Reform proposes changes in the 
working conditions scheduled with the inclusion of morning 
and afternoon duties and with the total working time in the 
hospital coordinated with the requirement of filling over- 
night duties (instead of those being instrumented as a way 
of achieving an extra compensatory remuneration from the 
public practice, as it is at present) (points 3.9.1 of the 
Bill proposals). 
- Changes in the working status of the doctors towards; a) the 
exclusive or full-time exercise, non compatible with the private 
medical practice; b) the non-exclusive commitment or the 
possibility of exercising both compatible practices; c) the 
appointment of part-time associated or consultant physicians. 
Different levels of remuneration are assigned to each status 
(points 3.9.2. ). 
- The implementation at the departamental level of some standards 
of activity and quality for the hospital health care provided, 
monthly controlled by the Direction Team of the hospital. 
For the second type of changes - that is, those refering to the 
nature of the existing budget-based arrangements - although some general 
points are made in the proposed Bill. (mostly in the sense of allocating 
budgets according to the responsibilities and the management objectives 
assigned) not much insight is provided in the Bill. This leaves open 
the problem of the efficiency motivation in which the former behavioural 
changes can be expected to operate in practice, and indicates the 
existing interest of research on the different strategies for reinforcing 
the budget constraint for revenue planning purposes: That is, the 
concern in providing an objective and prospectively stated financial 
constraint, capable of being inserted into the hospital decision-making 
process as a major watchdog for efficiency, as this thesis will pursue. 
The core of this alternative policy will be explored in the next 
chapter, in which a budget based-output sharing system will be presented 
as opti nial in the context of the Spanish hospital decision-making process. 
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FOOTNOTES. 
(1) The overall sample, and subsamples selected for the initial comparison refer to 1979. For the static purpose in this context, the overall sample was scrutinized for certain observations which presented some sort of operational irregularity for that year; say, not being in full operation, suffering reforms, etc. The main results derived from the analysis of the sample were afterwards validated with respect to the rest of 'Functional-Economic Reports' of INSALUD for 1980 and 1981, already available. They in fact proved that the sample selected was fully representative and stable over the period. 
(2) Similarly, pharmaceutical and hospital medical treatments 
could be also considered as intermediate inputs for the final outcome of improving the health states of the patients, 
as, for example, health education, preventive care or 
community life style might also be considered. Moreover, 
hospital institutional performance for these purposes can 
also be framed within certain aspects of alternative 
provisions, such as those medical services provided in 
outpatient clinics, day-surgery centers or nursing homes. 
(3) 'Technical efficiency' refers to the utilization of the 
minimum input per unit of output for each input in the 
firm; 'price efficiency' 
_ 
can be defined with respect to 
the extra costs incurred by using a combination outside 
the optimum tangency point on the isocost line; 
'allocative efficiency' refers, on the other hand, to 
a given economic arrangement (mix of inputs or output 
combination) for which there can be no rearrangement 
which will leave someone 'better off' without worse- 
ning the position of any one else; finally, the notion 
of "grand efficiency" introduces explicitly questions of 
equity in the allocation of resources. 
(4) See for this purpose M. DENNY and M. FUSS. University of 
Toronto Working Papers no. 8202,8131 and 8018. 
(5) In principle, some targets can be defined (i) in terms of 
access to inputs; (ii) in terms of the resulting outputs 
(this second view would need to adjust not only the different 
purchasing power of resources in the different geographic 
areas but also the productivity of the resource utilisation 
throughout the different communities); (iii) in terms of 
the outcome achieved from the output provision, or the con- 
sequences derived from its utilization (e. g. regarding the 
impact on the 'client states' for different groups and 
regions). 
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In addition, they can either use (as the denominators of the indicators) 'per capita figures', a concept of 'need' 
or changes in individual health states. We will not 
explore this problem which can be seen in G. MOONEY (1980). 
(6) In this line, see the article by MILLWARD and RAINEY "Don't blame the bureaucracy" in the Journal of Public Policy, 3.2.1983. 
The same argument is in P. M. JACKSON "Political 
economy of the bureaucracy? Philip Allan Publisher, 
Oxford 1982. Writing about this, Jackson points out: 'as a theoretical exercise, the comparison of market 
structures always permits perfect competition to win 
over the monopoly since the game is played with dice 
loaded by tautology. It will always be the case that 
perfect competition will win by the definition of 
efficiency we start-off with. However, the technical 
conditions required to establish a general competitive 
equilibrium are very stringent. In practice these 
conditions do not exist', (page 207). 
(7) This is basically the view of A. J. CULYER, A. MAYNARD and 
A. WILLIAMS in "Alternative Systems of Health care provision; 
An Essay on Motes and Beans", in M. OLSON: "A new approach 
to the economics of Health Care" A. E. I. Washington, 1981; or 
in a more recent article of A. J. CULYER "Health Care and 
the Market: A British Lament", Topics in Health Economics 
no. 3,1982. 
(8) In "The Geography of Public Finance", R. J. BENNETT introduces 
tentatively the question of differences in spatial productivity 
"concerning the relative efficiency with which public services 
are provided in different jurisdictions". Productivity 'should' 
differ as a result of technical factors, such as community size 
(reflecting scale economies and density) but, in addition, 
differences 'may' result from the different degree of effectiveness 
with which some jurisdictions combine factor inputs to produce a 
given level of quality of public service outputs. This result 
can be derived in this context at least partly from the differences 
in incentives operating on local governments to be more efficient, 
from local political pressures, etc.. Productivity differences 
also may derive from differences in preferences for service 
organization or from some differential degrees of public pressures 
and citizens' participation, and again, differences in productivity 
may also differ due to the existing institutional organization. 
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In the applied field it should be recognized the 
contribution of M. DENNIS and M. FUSS in "Intertemporal 
and Interspatial comparisons of Cost Efficiency and Productivity". Univ. of Toronto Working Papers, 1981. 
The question of the need of assessing common forms of the 
prodution function for comparison purposes has been 
mathematically treated by JORGENSON and NISHIMIZU (1978) 
by building a "transcendental logarithmic function". 
In fact, its quadratic approximation requires only some 
few second order coefficients in the components of the 
comparison to be identical allowing, however, for wider differences in the constant and linear coefficients in 
the specification of the production functions compared. 
(9) Unlike the theories which suggest that regional problems 
will disappear automatically because of the operation of 
market forces, the theory of cumulative causation maintains 
that the prior level of productivity is in itself an important 
contribution to its growth, leading to higher increases 
of productivity which raise thereafter the former levels and 
allow for further increases in their rate of growth. This 
theory is due originally to N. KALDOR in "Causes of the slow 
rate of growth of the United Kingdom. An inaugural lecture". 
Cambridge University Press, 1966. 
(10) At the micro economic level, this tax-price component would 
make possible, in principle, some margins for direct market 
simulation: particularly in those areas in which the 'benefit 
principle' is applied. 
The function of a pricing scheme would be to determine how 
the costs of financing the public good are to be shared amongst 
the users. However, while on efficiency grounds there is 
no reason to prefer the benefit pricing rule to any other financing 
scheme, on equity grounds thes'e may exist if value judgements are 
made about the resulting distribution effects. 
That market simulation is not, however, in our view, 
helpful from an operational point of view, given the set of specific 
assumptions required and which are mostly related to the notion of 
the marginal benefits raised from public expenditure and the marginal 
costs derived from the resulting tax distorsions. 
(11) These authors basically note that most of the former literature 
on grants has derived the local response to each specific type 
of grant from the nominal or legal requirements involved in the 
structure of the grant itself. However, this s an assumption 
which needs to be empirically proved and it is4ikely false. 
The effects of a grant depends critically on the structure of 
the local decision-making process, which ultimately determinesthe 
allocation of resources. For example, budget maximizing bureaucrats 
may react against the way in which grants are allocated by keeping 
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the citizens on their initial bundle of non-public goods, 
and taking any difference as a net transfer to be devoted 
to enlarging the amount of goods provided by the bureaus. 
This results in an inefficient allocation because of the change in the relative prices of the initial basket 
of goods up to the level of the expanded amount in the 
goods provided. 
In a similar way, by introducing the assumption 
of the existence of citizens' fiscal illusion, the problem 
can be analyzed from the supply side, with agents capturing 
all the potential consumer surplus through 
whichever expansion in the output levels is made. Therefore, how the state and local sector responses are 
influenced by the central aids of various sorts is an empirical 
question. What it is required is a theoretical framework that 
incorporates explicitly the decision-making process of the. 
institutions which are recipients of the grants together with 
the own structure of the grant. 
(12) As a consequence of what we expressed in the footnote 11, an 
adaptive response may be produced on the local fiscal 
behaviour, given the way in which the grant impacts on the 
expenditure side of the budget. This is studied particularly 
once the dominant approach to the determinant factors of 
local government expenditure is abandonned and the place is 
occupied by the institutional approach. The influence of 
that impact gives rise to the study of incentives for local 
governments to provide services more efficiently, stimulating 
additional expenditure or evaluating its current levels. 
The stimulative effects of intergovernmental grants; and 
the potential substitution of the otherwise revenues locally 
raised, have been specifically studied by P. N. COURANT; E. M. 
GRAMLICH and H. GALPER (1973). For the British case in 
particular, ASHFORD et al, (1976), B. LYNCH and M. PERLMAN 
(1971; K. CUTHBERTSON, J. S. FOREMAN-PECK and P. GRIPAIOS 
(1981) and K. SCHOTT (1982) have presented some applications. 
(13) At any rate, it is rather difficult to determine the precise 
meaning of this 'minimum level'. This problem is similar 
to that of fixing the notion of 'maximum earnings' in the 
case of the physician's profit maximization hypothesis. 
As R. G. EVANS (1974) has pointed out, that 'maximum' can 
be defined a priori, more or less reallistically, by introducing, 
for example, a 'medical ethics' notion into the physician 
objective function, defining a labour-leisure trade-off, or 
by redefining some levels of physician utility satisfaction. 
In the same way that the profit maximization hypothesis 
could represent the 168 hours of work a week, the utility 
maximization hypothesis in our context, with the wage level 
being regarded as some sort of given minimum, would obviously 
lead to the supply of a zero level of effort. 
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(14) This benchmark in fixing the amount to be earned is 
argued to be based on social considerations about status 
and dignity in what is felt to be, as a whole, a 'hard work' 
activity for which a poor remuneration is offered during 
the time of the junior physician training. In fact, the 
survey shows that physicians view themselves as being in 
a continuous position of service (between 50 and 60 hours 
a week), and that they feel that higher incomes are a fair 
compensation for the time and effortt`evoted yesterday to 
ov medical training, and today to the exercise of their 
profession. 
(15) The increase in the overall remuneration of hospital physicians 
(thousand pesetas)can be seen in the following table: 
Head of Department. 
(6 hours/day) 
Head of Service 
(6 hours/day) 
Head of Section 
(6 hours/day) 
Registrars 
(6 hours/day) 
General increase 
in the cost of 
living 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
- 11.7 19.6 10.9 10.9 13.0 
- 11.7 19.6 11.1 11.9 13.4 
- 10.0 19.4 9.8 17.0 14.3 
- 11.5 19.2 13.3 20.5 16.0 
11.5 15.7 17.0 17.7 24.6 19.8 
Source: Own elaboration from INE and INP data (today 'INSALUD'). 
For indicative purposes, we should distinguish the share of the 
three main components of the physicians' wage remuneration. 
Taking figures from 1980, these were their basic proportions: 
Staff categon¬s 'baseline 'position 'extraordinary Total 
wage' complement' payments' 
Chief of Department 
(6 hours) 26.3 55.5 18.2 100 
Chief of Service 
(6 hours) 27.4 53.2 19.4 100 
Chief of Section 
(6 hours) 35.0 49.8 15.2 100 
Registrar 
(6 hours) 45.8 26.7 28.5 100 
'Registrars' is here used as the equivalent to the Spanish 
category of 'Adjunto'. 
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APPEND IX2.1. 
As it can be seen in the following tables, although an effort 
was made to group the initial observations belonging to the overall 
sample of "Health Residences" into Subsamples with higher "within group" 
homogeneous characteristics and a lower "between group" degree of 
homogeneity (as described in Chapter V), the values of the coefficient 
of variation for some basic indicators remain relatively high, far 
above those which could be expected from some statutorily regulated 
condition of provision. 
TABLE 1 
Overall Subsample Only teaching Only non- HR with HR without 
Year 1979 Sarrple Selected 'Health teaching out- outpatient 
Residencies' HR patient services 
(HR) services 
Nurber of beds available 
per physician 
- Coef of Variatian 
- Van 
- Standard Deviation 
Number of nurses per 
physician 
- Coef of Variation 
- (`fan 
- Standard Deviation 
- 27.6 21.6 30.6 24.0 45.5 
3.48 3.55 3.90 3.27 3.58 3.41 
- 0.98 0.844 1.00 0.86 1.55 
- 27.4 19.3 31.3 24.9 38.9 
3.46* 3.725 4.175 3.359 3.687 3.930 
- 1.021 0.805 1.046 0.918 1.529 
Average cost per case (pts) 
- Coef of Variation - 
- Nban 75747 
- Standard Deviation - 
Average cost per patient 
day (pesetas) 
- Coef of Variation 
N ban, 
- Standard Deviation 
23.2 19.8 25.9 20.8 23.3 
71034 73493 69013 68142 86577 
16468 14540 17904 14157 20176 
- 20.3 16.3 23.3 17.2 18.6 11200 8010 7979 8036 7654 9922 
- 1623 1301 1870 1320 1848 
Source: 'InfonTe Econ6mico - Funcional de los Instituciones Sanitarias'. 1979 
(*) - This figure has had to be referred 
to 1976, given existing data available. 
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We explored afterwards a greater range on indicators for the 
final Subsample selected: 
TABLE 2 
Average length of stay 
Bed Occupancy rate 
Total personnel per bed 
Nunber of cases per personnel 
- per physician 
- per nurse 
- per ancillary worker 
- total 
Number of beneficiaries and affiliated 
per total personnel 
Average cost per bed available 
(thousand pesetas) 
Average cost per case on (pesetas) 
- pharmaceutical inputs 
- surgical inputs 
- Lab. inputs 
- radiology inputs 
Nan SD Coefficient of variation 
8.94 1.53 17.11 
77.68°/ 14.45% 18.60 
1.81 0.93 51.4 
114.79 32.54 28.3 
31.90 8.84 27.7 
62.55 24.15 38.6 
17.42 4.72 27.1 
468.16 197.9 42.3 
2317.3 741.8 32.0 
4447 2799 63.0 
1931 1840 95.3 
1092 639 58.5 
567 308 54.3 
Source: 'Infornre Econömico Funcional de las Instituciones Sanitarias'. 1979 
Finally, we analysed some performance indicators for the different 
categories of staff in the Subsample finally selected. 
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TABLE 3 
ANALYSIS of score 
PERFO1 ANCE INDICATORS 
per HOSPITAL STAFF 
Staff Categories 
Number of beds available per each staff Category 
Sarple values (1979) 
Mean SD I4xinun %oIrTun Coef. of 
Value Value Variation 
Total number of 
Mean SD 
RANK A (Physicians chiefs 
of Medical Services and .. _8.81 
2.36 14.8 3.33 26.8 
Section, and Pharrnacists) 
RANK B (Regtskrar physicians 6.52 1.73 11.8 2.71 26.5 
and Assist. 14 w fists). 
RANK C (Junior 
,,,, _ 
50. 50. -- 237 -- 
physicians) 
A+B+C 3.5 0.92 5.83 1.38 26.3 
Rank a (Midwifes and ,,, 
26.4 8.0 54.5 10. 30.3 
physioterapists) 
Rank b (Nurses, ATS) 1.87 0.41 2.95 0.57 21.9 
Rank c (Clinica Auxiliar) 2.32 0.64 3.93 1.01 27.6 
a+b+c 0.97 0.20 1.43 0.40 20.6 
Rank x Ancillary workers , 8.6 2.9 18.3 3.11 
33.7 
(technical and special 
services) 
Rank y Professional and ,, 
16.2 18.0 81.7 3.88 -- 
clerks. 
Rank z Ancillary workers, 3.2 0.95 5.84 1.23 29.7 
(auxiliar and 'for services) 
x+Y+z 1.91 0.60 3.63 0.90 
31.4 
TOTAL PERSONNEL ..... 
0.53 0.10 0.77 0.23 18.9 
9.2 2.41 
6.8 1.75 
54.50. 
3.65 0.91 
27.6 8.14 
1.94 0.37 
2.44 0.71 
0.97 0.19 
9.0 2.8 
16.8 17.9 
3.19 0.95 
1.91 0.6 
0.55 0.09 
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i 
Number of patients treated per each 
beds per each staff category 
staff category 
Sample values (1979) 
ale values (1979) 
Max Min. Coef. of Mean SD Max. Min. Coef. of 
Value Value Variation Value Value Variation 
'5.8 4.7 26.2 
i. 8 3.54 25.7 
208. 
5.83 1.92 24.9 
4.5 15.4 29.5 
288 77.6 443 128 26.9 
213 54.2 347 91.7 25.5 
1666 2000 - 6516 -- 
114 30 187 49 26.3 
872 306 1852 395 35.1 
2.95 1.27 19.1 
4.6 1.02 29.1 
1.43 0.40 19.6 
18.3 3.1 31.1 
1.7 5.1 -- 
5.84 1.24 29.8 
3.63 0.90 31.4 
0.77 0.36 16.4 
61.8 16.8 102 26.5 27.2 
76.2 22.4 127 35 29.4 
32.1 8.16 53.4 167 25.4 
287.9 113.1 591 85.3 39.3 
572 696 28.38 84.16 - 
106 38.6 148 54 36.4 
64 26 127 25 40.6 
17.6 4.4 28.8 83 25.0 
Ntxrter of potential beneficiaries and 
affiliated per each staff category 
Sample values (1979) 
Nan SD Max. Min. Coef. of 
Value Value Variation 
7562 3030 14280 1936 40.1 
5608 2313 10984 2369 41.2 
38226 47121 - 16581 - 
3016 1242 6208 1005 41.2 
23924 13765 70432 6915 57.5 
1637 815 511 785 49.8 
2027 976 5469 531 48.1 
849 374 2108 306 44.0 
7567 3711 16977 2298 49.0 
15218 19878 405648 2732 - 
2783 1363 7546 931 49.0 
1683 880 4695 692 52.3 
464 198 983 184 42.7 
'dý' 
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CHAPTERIII 
A BUDGET POLICY AIMED AT PROMOTING EFFICIENCY IN THE HOSPITAL SECTOR. 
3.1. INTRODUCTION. 
We have seen in the previous chapters that there exists a need 
to give INSALUD the scope to provide hospitals with incentives to be 
efficient, and that the existing budgetary mechanisms cannot be used 
as a means of promoting efficiency. The question to be answered in 
this chapter is how could we do this. 
The Outline of the Present Chapter is as follows: 
We will examine first which factors need to be taken into account 
in designing a goal-orientated budget policy and, particularly, (i) 
which is the appropriate setting for the policy; that is, how should 
management delegation and the budget relationship be regulated; 
(ii) whether we can specify within the resulting framework, a policy 
able to raise incentive compatibility on both sides of the delegation. 
For this, we ' to recognize that the present relationship, while 
treated as a hierarchical type of relation, is to all intents and 
purposes, an Agency-type of relationship (section 3.2.1. ). 
This recognition will imply, as we will see, the need to set up 
the terms of an optimal reward structure, capable in principle of 
producing incentive compatability (section 3.2.2). According to the 
Agency theory, some form of output-sharing can be expected to be 
appropriate for this type of situation. Thus, we will search for 
the optimal financial arrangement which, together with the insertion 
of incentives for efficiency motivation, could contribute to changes 
in the work-effort over and above the minimum levels (section 3.3). 
Given that efficient output-sharing can both create incentive com- 
patibility and lead to a work-effort in excess of some minima, the 
next step is to study what type of output sharing is 'optimal' 
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for our purposes. That is: how we could design a form of 
output-sharing capable of modifying behaviour over time 
(removing X-inefficiency) and accounting for the phenomenon 
of variable productivity (section 3.4.1). 
We will take Malcomson's result on internal incentives and 
wage hierarchies, applied to our modified model for a reimbursement 
policy under differential levels of performance, to prove that 
this policy for internal incentives could in fact be constructed 
and could be optimal under a specific set of objective rules. 
(section 3.4.2). 
Several implicit assumptions are made ire deriving this result 
(e. g. that a suitable unit of "work" can be observed and measured 
with sufficient accuracy). We will examine then whether all 
these conditions will hold in the hospital sector (3.4.2) and, 
if this is the case, how, according to the theory, the use of 
a budget-based contract as a form of output-sharing could modify 
hospital behaviour over time. The properties of this budget- 
based contract will be derived mathematically and represented 
in diagramatic terms for illustrative purposes. 
Section 3.4.3 explores the way in which such a budget-based output- 
sharing system could be operationalised in the Spanish hospital 
sector. Particular attention is paid to issues of monitoring 
and measurement and to some general considerations about the behaviour 
of the agents, with respect to the characteristics of the output- 
sharing system, to ensure that their reaction will work in 
accordance with the system goals. 
Assuming that we can operationalise the system, the question 
that then remains in our actual context is "What the likely effects 
would be, (or would have been) if the policy were (or had been) 
implemented? ', 
A simulation and other tests will be presented for these purposes 
(section 3.5) prior to the specific design of a Prospective Revenue 
Allocation policy which addresses all the former points. This is 
the objective of this chapter. 
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-Summarizing this third chapter aims to provide an insight into the 
economics of a Prospective Reimbursement Policy which, being linked 
to some observed levels of performance, is orientated finally 
towards the correction of some cost deviations, as reflected by 
the notion of variable productivity. 
3.2. FACTORS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN DESIGNING A BUDGET POLICY. 
Under the existing arrangements, the budgetary mechanisms in the 
Spanish hospital sector cannot be effective in the promotion of 
hospital efficiency. This would seem to be due to three factors: 
(i) INSALUD being organized as a 'pyramidal' structure, based on 
a hierarchical communication network, cannot monitor the 
performance of its hospitals closely; even if it were 
capable of doing so, the inforcement of its directives 
is likely to be a rather complex and costly task. 
(ii) Hospital physicians would have no incentives to honour 
the directives laid down by INSALUD, given the scope 
for discretional decisions which remain in their hands, 
and the technological knowledge available to them for 
the exercise of the profession with respect to the 
utilization of inputs 'scientifically' required. 
(iii) The payment to physicians of a fixed wage remuneration 
and the cost-based retrospective nature of the hospital 
reimbursement system, (which constitute the financial 
environment surrounding the hospital decision-making 
process) cannot provide the incentives required for 
closing the gap that exists between technical knowledge 
and motivation for improving the hospital performance. 
Therefore, it seems obvious that there is a need for a change in 
the basis of the relationship between hospitals and INSALUD if an 
appropriate budget policy, aimed at promoting efficiency by changing 
agents' behaviour, is to be implemented successfully. 
Two main factors need to be taken into account in the design of 
a goal-orientated budget policy. First, what is the appropriate 
basis for framing the relationship analysed. That is, which is 
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the setting in which the actual network or budgetary inter- 
relations occur, regarding particularly the scope of the 
decisions and powers of both sides of the delegation. Second, 
whether any problem of incentive compativility is present and, 
if this is the case, whether it can be tackled through an efficient 
reward structure, grounded in a budget policy. 
Both points are examined in the next subsections. 
3.2.1. The appropriate setting for the policy. 
If there is to be a successful implementation of a budgetary 
system aimed at improving hospital eff iciency, then clearly there 
needs to be an appropriate regulation of the relationship between 
INSALUD and Hospital Boards. As described in previous chapters, 
the present inter-relation is regulated statutorily within a 
hierarchical system, with unity of command and spanned control 
of management. This is done via central directives, enhanced 
by the INSALUD territorial delegates. 
In this context, if INSALUD is going to have some impact on 
hospital behaviour, it needs to have the power to enforce its 
directives on policy targets set up by the Health Authorities. 
This has proved virtually impossible to achieve through the 
existing hierachical network, which fails to recognize the nature 
of the actual relationship between hospitals and INSALUD (more 
similar - as we will see - to an Agency type of relationship than 
to a hierarchical type of relation). This is mainly due to the 
following factors: 
(i) Less than full information is available to INSALUD Authorities 
about hospital agents' performance. The nature of the output 
provided and the technological information barrier which are 
used frequently as justifications of the actual input utiliz- 
ation, are two factors which make performance particularly 
difficult to check. 
(ii) In addition, problems of behavioural dependence can accompany 
those problems of informational dependence, breaking the 
postulates of the efficient communication network required 
for the operation of hierarchical structures under conditions 
of no-clear observability of the outcomes and no direct 
monitoring of the inputs utilized by the agents. 
I 
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(iii) As a result, hospital agents, performing under less than completely specified contracts, come to dominate the behaviour of the institutions. In these contexts, only the identity of interests between parts can guarantee the achievement of the organisation's targets. This is, 
however, unlikely whenever rational agents take advantage 
of the behavioural and informational assymmetries sup- 
port the power with which they are vested. 
3.2.2. Incentive compatfbility and the efficient reward structure. 
However, the current regulation of the institutional relationship 
has failed to recognize the existence of the efficiency motivation problem. 
Indeed, hierarchical structures, by nature, do not treat specifically 
the issue of the potential shortcomings caused by the lack of the identity 
of interests between the individuals and the organisations. Economic 
institutions are monitered to perform in these contexts as a sort of 
neoclassical "black-box" in which individuals behave in a blind 
mechanistic fashion or, alternatively, operate within a context in which 
rewards are expected to stimulate the individuals productive response, 
preventing any form of economic "shirking". 
This view of economic reality exhibits ovbious deficiencies, 
either because of failing to recognise the factors (i) to (iii) 
mentioned in section 3.2.1 or due to the fact that, in practice - 
and in particular in the hierarchical context - wage rates do not 
relate to marginal productivities and, therefore, market rewards cannot 
provide 'per se' incentive motivation to the agents (Lazear, 1979). In 
these cases it remains to be explained why any goal is ultimately sub- 
scribed to by the individual agents, and then, the problem of incentive 
compatihili may need to be explicitly treated and taken into account 
for the design of an appropriate budget policy for promoting efficiency 
amongst revenue recipients. 
In fact, the problem of incentive promotion, and the efficient 
reward structure to achieve it, can be considered a sequential one. 
When the incentive problem appears - e. g. when management has only 
imperfect information about the abilities and willingness of individuals 
to work, and the outcome of the Agency (but not eh Agents' work effort) 
can be observed - the reimbursement policy needs to address, 
in some way, 
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the question of efficient funding. Otherwise, postulates of 
rationality may involve a constant perverse incentive for reducing 
the agents' work-effort instead of moving it to some targeted 
outcomes. As Alchian and Demsetz have pointed out (1), in these 
circumstances each individual may be able to adjust rather freely 
his work-effort with respect to the realized reward, so as to 
equalize the marginal rate of substitution in consumption. 
In other words, under less than complete contracts and a lack 
of performance monitoring, each agent will feel induced to take more 
leisure, because the effects of relaxing his rate of substitution 
between output and leisure will be less than the effect on the 
true rate of substitution. Thus, any contract that would pay a 
pure wage in these circumstances would involve no incentive to honour 
the agreement, since the worker could take his wage as given and select 
an effort level which tends to zero. 
Given then the entire set of factors surrounding the institutional 
relationship under consideration, the Agency type of relationship is 
thought to be the most appropriate setting for analysing the nature of 
the delegation between the INSALUD and the Hospital Boards. This 
approach does obviously need some changes in the current statutory and 
financial arrangements which accompany the regulation for the allocation 
of overall value responsibility to the decentralized agencies (i. e. holding 
the funding at the central level), with the purpose of providing the basis 
for the promotion of efficiency improvements in performance. 
(2) 
In 
addition two questions need to be dealt with: 
a) which postulates can support in this relationship a 
model of incentive compatibility for the achievement 
of some common goals?. 
b) What is the optimal reward structure on which to base 
the required budgetary arrangements?. 
The first question is analysed in the next pages within the framework 
provided by the theory of the Agency relationship, with central funding 
and attribution of overall responsibility to the decentralized agencies 
in the sector. This is considered both generally and in the specific 
case of hospital units within the health care sector. The second 
problem will be solved in the context of the intra-sectorial 
financial 
agreements, verifiable by those parties involved in the relationship. 
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They will be presented thereafter as the basis of a wider theory 
of resource allocation and, in particular, of the design of a 
Prospective Reiumbursement policy. 
In this context, we will consider the potential effects of a 
change in the funding methods of hospital expenses aimed at breaking 
the causation of system inefficiency. The new funding methods will 
introduce incentives for efficiency improvements and will seek to 
control, in addition, the factors which are thought to cause 
variable productivity. 
In sum, the formulation ofan incentive policy for a cost-conscious 
management of hospital resources can be designed from a budget policy 
which focusses on the Agents' compensation for a given work-effort and, 
more widely, on the Agencies' reimbursement according to performance. 
These points will be examined in the next sections. 
3.3. CENTRAL FUNDING AND HOSPITAL PERFORMANCE UNDER THE AGENCY 
RELATIONSHIP 
In light of the discussion above, the relationship between hospitals 
and INSALUD Central Board can be better framed from the view of an Agency 
type relationship, where the first (designated as the Agents) act on 
behalf of the second (or the Principal) in a particular domain in the 
hospital decision-making process, and mainly in the case of recurring 
decisions and sequential transactions involved in hospital activity. 
In this framework, the principal is the one statutorily nominated 
with the responsibility for the provision of the service and for the 
overall management of resources. Whether this is designated as the 
Central INSALUD Board, the Regional Health Authority or any other more 
decentralized level of management, it does not change the nature of the 
principal. However, it has consequences for the type of monitoring 
which can be exercised, given the amount of information available in 
each of those organisational steps. 
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The agent in our model is, in principle, the Hospital Board. 
In reality, given the nature of the internal management and organ- 
isation of Spanish hospitals, the hospital physician can be con- 
sidered the ultimate unit of analysis. Thus, the Agent-physician 
is the unit supplying work-effort in terms of medical services to 
produce 'output'. 
. 
SFveral reasons exist for recognizing the Agency relationship 
to be most appropriate. First, the enviroment surrounding the 
relationship, as we have seen, creates problems of information 
access and 'adverse selection', and hence involves behavioural 
dependence from the agent activity (or the moral hazard issue). 
This is due fundamentally to the fact that the extent of the in- 
dividuals' choice of the time-activity-pace cannot be fully observed. 
Secondly, the Agency type of relationship is more appropriate, 
having seen the particular relation of interests and powers involved: 
That is, whereas the principal is vested with reimbursement powers 
and concerned with the cost-conscious management of resources, the 
Agents' objective can be defined mostly in terms of the remuneration 
achieved for a given work-effort. The lack of identity of interests 
in this context involves pure wage contracts being inefficient in 
motivating Agents, in a context in which a complete monitoring of 
the Agent activity is extremely complex. 
But in defining in practice the nature of the particular type 
of Agency relation relevant in our context, some important questions 
need to be considered. They are: 
(i) What are the predominant reasons giving rise to the Agency 
delegation (i. e. problems of information access or 
behavioural dependence) and which part of the relationship 
is most affected by the implementation of the control 
policy designed? (For instance, is it the improvement 
in the information available for purposes of greater control 
for further central monitoring -i. e. providing Agents with 
incentives to reveal information but keeping overall Agency 
autonomy - or the attempt to achieve direct changes in 
the work-effort supplied by modifying the agents' behaviour)? 
(ii) The intrinsic character of the relationship with regard to 
the potential limits for cooperative behaviour (either with 
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reference to an initial point or through the 
sequential search for an outcome equilibrium). 
(iii) The nature of the delegation from the principal to 
the agent, and whether the long run operational 
point of view dominates for this purpose any short- 
term influence (given, for example, the time horizon 
of a public agreement with privat'ly owned hospitals). 
(iv) Finally, whether there exists a random element or 
risk-bearing factor for any of the parties involved 
in the relationship with respect to agent's productive 
knowledge and the outcome of his/her activity. 
In consequence, according to the terms and the nature of the 
relationship defined, the principal enjoys the outcome of the agents' 
activity (i. e. the statutory provision of the service and the achieve- 
ment of certain targets related to policy planning). For this, he 
needs to remunerate the agent appropriately, in order to motivate 
his work-effort and compensate him for the disutility he suffers from 
it. The reward structure must then cope with both elements of 
compensation and motivation, given the dependence of the outcome 
on the Agents' behaviour, in order to orientate their effort towards 
some planned targets of performance. 
3.3.1. The Optimal Reward Structure in a Single Agency Relationship. 
We have seen above that in the absence of non-fully observable 
work-effort, a pure wage contract which would pay directly a fixed wage 
for a specific task involving a particular level of effort might be 
sufficient for job motivation. However, there are several reasons why, 
in reality, the construction of a contract of this nature is not optimal 
when information assymmetries and behavioural dependence problems exist 
between the parties concerned. This is due, inter alia, to the fact 
that the non-observability of the agent's effort for purposes of work 
monitoring would allow the agent to take the salary as given and reduce 
his effort, consequently, towards zero levels. In addition, if un- 
certainty were present, agents would have no incentive to move from too 
cautious or too venturesome positions for a comprehensive analysis and a 
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complete evaluation of risks. 
In these contexts, many authors (e. g. Hurwicz, 1973) have pointed 
out the convenience of the definition of an efficient reward structure 
in terms of an output-sharing formula, with a common functional form 
dependent on some variable observable by both parties involved in the 
relationship. 
Defined in simple terms, an output-sharing contract, with no 
random states influencing the final outcome other than the agents' 
work-effort, can be designed in the following terms: 
UA ( Z, MA ), where UA <0 U2 > 0, and 
Up ( 0, MP ), where UP >o U2 } 0, 
where UA and UP are the Agent's and Principal's utility function, 
Z refers to work-effort, M income and 6; outcome, with 0= a. Z and 
M=ö(a). 
The agent's objective function would be then to maximize his 
utility, (or expected utility where an uncertainty element influences 
one of the arguments of the function), this being a positive function 
of his share in the outcome (compensation) and a negative function of the 
level of work-effort. Similarly, the principal's goal involves 
the maximization of his utility function, which is a positive function 
of the difference between the total outcome achieved and its specific 
share with the agent. The introduction of some constraints in this 
basic relationship would not change its nature - e. g. by requiring the 
provision of a minimal amount of output, or as a result of fixing a 
certain financial compensation over some basic amounts. 
In order to derive a determinate solution to this initially joint 
maximization exercise, the two following approximations can be suggested: 
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(i) Approaching the solution from a bargaining view with the 
tools of the Game Theory, in which each individual party 
of the Agency relationship pursues his own interest, but 
no one can dictate the outcome. 
(ii) Searching for a solution where one actor maximizes his 
utility, subject to the constraint that the utility of 
the other part of the relationship is not lower than some 
pre-specified level. This position can be defined as that 
stationary point which satisfies the first order conditions 
for an utility maximization or a 'selective rational' 
position with respect to the choice of the action. 
Thus by confronting the problem of output-sharing as a bargaining 
situation with the tools of Game Theory, the existence of transaction 
costs, information assymmetries and the characteristics of the output 
provided do not suggest a clear-cut solution valid for operational 
purposes. For example, in the context of incrementalistic budget 
strategies of an interactive process type as a form of output-sharing, 
which has been tentatively studd by Wildavsky et al., some alternative 
solutions can be suggested with respect to the pattern followed by the 
budget requests, budget approvals and the budget amounts finally settled. 
In this context, a solution of the Von Neumann-Morgernsten type of 
"two persons non-zero sum game" or a Nash type of solution 
(3) 
are 
obviously unlikely, given the communication network required for an 
efficient inputation of all the alternatives available. In similar 
terms we could reject the Zeuthern-Harsany result, although it might 
appear as more appropriate in the present context, regarding the 
postulate that 'the bargainer who can afford the least risk of dis- 
agreement is the one to make the concession'. But this approach does 
not account for the 'needs constraint' operating as a minimum for service 
provision. Moreover, the possibility that initial uncooperative 
strategies may become in a sequential approach "cooperative" ones, with 
respect to the final equilibrium achieved, should be taken into account 
(Radner, 1981) since, as Cross 
(4) 
has pointed out, 'actors can exhibit 
expectations and learning over time, which may allow finally for an 
implicit agreement in the common interest'. 
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In our view, a constrained joint maximization type of solution 
can provide a more realistic approach: that is, in searching for 
a reward structure in which one of the parties is at a stationary 
point with respect to the choice of the action, or in a 'selective 
rational' position, and the other maximizes his course of action 
under this constrained framework. A cooperative outcome then can 
be derived which is more in accordance with the postulates of the 
bounded rational behaviour described in Chapter I I. However, this 
constrained maximization solution seems to require a previous agree- 
ment by both parties in the relationship on the general terms in 
which this framework is specified. 
This framework can be set in our modified context of an explict 
separation between the demand division - or that generated by the 
medical staff - and the supply division of Central Administration. 
Under these terms, budget-based contracts have already been presented 
in other fields or research as an efficient resporEe to the existing 
dichotomy between the actual management and the control and ownership 
of modern economic organizations. As Fama (1980) has noted, this 
solution requires only that: 
(1) The activity can be carried out under a minimum degree 
of discipline among Agencies (in competing, for instance, 
for a fixed amount of output or resources), and 
(ii) some "market" for the recognition of agents' capacities 
exists with regard to the Agencies performance (e. g. 
with principals willing to compensate according to 
performance). 
In this last scheme, the agent's compensation as a form of output 
sharing consists of two parts, one defined over the subset of favourable 
outcomes and another defined over the subset of unfavourable ones. 
The partition is specified in the contract with reference, for example, 
to a standard benchmark. This divides the set of possible outcomes 
(into favourable and unfavourable ones - although there is not a binary 
limitation for this purpose ) and according to them, the agent's 
remuneration. 
As a result, the outcome of the partition comes to depend; partly, on 
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the relationship between actual and the pre-stated standard performance, 
with 'performance' expressed in terms of some observable attributes 
of the outcome derived from the Agents' activities. 
This general setting for incentive rewards has been proposed 
in the specific field of public sector management by some authors 
- see Bergson (1978), Ben-Zion and Spiegel (1979) - with the proposal 
of working a system of compensation ofpublic officials, mostly based 
on a 'career function' competing for the allocation of jobs and 
levelled down by potential dismissals. They offer a 'bonus function' 
as a form of output-sharing or compensation according to the Agency's 
performance. 
This incentive structure could be optimal for our purpose, under 
some more specific conditions which we will explore in the following 
section. In particular: 
(i) The prior commitment to share a pre-stated amount 
(the total budgetary funds available to the sector). 
(ii) The possibility of monitoring 'minimum' levels of 
effort as resulting, for instance, from average 
benchmarks). 
Summarizing, we will study the potential effects of the re-stated relation- 
ship between INSALUD and the individual Hospital Boards in the context 
of the Agency relationship, selecting a budget-based contract which 
accounts for the second of the solutions proposed - this is, to be at 
a point of the interior solution for a "satisfying" position for one of 
the parties - and it is addressed to the problem of providing incentives 
for a behavioural change by allowing to the other party the maximization 
of utility according to a prospectively advanced budget contract. 
This provides a differential system of reimbursement with regard to 
some observed levels of performance, which is able ultimately to 
motivate a change in the work-effort of the Agent over and above some 
minima. 
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3.4. AN INCENTIVE REIMBURSEMENT POLICY UNDER DIFFERENTIAL LEVELS 
OF PFRFORMANrF 
We saw earlier that any reimbursement policy aiming to provide a 
global and objective financial restraint under postulates of rationality 
needs to recognize the inital levels of differential performance of 
the institutions concerned. 
In this sectionwe will examine whether an ouput-sharing formula 
which incorporates some proxies for the notion of variable productivity 
can modify behaviour over time, leading to an optimal budget arrangement. 
This will be proposed from a budget contract which provides two types 
of reimbursement according to the observed levels of performance under 
conditions specified prospectively. The properties of this model 
for changing the agents' behaviour are mathematically derived 
from the maximization of the agent expected utility, having specified 
first an output-sharing arrangement which satisfies the principal's 
selective rational position (Leibenstein, 1975). The diagramatic 
representation of the properties of the formula, and some other general 
considerations for its implementation, are presented at the end of the 
section. The outline of the model is introduced first. 
3.4.1. Outline of the Model 
The main hospital reimburser is defined here as the 'principal', 
funding the i hospitals (i = 1... n) over t periods (t = 1... m). 
With no uncertainty surrounding the Agent's decision-making process, 
(6) 
his actions or decisions D depend only on the technical knowledge 
and the work-effort Z. Assuming that the agents' skills are known 
(medical affiliation, etc. ), this defines an outcome (e. g. produced 
under assumptions of constant returns to scale) such as: 
(D). D=D(Z, M) and O= 0' 
The utility function of the principal is defined in principle 
over the difference between the level of utility derived from enjoying 
the total outcome and the loss of utility from having to reward agents: 
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That is, 
Up =U (B`') -U(M). 
However, as we saw before, the reward compensation M is itself 
a function of the outcome, i. e. M= ý(@ ). (This proposition is in 
the core of any budget-based contract). 
To avoid indeterminacy from this joint-maximization interaction, 
we will focus on the constrained Agent's maximization of his utility 
function, from which the principal's equilibrium is defined residually. 
In doing this, we will assume that: 
(i) Hospital agents of different hospitals behave in similar 
terms. Thus being each hospital dominated by the medical 
agents, they can be treated as the unit for analytical 
purposes: They may share a common utility function, at 
least within the subsample studied, with a similar 
type of basic argument influencing the relevant physician 
and Agency behaviour. 
(ii) Consequently, the hospital's performance can be approached 
as the 'Agent' performance in the basic Agency relation- 
ship and the 'individual income' as the total reimburse- 
ment at the hospital level. Individual Agents (and 
hospitals) seek in this modified context to maximize 
their utilities in terms of the income earned against 
the work effort required. 
(iii) Moreover the reimburser is able to make some type of 
general(and objective) assessment about the hospitals' 
performance using the available statistics - although 
possibly subjected to measurement errors - in order 
to partition the set of relevant outcomes with respect 
to the total amount available for reimbursement purposes. 
Assumptions (i) and (ii) are natural consequences of the model of 
hospital behaviour presented in the second Chapter. Hence, either 
from an organisational approach or from a similar set of individual 
agents which influence the Agencies' behaviour, these assumptions can 
be plausibly sustained. (For instance, with respect to a dominant 
group of physicians sharing similar motivations, such as doctors with 
a given status in the staff hierarchy, exercising their profession 
in 
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the private and public practice, etc. ). 
The assumption contained in (iii) will require some adequate 
estimates of output, but, as we will discuss later, this measure 
can be plausibly achieved for those comparative objectives. 
Therefore, we can define a utility function for the hospital agent 
defined over the work-effort Z and the income M, such as: 
Ui _U (Z1... Zt, M1... Mt ), with UZ <0 UM >0 
Assume, for analytical convenience, a short term prospective 
revenue planning with t=i, 2. This time factor will not change the 
essence of the model (although a period of four or more years will 
seem more appropriate for our purposes). 
The reimbursing authority then advances a 'two period' programme 
with a prospectively specified reimbursement level M1 for period 1 
and a chance of adjustment for period 2, with M2 or M2 depending on 
the outcome achieved by the Agency in the first year. This entails 
two potential levels of reimbursement for the second period: M2 
for an individual hospital which is 'relegated' and, say, M2 for one 
which is not. For example, M1 and M2 would imply the funding of all 
the initial requestswithin the general guidelines, 
( ) 
whereas M2 would 
be a weighted average of actual and standard expenditure. For instance, 
if EA is the actual expenditure and EP the standard average or predicted 
one from the sample behaviour, the total revenue allocated (ER) can be 
stated as: 
ER = ßt. EA + (1-(3t). EP, where 0 <P< 1 and 
t refers to time. Other different combinations are however certainly 
(8) 
possible. 
As we prove in the next section, by penalising those hospitals with 
a poor performance through relatively lower reimbursement levels, 
incentives may be created to increase the work-effort. Moreover, 
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by allocating the defined budget revenue already committed in this 
way, expenditure will remain under control and on more rigorous bases 
of rationality for efficiency motivation targets. 
A theory of resource allocation to the decentralized institutions 
can be based on a 'budget contract' under the former premises (Demski 
and Feltham, 1978). This can be written in verifiable terms by the 
parties, in the sense that the total amount to be distributed is 
initially comitted and the problem is reduced to that of its distribution 
regarding ultimately some notion about the Agents' (cost) effective 
performance. 
The outline of this approach was first put forward by Malcomson 
(1983) in the field of the search for efficiency in a context of 
wage hierarchies. The elements involved in Malcomson's model are 
similar, in our view, to those involved in any process of budget 
revenue allocation: the core of the decisions required in this area 
also involves an initial commitment of the resources to be distributed 
and its specific distribution amongst the 'individuals' encharged of 
its provision. The nature of both decisions in the budget revenue 
allocation process can then be analysed in very similar terms to those 
described in the context of Malcomson's research. 
3.4.2. The model at work. 
In line with MALCOMSON's model of internal incentives for an 
efficient performance, 
(9) 
the effective work-effort Z is defined here 
by some proxy measures on certain observed values X* depending on 
Z, but with some random errors potentially associated with its de- 
finition. This will be done by fixing a proportion P of hospitals with 
observed values of X over the average values of the 'peer groups' 
considered. These hospitals will find their budgets initially 
reviewed and, in cases, submitted to the regulation policy in 
question. 
Different indicators can be used for the definition of X, mainly 
with regard to: (i) the average sample behaviour of some homogeneous 
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groups of hospitals, with respect to certain relevant aspects included 
in the specification of the entire hospital production function - for 
instance, from a cross-section analysis in which we assume a potentially 
identical productive knowledge but a different realization in practice 
of their production possibilities; and (ii) the resulting values from 
a more accurate prediction of hospital performance or some other combined 
indication with regard to some disaggregated hospital functions, adjusted 
for certain external and internal factors affected to the activity. 
The probability of relegation P will be defined as P=1-F 
(X* - Z), where F(X-Z) is the cumulative distribution function for 
the observed effort, approached empirically. 
(10) 
Since P is defined 
in terms of number of standard deviations from the average values of 
X, assuming the presence of a normal distribution, once P is selected 
X* is determined. 
Hospital units are then faced with the necessity of improving 
performance (Z), moving towards X*, or having to adjust themselves to 
the advanced policy of expenditure restraint. 
A minimum management supervision inside the hospital to avoid 
utility levels falling below minima and a positive value of P (O<P<1) 
are required to sustain the incentives designed. 
The system, by dealing with the terms of the distribution verifiable 
by all the parties involved in the relationship, makes it more costly 
for each element of the relationship to 'cheat' on the rules or give 
false signals about performance. This is because average rather than 
individual signals are taken into account by the system and the dis- 
tribution of the overall expenditure already commited is based 
ultimately on these factors. 
Let us present an example. Suppose the hospital is to join a 
programme for expenditure rationalization over two periods. P is fixed 
(e. g. at levels of 20%). This defines the benchmark X* with respect to 
which the performance of each hospital is going to be compared within the 
peer group we are considering. The crucial point in this approach is 
that for an individual hospital, X* can be taken as given, since, although 
'for any fixed value P it will in fact depend on the individual's work- 
effort, collectively its own contribution in this is neglegible. 
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Mathematical derivation of the_properties of the model. 
Values over X* will make for a M2 type of reimbursement in 
period 2( M2, otherwise ). In both cases we will assume that it 
gets M1 in period 1 but it is advised that the new policy comes 
into operation in period 2. 
(11) 
The hospital_agents`expected_utility_ is defined over the following 
arguments: 
V (Zi 3 Mi 5 M2, M2, X* )=F( X*-Z1 ). U( Zi , Mi 3 Z, M2 
)+ 
( 1-F(X*-Z1)). U( Z1, M1,7, M2 ) 
i. e. the hospital expected utilityisa product of the probability of 
being out of the zone implied by P, the utility derived from U given 
ZV Z, M1 and M2, plus. the utility derived if M1 and"M2 are the respective 
reimbursement levels, weighted by their corresponding probabilities. 
The hospital will choose Z, to maximize V subject to Z, >Z 
For an interior solution, the first order condition for this 
maximization is: 
U' =f( X*-Z1) U (Z1, M1, Z, M2) +F (X*-Z1). U1 (Z1)M1, Z, M2) 
-f (X*-Z1). U (Z1, M1,2, M2) + (1-F(X*-Z1)). U1 (Z1, M1,7, M2) =0 
Rearranging terms, 
V1 =f (X*-Z1). 
(U (Z1, M1, Z, M2) -U (Z1, M1, Z, M2)) + 
F (X*-Z1). U1 (Z1, M1,7, M2) + (1 -F (X*-Z1)) U1(Z1, M1, Z, M2 )=0 
[1) 
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Since F( XtZ1 ) is the cumulative distribution function of the 
observed effort, f( X*Z1 )-its derivative- will be the probability 
density function. 
This result, together with the minimum effort level Z, defines 
an effort supply function Z1 =g( MV M2, M2 , X* 
). Note that 
since U1 (. )<O and U4(. )>O, there can be an interior solution for 
Z1 if and only if M2>M2 and if f(X*-Z1) is strictly positive. In 
other words, that there is always the probability of an external inter- 
vention for the so called 'relegation'. 
Since X* is defined once P is selected, for purposes of the 
effort-supply function of the hospital, P and not X appears as 
primarily relevant. 
The effort supply function of the hospital is then defined by: 
Z1 =h( M1, M2, M2, P ). (2] where P= 1-F ( X-Z1 ). And 
it follows that aX/aZ1 
=1 and DX/aP f(X-Z1)- 
From the first order condition of the agent's expected utility 
maximization, choosing Z1 subject to Z1>Z and using standard 
comparative static methods, we can derive the effects of changes 
in variable Z1 by total differentiation of the expresion in (1) 
(V11 + V15) dZ1 + V12 d M1 + V13 d M2 + V14 d M2 + V15 d X*= 0 
Since P= 1-F (X-Z1 ), dP =äP. dX + DP dZ1 , and 
dX = -8P + dZ1 , 
aR a Z1 f (X-ZZ ) 
therefore, 
(V11 + V15) dZ1 + V12 d M1 + V13 d M2 + V14 d M2 - V15`ß%£ (X*-Z 
1)-0 
(3) 
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Assuming conventionally that U11 <0 and, for simplicity, 
that the utility function is additively separable between periods, 
one gets the following results for an interior solution of Z1 by 
solving h, using the theorem of implicit functions: 
c7Z1= h1 U12 0, as U ; ý: - 0 1a 12c 
M1 dZ U11 
a Z1= h2 -f (X*-Z1) U4 > 
0,12 a) 
2) M2 U11 
a Z1= h3 (. ) =f (X*-Z1) U4 0, 
(3a) 
M2 U11 
CD Z1= h4 (")=f'(, X*-Z1)(U(Z1 ,M1 , Z, M2) -U(Z1 , M1 , Z, MZ)) 
/ (f (X*-Z1 )'U1 )cO, 
aP 
as f' (X*-Z1) 7 0. 
{4aa 
In (2a) and [3a), object of our attention here, we need to 
evaluate U4 at M2 and M respectively. As we postulated in our 
prospective reimbursement policy, based on an internal type of incentive 
as reflected inf3aa, its negative sign proves the positive influence 
on the work-effort Z of a marginal decrease in the advanced level or 
reimbursement M2 - within the boundaries stated by the policy - 
whereas an increase would lower it. 
Therefore, the difference in the levels of reimbursement stated 
from a budget-based contract, advanced through some sort of prospective 
formulation of the reimbursement policy, well related to the Agents' 
performance levels and ultimately to their work-effort, can be 
considered a major element in improving efficiency. 
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Diagramatical representation_of the properties-of the formula 
Diagramatically, the Prospective Revenue Allocation policy put 
forward earlier consists, in short of: 
(i) The definition of the variable X as a proxy for 
hospital performance and its value of reference, 
say X* , to be utilized as the benchmark for its 
evaluation. 
(ii) The determination of the number of units (percentage), 
to be submitted each year to the incentive reim- 
bursement policy, with regard to the sample distri- 
bution of X. Assuming normality, this implies the 
possibility of fixing P from the product of the value 
of the standard deviation of X* (V) and the number 
required for catching the stated percentage of the 
probability distribution function. (See Figure-1). 
10 
if A=20%, n1 =1.78 X*r1 . 78 '! 
if A130%, n2 =0.68 X2=0 . 68 
V 
/J 
(iii) For those units included in the shaded area A, the 
prospective control policy is applied in order to 
achieve an improvement in their performance. The 
operational mechanics of the system involve in this 
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I t41 X h2d' 
context some sort of functional relationship between 
the total reimbursement and the cost per unit, with 
the strength on efficiency promotion depending on 
the incentive parameter p. (See Figure 2). 
M, ý 
i 
(The continuous line involves the binary set of results 
which determines the levels of reimbursement. The dis- 
continuous line implies an increasing revenue allocation 
strategy which follows a less than proportional rise in 
the level of reimbursement per unit with respect to costs 
as we move inside of the area A starting in the inflexion 
point). 
(iv) The result of the efficiency improvement involves, 
therefore, a sequential approximation in real terms 
to the X* average values of the overal sample. 
(See Figure 3). 
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3.4.3. Some other general considerations. 
Some other factors have to be pointed out, however, at this stage: 
a) So far, financial incentives potentially raised from a reimbursement 
policy point of view have been only considered. They are by no means, 
the only set of incentives which can be proposed. For example, regulatory 
enforcement or education for behavioural change may be used with an 
appropriate reimbursement policy and complementary training to physicians 
given since, as the ultimate managers of health resources, they will 
have to confront those issues related to costs and bear thereafter 
the responsibilities derived from their decisions. 
b) For our purposes, the possibility of 'relegation' rather than the 
possibility of 'promotion' has been selected as the incentive scheme. 
Some evidence is available from those countries in which funding for 
overall responsibility has been implemented(12) that 'negative' incentives 
in the financial field have produced more direct results. In fact, there 
seems to be evidence that hospital directors, and doctors in general, have 
not showed too much interest in saving money if the reimbursement system 
appears to be working under incrementalistic mechanisms for expansion 
of recurring expenditure. The reason is that one-off savings today may 
represent a threat against future expenditure and they are likely to 
result in permanent reductions of the budget bases. 
In this sense negative incentives are not merely the reciprocal of 
positive incentives. In fact, hospitals do not appear to become more 
thrifty in order to earn and keep profits, but they may become less 
inefficient in order to avoid losses. Negative incentives seem to have 
the virtue of: making over-spending risky, given the prospective settlement 
of the financial constraint with effects on the future revenue planning. 
Moreover, this view allows money rewards to be considered as 'awards' 
for excellence since they are not generated just from the hospitals' 
savings. Thus the question is not that of favouring underserving or 
pure cost-shifting, but to promote a cost-conscious management of resources. 
However, we have to notice that for the process as a whole to operate, 
requires the validity of the assumption that observed measures of in- 
stitutional performance can be taken by the parties as acceptable bases 
for the analysis of the 'budget fat' and managerial slackness. (This 
point needs further attention and will be explored later on). 
c) If governmental incentives have to help achieve some plublic health 
targets, they must move doctors towards positions of cooperation. This 
may require as much political as technical elements of motivation. For 
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these purposes, a minimum level of utility should be guaranteed by 
the reimburser in terms, for instance, of a realistic wage settlement 
on which to base the reinforcement of the physicians' own respons- 
ibility in the hospital results. At the same time, some minimum 
levels or standard units of work-effort have to be monitored and 
strengthened as a condition of payment (e. g. the fulfilment of the 
minimum notional working time, the actual provision of the service 
within some statutory boundaries, etc. ). 
d) Finally, some sort of ranking, order or scaling of measures for 
performance should be capable of being utilized for basing the budget 
contract, although no cardinal unit is required for defining an 
absolute difference between the groups relegated and promoted. 
3.5. THE POTENTIAL EFFECT OF AN 'OUTPUT-SHARING' BUDGET SYSTEM ON 
THE AGENCIES' PERFORMANCE. 
The potential effects which can be induced over time from the 
implementation of an incentive policy of the nature here proposed will 
be seen in the following exercise. 
We will insert for this purpose, our prospective reimbursement 
policy into a very simple model of expenditure determination, widely 
used for deriving behavioural inferences in the private versus public 
provision debate, such as that of Baumol (1967) concerning the existence 
of a 'productivity lag' in Public sector services with respect to the 
rest of the economy. This is a model with only one labour input 
explicitly included 
(13) 
- hence with the overall operating expenditure 
figure equal to the total wage bill - and with a postulated single 
constant input-output coefficient. 
Hence, 0-it = Z. Lit, where 
Oland L denote as before output and 
physical input - or amount of manpower -(14) i the Agent unit, and 
Z the true level of effort (or the proxy for productivity). 
Crucial elements of the modified version of this model are: 
First, the introduction of the hypothesis of variable productivity 
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(Zit), according to the evidence available, is a more realistic approach 
than that derived from assuming a single homogeneous rate of growth and 
an uniform level of productivity for all the productive units in a sector 
of the economy. 
Second, the fact of making explicit in advance the terms of the reimburse- 
ment policy. That is, for those units included in the A area seen 
before, we can define a budget-based contract where the budget allocation 
(ER) is 
ER =pt TOCit + (1-pt) TOC. lt 
with 0<3 < 1. TÖC represents the predicted operating costs from the average 
performance of the peer group considered (once adjusted for exogenous 
variables through a multi-regression analysis), and t refers to time. 
Third. the definition of Z in expenditure terms, and so X*, by fixing 
the percentage P (i. e. 20%) - picking up the appropriate number of 
standard deviations from the predicted mean cost - in order to set the 
desired level of efficiency. 
Fourth, the separation of the total wage bill into its several 
components in a way in which we can identify each of the specific 
elements to be considered for specific control. 
Hence, TOCit = WBit = Wit ' Lit='ýE" Lt . Nit+ 
(Wit-Wt) Lt . Nit 
Nt 
+ tit (Lit - Lt . Nit) + 
(Wit - Wt). 
Nt 
Nt 
it Lt' Nit); `ij 
Nt 
where L is the amount of labour input as before, N the population 
served(15)5 W the effective cost per unit of labour input and W its 
average sample value. 
The first element of the right-hand side of the identity approaches 
the budget allocation which could be provided on pure population bases 
(e. g. regarding the average work-load indicators); the second element 
corresponds to the intra-sample relative price adjustment due, for 
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instance, to the different external labour market conditions in the 
rural areas, and the third and fourth elements reflect the 'residual' 
comprising 'price' and 'quantity' deviations from the average sample 
values. 
Both elements can be represented by 
it Lt ' Nit ). Wit 11 11 3; 
Nt 
and fifth, having postulated some 'target' value for ait/Nit, which 
would tend over time, with the support of the implemented policy, 
towards atANt = k. . 
Under these conditions, the effort for a cost-conscious management 
of resources, and for any potential efficiency improvement, has been 
postulated in our context to be a function of the binding budgetary 
coverage, sustained on the rationality of the Prospective Reimbursement 
Policy formulated. This 'tightness' can be measured as the difference 
between what the Agency would expect to get under unmodified conditions 
of reimbursement and what they will actually get according to the 
control policy implemented. That is, 
TOCit - (Pt TOCit + (1- (t) TOCit) = (1 -ßt). (TOCit - TOCit ) 
[2'), 
where TOC accounts for the adjustment of the first and second element of 
our initial identity [l'j, but does not include the 'residual' term [1"] . 
In terms of the effective work-effort and allowing for a one-period 
lag in the operation of the financial constraint, according to the model 
formulated for internal incentives, we can write: 
Az = Zit - Zit-1 =f( 1lt-1) .g 
(Zit-1 Zt-1 `3ýý' 
Zt - Zt-1 
given the assumption that (TOCit-1 - TOCit-1) is in itself a 
function g of the difference between the individual and average work- 
effort, with g' <O and PA. 
(Note that LZ must be strictly greater than one if an increase in the work- 
effort of the relegated subsample has to be achieved in real terms). 
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Since in our X-efficiency analysis movements in Z are bound 
to be reflected in X* , we can write: 
TOCit-1 - TOCit_ý _ (L it-1 Lt-1 ' Nit-1). W 
Nt-1 
Therefore, (2') can be re-writen as: 
LLt-1 
' Nit-1) ' Wit-1 - (1- 
(3t-1) ý-it-1 
_ 
Ct-1 Nit_ 1'Wit- 
or 
Nt-1 Zit-1 
t-1 t-1 
t-1 ý1- 
t-1 Nit-1 
Ot-1' Nit-1 ' Wit-1 
Nit-1 Zit-1 Nt-1 Zt-1 C 2' 
As we postulated, this equality should tend over time towards 
t-1 1- 
-1 
). w1t_i. Ni1. (1 -t 
Zit-1 zt-1 
Approximating the solution with k evaluated at t-1 on the optimal path 
as t_1/Nit-1, the former expression can be writen as: 
(1-1 wit-1 (1- @t-1 ). C4'] 
Zit1 Zt-1 
or, (1- 
`1 
). Zit_1. Lit-1. Wit-1 (1_ýt-1) _ 
Zit-1 Zt_1 
=(1-1). Zit-1 (1- ý 
t-1). WBit-1 
Zit-1 Zt-1 
and therefore, 
A Zit f Zit-I WBit-1 
zit-1 
This provides a similar result to that derived from the theoretical 
approach seen before 
(16) 
, with the increase in the work-effort made 
dependent on: 
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(i) The lagged component of the Agency work-effort 
with respect to its average value, weighted by the 
initial levelof budget reimbursement (or output amount 
in (4') ). 
(ii) The incentive parameter 3 stated in the funding policy 
previously advanced. 
Therefore, in basing the reimbursement levels on the Agencies' 
performance, the productivity rate of growth becomes endogenous to 
the reward structure and hence able to be submitted to control and 
manipulation. Correspondingly, the link between productivity and 
financial rewards, when compared with what the neoclassical theory 
asserts for the incentive motivation of the economic agents, appears 
reversed. 
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3.5.1. A Simulation Approach to the Solution. 
The 'moving average' nature of the result that appears from the 
reimbursement system designed - given the average or predicted sample 
benchmarks to which hospital performance is going to be sequentially 
compared - raises a non-linear problem in the difference equation 
derived. (17) 
In approaching its solution we can either: 
(i) replace the target observed values X* by some other 
standard values, discretionally defined 'a priori' 
in each period of time, independently of the sample 
behaviour; 
(ii) simulate the behaviour of the derived equation 
through the construction of a computer program, 
in order to suggest the pattern followed by the 
Z values under some previously stated plausible 
conditions (mainly with regard to the analysis 
of the deviations between actual and predicted 
or potential levels of expenditure). 
We adopt the second approach, since the first alternative is 
inconsistent with the nature of the objective conditions required for 
our optimal reward scheme and which must be in the core of the budget 
contract advanced. 
For these purposes, we need: 
1. To define those variables included in the analysis in a 
way that they can be empirically estimated; 
2. to give some plausible values to the parameters which 
appear in the derived equation. These values can be in fact, a 
matter of policy choice; and 
3. to make some explicit assumptions about the functional 
form and other related parameters of the incentive scheme 
formulated. 
We proceed as follows: 
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a) The proxy for the observed work-effort, and 'efficiency' measurement, 
is defined in expenditure terms. The variable selected is the 
'average cost per case', redefined according to the results of 
increasing the sample homogeneity, first by using the clusters derived 
from the inclusion of the external factors thought to influence 
legitimately hospital costs, and second, from adjusting the average 
values resulting from each of those Subsamples for the individual 
internal factors, which prove an impact on costs, as analysed through 
the standard multi-regression techniques. (Both approaches will be 
adopted in the following Chapter). 
The starting value for the proxy of X will be defined for each 
unit of the sample as the ratio between the estimated and the observed 
average cost. For the remaining years, individual productivity levels 
will be taken from the addition to those starting figures of the values 
calculated from (5'J , in relation to the subset to which the formula 
was eventually applied. 
The 'exogenous' average productivity increase 
(18) 
is calculated 
year by year from the ratio between the estimated and observed values, 
but refered only to the subsample of observations to which the formula 
does not apply. This figure will be used thereafter as the denominator 
of (3') to calculate a relative value of Z for defining aA Zit 
b) A four year incentive scheme is stated, during which hospitals failing 
above the levels of X*, sequentially defined by the iteration, will be, 
in our terms, 'relegated'. This budget contract provides a controlled 
reimbursement which depends on a weighted consideration of; 
(i) the budget level resulting from holding unmodified 
conditions of funding; 
(ii) the budget level resulting from the individual prediction of 
the hospital average expenditure, according to the 
performance of the sample in which the unit is included, 
as considered in [211. 
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The efficiency parameter will receive an initial value of 0.95, 
which over the four years is bound to decrease as t increases 
(i. e. 0.940,0.884,0.781), given the nature of the proposed formula: 
TOCt+1 = (ß 
tTOCt 
+ (1-P 
t) TOCt) . (1+r t+l 
) 
Due to the complexity of the estimation exercise and problems of 
data availability, we will not be able to repeat the exercise for 
each single year - although this should be possible with a more complete 
information base and an appropriate system of data processing, as we 
point out in Chapter V. 
Hence, we will simulate repeatedly the initial estimattion - 
adjusted annually for inflation - using alternatively the retail price 
index, the projection of the trend of the health care expenditure and 
the increase in the Gross Domestic Product at market prices (or factor r). 
The 'global budget' for funding purposes will be thereafter 
calculated from multiplying the average cost per admission within each 
of the clusters derived - adjusted for the estimated parameters of the 
regression equation formulated - by the observed actual number of 
admissions in each hospital unit. 
With respect to the proportion P of units considered each year 
for budget utilization review and control through the revenue planning 
system, the value is fixed alternatively at levels of 20% and 30% with 
regard to the cumulative distribution of the differences between the 
estimated and actual values of the total operating costs in the overall 
sample. The number of standard deviations chosen for this purpose are 
1.78 and 0.68 respectively. (For simplicity, we assume normality in 
the distribution of the selected variable). The values of the standard 
deviations are calculated using the conventional procedures in relation 
to the variable defined as the difference between the actual and estimated 
values. 
The maximum cost reduction to be reasonably expected for each 
single year (hence, residually, the minimum utility 'safe' from the 
incentive scheme) is established with values in between 1 per cent and 
3 per cent. 
-119- 
We take these floors from the cost savings criteria expounded on 
the Resource Allocation Working Party for England, and from the 
US experience in the operation of some prospective reimbursement 
experiments. 
(19) 
c) The functional form selected for f and its weighted factor WF 
- which accounts for how quickly the incentive scheme should develop 
its effects in moving towards the cost reduction target - is dealt 
with in the following way: 
With respect to the specific shape of the incentive formula 
aimed to promoting a productivity change of the nature shown in 
Figure 4, the first hypothesis implies that for any single year, 
the maximum productivity increase (DZMax), or 'cost-efficiency' 
reduction, increases positively with F. This variable F is assumed 
to approach the 'fat' of the budget, or the 'sacrifice possible', this 
being defined, as before, as the difference between 'what they know 
they are going to get in relation to what they would expect to get 
in the case of holding constant conditions of reimbursement' 
(i. e. resulting from an incrementalistic pattern of reimbursement). 
(See Figure 5). 
Figure 4 Figure 
_5_ 
ýL 
ý`ýý 
xt 
(DZMax defines in fact the 'possible set, 
F 
The factor WF receives 
alternative values for the prupose of accounting for how quickly the cost 
reduction targets are reached). 
. 
Ai 
wl ,4>W 
ýý > lJ 
DýMax 
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The assumption involved in f is that the incentive which slims 
from the announced penalty declines to the DZMax value once it 
overtakes a determined amount close to the cost-reduction target. 
As a result, the specified form can be defined as: 
A Zit 
= DZMax. (1-e-WF. 
F) 
where F, as before, is equal to: X* it-1 (1- ßt-1)_ TOCit-1 ' 
X*t-1 
with Zit =0 when F< X*, and Zit DZMax when F CIO 
Other forms considered give values to f' and f" both > 0, 
with A Zit = DZMax. (F«F ), and, from taking the functional form 
y=bx, under the exact specification of A Zit = DZMax. (WFF_ 1), 
with WF > 1. 
(20) 
The results of the exercise are presented and analysed in Chapter V. 
3.5.2. Potential Hypothesis and Policy Testing. 
At this stage, it would be attractive to set a formal test of 
sine alternative hypotheses presented in this Chapter, mainly with 
regard to the positive effects of the reimbursement policy on a 
cost-conscious management of resources, from replacing a cost-based 
retrospective system by a prospective strategy of the characteristics 
described above. 
This is not possible at this point, since there are not, obviously, 
two consistent situations to be compared. However, two simple tests 
can be designed to validate the operational insights of the system, 
once the projected policy is in operation: 
a) With regard to the nature of the policy, its fundamental feature could 
be approached by estimating the following equation: 
Az- = +X2, azt_ l+ 1ý3 Qzt_ l. (3 (t) +a t 
where A3 tries to collect the joint influence of the efficiency parameter 
interacting with the lagged increase of productivities. The reason 
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for the specification of this equation is that the value of the 
efficiency parameter is dependent on both the previous year's level of 
effort and on the present Agency performance with regard to-their 
success in closing the gap between actual and predicted expenditure. 
b) Looking at the operational way in which the policy as a whole 
works, the empirical test would consist of the study of the influence 
in the cost behaviour of the sample analysed once the prospective 
reimbursement policy is implemented. This second test can use a dummy 
variable for collecting the effect of the policy on the endogenous 
cost variable in a behavioural cost function of the Hospital units 
enrolled in the policy with respect to the cost function of those 
units not included. 
Either in a cross-section or time-series analysis, conventional 
levels of confidence may be used in support of the statistical 
significance of the reimbursement policy, in approaching its 
differential impact once we control for 'everything else' in the 
regression equation. 
However, in the absence of an incentive formula of the type here 
proposed, we will be able to test in our context only some alternative 
hypotheses about the effects that this absence may have had on hospital 
performance. They will be centered on the hypothesis of cumulative 
causation and of the absence of self-correcting mechanisms in the 
management of public hospitals. At 'sensu contario' this test will 
be suggested as a proof of the value of the policy here proposed 
for improving the allocation of resources in the hospital sector. 
In addition, by examining its results on a cross-section basis, some 
suggestions about the nature of spatial and institutional X-inefficiency 
will be further explored for policy purposes. 
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3.6. CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY. 
In this Chapter we have examined the terms in which an alternative 
budget policy, aimed at promoting efficiency in the hospital sector 
can be designed. 
We conclude that having recognized the appropriate institutional 
setting for the relationship between the decentralised institutions 
providers of services4^ iereimbursing Authority with control over 
the total amount of resources available, as described by an Agency 
type of relationship, a budget-based contract of the characteristics 
proposed in this chapter can raise incentive compatibility. In 
addition, a budget-based output-sharing system, which accounts for the 
differential performance of the institutions and allocate revenues 
correspondingly, can help to promote efficiency and to insert guides 
for the allocation of resources within the Spanish hospital sector. 
The specific design of a Prospective Revenue Allocation Policy 
of the type proposed in this Chapter will be the object of attention 
of the next Chapter. 
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FOOTNOTES. 
(1) in "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization". 
American Economic Review, vol 61.1972 (page 780). 
(2) On one hand, the relevance of an explict separation between 
the allocation of resources and the financial funding limits for 
the analysis of the economic behaviour of the organisations 
has been recently expounded by Hoenack (1983). On the other 
hand, the potentialities raised from the insertion of economic 
incentives in systems of budget control have been studied 
in the context of incomplete markets by Demski and Feltham in 
The Accounting Review vol LIII ne 2, April 1978. 
(3) The Von Neuman-Morgensten "two persons non-zero sum game" 
solution consists of accounting for all those inputations 
in which each player gets individually that amount which 
he can secure for himself, while the two together get 
precisely the maximum amount which they could secure together. 
A Nash type of solution would stem from the bargain in which 
it is maximized the product of the utility increment from the 
initial threat point. In both cases, less than complete 
information for the calculation of the required inputations 
and the lack of an efficient communication network seem to 
make these solutions less meaningful in our context. 
(4) as referred in CODDINGTON A. "Theories of the bargaining process". 
Allen and Unwin, 1968. London. 
(5) This concept of 'selective rationality', as defined in 
Leibenstein (1975), refers mainly to the differences in 
constraint concern, and it is reflected in a sense of 
'obligation to commit ents', 'degree of calculatedness', 
degree of satisfaction' and some other aspects ultimately 
related to the concept of managerial discretion. 
(6) When uncertainty is present, the optimal contract can be 
approached through a rental agreement, contracting for a 
fixed fee and enabling the Agent to claim for any residual 
left. The optimal output-sharing has then a mixed nature, 
in which the consideration of the agents' risk behaviour 
is decisive to establish the correct balance between the 
rental fee and the risk-share in the outcome. 
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(7) Since the total amount to be distributed has to be 
previously committed, precaution has to be taken in 
order, (i) not to overrun the total amount available: 
a general maxicap might be required for this purpose 
on the non-relegated subset, which optimally should take 
into account the expected changes towards the cost-saving 
targets of those units included in the relegation set; 
and (ii) to commit any amount left unused over the 
total figure available, for example to some specific types 
of service developments or some particular quality im- 
provements. 
(8) Other formulas for incentive reimbursement could be 
however also studied. For instance, referring DI as the 
deficit incurred, in general terms: 
ER 
it =f( 1/n DIit_4 
) or ERS f (ýZ(1-&()t DIit_ý ), with 
04Xz. 1. 
(9) in "Trade Unions and Economic Efficiency". The Economic 
Journal, Papers and Proceedings, 1983. 
(10) This form makes the implicit assumption that the distribution 
depends only on the error and not on the level of true effort. 
However, it would not make difference if output is made to 
depend on X (observed effort) rather than on the true effort 
Z, except for the minor complication of having to treat output, 
and hence remuneration, as a random variable (see Malcomson, 
op. cit. ). 
(11) Probably, some boundaries should be set up in a way that 
M2 is just sufficient to avoid complete` bankrupcy'(e. g. 
according to a budget utilization review). 
(12) This is the case of Canada. See for this purpose, W. A. GLASER 
"Paying the Hospital: Foreign Lessons for the United States". 
Health Care Financing Review, Summer 1983, vol 4 No. 4, and 
particularly, the monography "Paying the Hospital in Canada", 
November 1980. 
(13) However, some explicit assumptions about the role of the capital 
input in the production function of services can be made. 
For instance, in the sense that the capital factor is at any 
rate implicit in the sector, but with different ex-post 
relevance, given its character of limitational input (this 
being necessary but not sufficient for the growth of the output), 
or given the nature of the innovation process and its reflection 
on the technical substitution possibilities. 
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{14) Whether the number of "whole-time equivalent" physician 
hours is a more appropriate measure of labour input is, in 
our case, not a matter of choice but of data 
availability, and of the specific purpose of the analysis 
(e. g. the intensity factor relevant for output production 
can try to be captured entirely by the work-effort of L 
in terms, for instance, of the medical services offered). 
(15) Other measures of output could also be selected instead of 
the pure population data, such as the number of beds per 
population available, for instance, in the case of being 
applied the formula to the inpatient care sector. 
(16) [4'' and [5'9 offer a first approach to the potential policies 
for cost-containment purposes. For example, in adjusting 
expenditure in real terms, by creating a gap between the 
adjustment rate allowed and the actual rate ex-post required 
from holding figures in real terms; by controlling manpower 
expansion, in fixing the level of inputs per capita, or any 
other output or throughput measure selected; or via the design 
of an incentive scheme and manipulatiing the efficiency parameter 
over the time horizon of the revenue planning policy. 
(17) In fact, being the real increase in work-effort a function of 
lagged individual performance with respect to the average, 
and operating the mechanism designed in a selective way in 
which each period, different subsets of units will be formed ýoc 
each year, depending broadly, onZ 
it-1 -Z t-1 <0 
for 
the subset IC i and, otherwise, Zit-1 Zt-1 >0 for the 
subset II: i. 
(18) The term 'exogenous' refers here to the fact that its increase 
is considered to be independent of the operation of the incentive 
formula. 
(19) These figures have been taken from the England Resources 
Allocation Working Party (1976)(pages 32 and 33) and from 
the United States experience in Hospital Regulation (see Sloan 
et al. (1982), page 105). 
(20) All of them respond however to the assumption, in line with 
Leibenstein's proposition, that the degree of X-inefficiency 
(and , the potentialities for efficiency improvements) is 
a function of the size of the"shelter" or'budget fat, given 
its direct influence on the agent's work-effort. 
(H. LEIBENSTEIN, "Notes on X-efficiency and bureaucracy", 
published by R. C. O. MATTHEWS and G. B. STAFFORD (joint eds. ) in 
"The Grants Economy and Collective Consumption", International 
Economic Association, London, 1982. 
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ISSUES IN THE DESIGN OF A PROSPECTIVE REVENUE ALLOCATION POLICY 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
We examined in the previous chapter the characteristics of 
a budget-based contract which is optimal for our purposes, in the 
sense that it can create the efficiency motivation required for 
improving performance in the hospital sector over time. 
In this Chapter we will study the translation of the abstract 
setting of the former budget-contract into the design of a reimburse- 
ment formula, basing a Prospective Revenue Allocation Policy - 
'PRAP' - in the field of the Spanish Hospital Sector. The construction 
of this formula will enable us to test in Chapter V some hypotheses 
on system inefficiency and variahle productivity that were advanced 
earlier on. 
In this Introductory section, we will frame the budget approach 
to a PRAP in the context of the determinants of health care expenditure, 
and the corresponding cost-containment policies in order to provide 
a better understanding of its workings and limitations. 
4.1.1. Determinants of Health Care expenditure, Cost-Containment 
Strategies and Budget-Based Policies. 
The general context in which a Budget-based policy applies can 
be seen in Table 1. 
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TABLE IV. 1 
The operational context of a Hospital Budget Review and Expenditure 
Evaluation Polic 
Demand side 
Population ............. Planni health states 
Morbidity 
factors 
(Supply-agency 
elements) 
I 
ng 
Supply side 
Policies..... (Hospital) factor inputs 
available. 
i 
Individuals' potential 
utilization of (inpatient) 
health care services. 
1I 
Pricing Regulation 
Policies I 
Regulation & Expenditure 
allocation 
Potential utilization of 
factor inputs within the 
Hospital Health Care System. 
Utilization Review & 
Operational policies 
Actual utilization... Hospital Budget........ Actual 
Review 
Expenditure 
Evaluation 
ý11 
supply of services. 
/.... Clinical Audits and Other Quality related policies.... 
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Regarding regulation and expenditure allocation procedures in 
the context of the supply side, we must distinguish those policies that 
exert control over some partial aspects of the hospital operation 
from those which provide a global restraint on activity, but which 
allow hospitals to decide the details of production. 
The first approach mainly refers to the control of inputs or levels 
of performance on the bases of 'engineering', economic, financial or 
epidemological evaluation. This can be done either; 
(i) from a planning view: e. g. limiting manpower increases, 
fixing some input costs or controlling for the supply of 
capital - hospital beds, major equipment for service 
expansion, etc. - or 
(ii) from an operational point of view, by exerting for 
example, controls over the length of stay of the 
patients admitted, the medical utilization of some 
specific inputs which appear to be related to the 
quality of some services, or by imposing normative 
criteria in order to restrict the utilization of 
certain services. 
The second approach mainly refers to those budget policies which 
aim at a cost-conscious management of resources through the imposition 
of a global resource constraint, leaving to the hospitals the decisions 
concerning provision. If the Hospital Board enjoys an appropriate 
degree of autonomy, then it is considered likely that this type of 
policy will lead naturally to the application of techniques designed 
to improve the efficiency with which hospital budgets are spent. 
Otherwise, in the absence of a binding overall restraint on hospital 
resources, no reason would exist, in our view, for expecting the use 
of techniques of evaluation analysis in the internal allocation of 
resources. 
How a budget policy of this nature can be designed and how it 
could operate in the context of the Spanish Hospital Health Care 
Sector will be described in the next subsection. 
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4.1.2. Considerations to be taken into account in designing a Budget- 
Based Prospective Revenue Allocation Policy. 
In designing a PRAP of the characteristics formerly seen in the 
context of the Hospital Health Care sector, the following considerations 
need to be taken into account: 
1. Which specific causal factors are the policy makers attempting to 
tackle through the Hospital cost-containment policy, and through which 
mechanisms those factors are postulated to operate. 
This requires: 
(i) the definition of the ultimate and intermediate 
targets of the policy (e. g. efficiency promotion 
through the achicwment of the maximum feasible 
output, a given optimal output mix, or the 
utilization of an appropriate input combination); 
(ii) the recognition of the elements by which the former 
outcomes could be achieved (e. g. once we have 
analysed the workings of the policy in the context 
of a plausible Agents' reaction function consistent 
with the behavioural model specified); 
(iii) the identification of "where" the policy can be 
best implemented (i. e. once we have considered both 
direct and indirect effects which the policy is 
likely to provoke). 
2. How those causal factors can be controlled by the introduction 
of the policy, and which mechanisms are thought to be appropriated for 
its correction. The design of this instrumental policy mainly involves: 
(i) the definition of a particular 
according to the allocation of 
value responsibility (looking, 
effects on the degree of conce 
faced by agents, with regard to 
in terms of work-effort), and 
functional form, 
overall or specific 
for instance, at the 
rn over the constraints 
the targets defined 
(ii) the specification, in consequence, of the financial 
unit to be considered for reimbursement purposes 
(i. e. a fixed or variable basis), accounting for its 
ultimate effects on the characteristics of the hospital 
output provided and the degree of utilization of the 
existing facilities. 
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The description of the actual type of PRAP proposed here, and 
its workings in the context of the Hospital Cost-Containment Policies, 
are presented in the next section. 
4.2. DESCRIPTION OF A 'PRAP' AND ITS WORKINGS 
Taking into account the considerations set up in the former 
section, the budget approach to a Prospective Revenue Allocation 
Policy in our context will be based on: 
a) The identification of system-inefficiency (as defined in Chapter I) 
as the causal factor accounting for an important part of hospital cost 
increases; 
b) the aim of putting forward a target for incentive motivation, able 
to promote, overtime, efficiency improvements (in the sense defined in 
the second chapter) out of the incrementalistic guides for current 
hospital expenses; 
c) the recognition of the phenomenon of variable productivity to which 
the allocation or hospital funds needs to be mostly linked. 
This approach views, moreover, the role of the physician as the 
dominant agent in the hospital decision-making process, and it proposes 
a policy on the overall allocation of revenue, accompanied by the 
allocation of specific responsibilities as the basic mechanisms of its 
control. 
4.2.1. Basic Idea and Potential Utilization of a 'PRAP'. 
The basic idea of a budget approach to a PRAP is that each 
hospital receives a revenue allocation which is deemed to be an 
appropriate operating cost figure. The rationale of such a policy 
consists of hospitals having to keep their expenditure within the 
limits imposed by the budgets objectively stated (see Evans 1970). 
What distinguishes moreover a Prospective Revenue Allocation 
Policy from other Cost-Containment Policies of financial restraint, 
independently of the method of calculation, is that the rates reimbursed 
are set in advance For a future period, leaving hospitals to plan 
expenditure accordingly. As a result, hospitals come ultimately to 
share the risks from spending over and above the prior specified amounts. 
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In order to determine these prospective values, we can state 
in principle some normative criteria, either on input utilization 
or on overall hospital performance, or we can derive empirically 
some average or standard benchmarks. This second view is mainly 
pursued through assembling data into sets of "comparable" hospitals. 
Deviations from the average will distinguish in principle, the 
"efficient" from "inefficient" hospitals in the allocation of 
hospital expenditure. 
This type of prospective reimbursement policy proposed here 
can serve two main goals: 
a) As a Budget Review System. This system for evaluation of 
budget requests requires the revision of the prospectively set budget 
forecasts by the reimbursing Authority in the light of the former base- 
lines. As a result of the comparison, expenses which appear as 
"unnecessary" or "excessive" in view of the stated benchmarks are 
requested to be reduced by a certain time horizon. 
Hospitals are generally given the opportunity to negotiate and/or 
to appeal against such decisions. However, once the final budget 
has been approved, a payment rate or a fixed global sum is established, 
covering what is understood to be the hospital "allowable" expenditure. 
b) As a Formula-Based Renue Allocation Policy. A prospective 
rate or total amount is determined here for purposes of a direct reim- 
bursement through a revenue allocation formula. The formula is 
periodically recomputed and adjusted for external increases in order 
to set up each year the prospective expenditure figure. 
This method of distribution of funds involves relatively little 
direct interaction between the Hospital Boards and the rate setting 
Authority, and it is, therefore, less costly to administer. But 
this method is more likely to be controverted given that no bargaining 
is provided for the hospitals. Therefore, it can be expected to 
be less preferred by hospitals than the former method. 
In both cases, the revenue allocation base-line is grounded in 
factors which usually refer to certain hospital characteristics, 
actual performance and some other relevant factors in the hospitals 
activity. Based on this information, an expenditure or standard 
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cost-line is fitted, which is subsequently used to evaluate 
hospital performance and to allocate the budget funds. Hospitals 
above the fitted line, and hence considered relatively inefficient, 
are requested to reduce costs so as to approach standard values. 
(1) 
The residuals between the actual and estimated figures distinguish, 
in principle, the efficient from the inefficient hospitals. The 
degree of 'relative efficiency' is defined, therefore, in terms of 
the discrepancy between actual and predicted costs, as derived from ýr 
the estimation of the hospital cost function. 
(2) 
4.2.2. Approach Adopted in Designing a 'PRAP in our Context. 
The specific approach proposed here consists of: 
a) The determination of a revenue allocation formula and the allocation 
of the responsibility for the disposal of the resources. This is a 
power vested entirely in the hospital decision-makers. 
This determination will require: 1. -The selection of some 
homogeneous subsamples for which an average cost figure could 
be plausibly derived; and 
2. -the estimation and prediction 
of the individual levels of hospital expenditure, according to 
the 'average' performance of the subsample. 
b) The implementation of a budget evaluation strategy, supported by 
the revenue allocation formula and planned over a time horizon. 
For this purpose, the criterion for revenue allocation is defined 
as a weighted sum of actual and predicted costs, with the weighting 
factors changing over time (see page103 Chapter III). 
Summarizing, the policy aims to reinforce the role of the budget 
constraint in the hospital decision-making process. This result is 
expected from the incentive/penalities motivation of sharing between 
the Hospital Boards and Reimburser the difference between the pros- 
pective amount set and actual expenditure. The process of correcting 
discrepancies between actual and targeted values are phased over 
several periods through a revenue planning system. Such an approach 
may indeed be needed, given the evidence that costs at any point in time 
depend on both current and past behaviour, in such a way that past 
decisions cannot always be reversed immediately, even if current 
effort is very great. 
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In the rest of this Chapter, we will work out the mechanisms of 
the 'PRAP, by showing its construction in the applied field of the 
Spanish hospital sector and trying to establish the potential it has 
for reducing variable productivity in this sector. 4 
4.3. COST FUNCTIONS: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 
The construction of a base-line for the allocation and budget 
evaluation of hospital expenditure requires first the consideration of 
the following steps with regard to the nature of the cost-relation 
formulated: 1. The definition of the basic relationship to be 
analysed (and of those variables included therein). 
2. Its mathematical specification and the measurement 
of the relevant variables. 
3. The study of the alternative approaches to its 
(empirical) estimation, methodological issues and some other 
related econometric problems. 
In this section we will examine the first of the three points mentioned 
above. Points (2) and (3) will be explored in sections 4 and 6 of this 
chapter, respectively. 
4.3.1. The Definition of the Basic Relationship Analysed. 
The definition of a total cost function requires, from a theoretical 
point of view, at least three sets of variables (see, for instance, Henderson 
and Quandt, 1980, page 84). 
a) The quantity (Y) and quality (Q) of the output produced. 
b) The vector of factor input prices (Ip) and their quantities (Iy) 
utilised to produce this output (at a given quality level). 
c) The service conditions (Sc) which affect the level of inputs 
required, together to the current state of the technology available. 
This is: 
TC =f(Y, Q, Ip, Sc, St ) 
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Determining relevant hospital expenditure by establishing relative 
efficiency across hospitals has one main difficulty. This arises from 
the definition of the underlying production function supporting the 
associated (dual) cost function. In fact, as we will see, the elements 
included in the production function of hospital care will not always 
allow for a clear-cut identification of the cost equation. 
4.3.2. The Definition of the Components of the Basic Relationship. 
The first issue to be addressed in defining the components of 
that basic relationship is the definition of what constitutes hospital 
output. 
It should be recognized that the final output of the hospital 
activity is the improvement in the health states of the patients treated 
or perhaps, ultimately, the increase in the levels of satisfaction that 
this improvement represents in the individuals' utility function. 
However, as we will see in the next section, operational reasons 
usually prevent the utilization of this approach. This is mostly due 
to measurement problems, particularly complex in the context of health 
care, and to the identification of the output of the health care industry, 
in which the production-supply aspects of hospital activity can dominate 
the existing hospital information systems. 
A further problem in defining hospital output is that of accounting 
for its multidimensionality.. Several different aspects of care and cure 
are usually present in hospital activity. In addition, training and 
medical research may accompany the former hospital services. They can be 
certainly analysed as increases in the human capital stock or as inputs 
for future outputs, given their potential impact on patient health states. 
But this opens problems of trading-off one dimension against other and 
even within each of them. 
In fact, in order to deal with this hospital multiproduct approach, 
we need to assume that each basic relation can be identified; that is, 
that the production function for each of the separate products is ident- 
ifiable. We must then have a method to select and classify each indivi- 
dual relationship between inputs and each of the resulting outputs. 
For this, the assumption of the separability of the underlying technology 
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requires that the use of an input in the production of a treatment, 
say of one type, does not affect the (efficient) method of producing 
the treatment of other types (i. e. assuming that "treatment" is 
regarded as the primary output unit from the hospital activity). This 
is unlikely, however, to be a valid simiplification of reality. 
A second important component in the definition of the components 
of our basic relationship is the vector of the input factor prices and 
quantities and other external conditions which affect the provision of 
the service. 
The adjustment for factor price usually arises from the need to 
control for differences in those exogenous factors which affect differ- 
ential (territorial) purchasing abilities. A 'geographic relative 
price effect' of this nature can be due, in the present context, to 
the following factors: 
a) The direct influence of differences in the territorial index of 
prices (and cost of living) on the price of the factor inputs. 
b) Local scarcities in the amount of certain inputs available. These 
can stem as a cause or a consequence of the former differences in 
territorial prices. 
c) The influence of the geographic variations in the rate of unemployment, 
and in the price of the labour input in particular, if a competitive 
labour market can be assumed to exist. 
A third component is that related to the differential service conditions 
which may influence territorial costs. In fact, regional variations in 
social and economic characteristics, external to hospital activity, can 
make for differences in costs due to circumstances beyond the control of 
the hospitals (e. g. 'sunk' costs, enviromental externalities, social 
deprivation, etc.. See in this line those factors described in footnote 
8 of Chapter II). 
Finally, the state of technology ica relevant variable in the light 
of its impact on costs. This is deemed to be, however, a minor factor 
in the present context, since, in principle, the level of technology 
available to any hospital is likely to be highly similar in any given year. 
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It should also be noted that questions of output quality will 
not be separately examined here. This is because the definitional 
line adopted above assumes that outputs with different quality aspects 
constitute in reality different outputs. Moreover, this approach avoids 
the discussion of the conceptual issues involved in the definition of 
the 'quality' of hospital output, a simple presentation of which can 
be seen in Cullis and West, 1979 (page 120). 
Summarizing, important conceptual problems exist in the definition of the 
basic cost-relationship analysed and its relevant components, once 
translated into the hospital care sector. These difficulties and, 
in particular, the question of the hospital output and the need to 
identify a vector of input prices and quantities in correspondence to 
its multidimensional aspects, have orientated the attention of the 
literature on hospital cost functions towards a reduced set of 
behavioural factors, which, without being strictly speaking defini- 
tionally related to the former variables, can actually explain hospital 
costs. 
The operationalisation of this approach will be presented next. 
4.4. OPERATIONALISING THE COST FUNCTION: BEHAVIOURAL ANALYSIS AND 
HOSPITAL OUTPUT. 
In this section we will explore the rationality of the behavioural 
analysis of hospital cost functions and the measurement problems 
involved in the specification of the hospital output. In this context, 
the search for a sample selection of greater hospital output homogenity 
and for an explicit hospital output-mix adjustment, will be particularly 
considered. 
4.4.1. Behavioural cost functions and hospital output. 
Given the difficulties found for an appropriate specification of 
the fundamental components which should be included in a conventional 
production function and its associated cost function, the existing 
literature has turned its attention towards the behavioural cost approach. 
-138- 
The basic relation is then defined from the exogenous factors which 
prove to be of "ex-post" relevance in explaining the cost behaviour 
of hospitals. In this approach the efficiency line can be drawn 
from the analysis of actual sample-average costs, associated with 
changes in the unit costs of the services, holding the character 
and complexity of the output constant. The fundamental logic 
behind this is that if all the other explanatory variables remain 
constant, differences in the efficiency in which input prices are used 
will necessarily be inversely related to costs. That is, other things 
equal, the cost per unit will fall as the efficiency with which resources 
are utilized increases, and vice-versa. However, the connecting link 
that supports this relationship remains the production function. It 
should be noted too, that this approach makes most sense in a static 
world in which the major problem is that similar hospitals produce the 
same services with different levels of efficiency. 
Under the former behavioural approach, the issue of measuring 
hospital output has received a preferential attention. 
Problems of measuring improvements in health states, due to the lack 
of data (i. e. no indicators are available of health states when the 
patients enter and leave hospitals), have brought the attention of the 
researchers back to the use of some proxies of hospital output. 
A first proposal has been to reduce the several aspects of the 
hospital output to a single global value unit - incorporating, for 
instance, inpatient services, outpatient activities and teaching and 
medical research (see Ruchlin, 1973). These efforts have failed in 
our opinion to provide a fully validated measure of hospital output, 
given the strong assumptions required for adding up its multidimensional 
aspects to a single unit. 
(3) 
Therefore, most of the literature has sought, instead, to employ 
various adjustments on certain proxies, in building up an appropriate 
output -measure to be used in the context of a cost-behavioural analysis. 
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Regarding this objective, two variables have been traditionally 
proposed: 
a) The number of patient days. This measure would seem 
to be better grounded in the 'hotel' and therapeutic aspects 
of the hospital activity than alternative ones. However, as 
different authors have argued (see, for instance, Williams, 1981) 
the use of this indicator requires the rather dubious assumption 
that the longer the patient stays in a hospital, the greater the 
output of the health industry. In addition, this measure comes 
to assume implicitly a fixed input-output technology, with output 
measured through the measurement of those inputs related to 
hospital stay. 
However, as a whole, this measure is less sensitive to 
differences in the output-mix than the existing alternatives, 
although this may, in itself, be a matter of statistical testing. 
b) The number of patients treated. This measure captures at 
least one dimension of the outcome of hospital activity, although 
it is still a misleading indicator of changes in patients' health 
states (among other reasons, because it does not take into account 
how many of the discharged cases are due to death). In this sense, 
the number of cases treated is generally agreed to be amore consistent 
measure of the hospital output than patient days, although its use 
requires a greater effort on the part of the researcher to perform 
an accurate adjustment for the hospital output-mix characteristics. 
As we will see, this necessitates the development of some acceptable 
criteria for grouping, and weighting by case, the resulting case-mix 
vector. 
4.4.2. Increasing Hospital Homogeneity. 
In practice, researchers have responded to the need to adjust 
for the different nature of the hospitals' output, once one of the 
former basic "units", in the following terms, have been accounted for: 
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(i) Looking at some hospital characteristics which it can be 
postulated may increase hospital homogeneity within each 
subsample with respect to the initial group and against the 
similarity of the rest of the subsamples. 
Thereafter, the assumption to be established for each 
of the subsamples is that the output of the hospitals is 
similar enough for the application of a single accountancy 
measure (e. g. number of cases). 
In practice, this approach to searching for a greater 
homogeneity of output comes to consider external factors 
to the hospital activity, in order to group 'ex-ante' those 
hospitals with similar characteristics thought to reflect 
similar output-mixes. (A study of the different techniques 
used for classifying hospitals in this way can be seen in 
Klastorin, Watts and Trivedi (1978)). _ Amongst the techniques utilized for this purpose, Cluster 
Analysis seems to provide a convenient classification procedure, 
as we will analyse below. 
(ii) The introduction of some output-mix proxies (e. g. a case-mix 
vector) to be used for a direct adjustment within the overall 
sample of hospitals. (With respect to the use of this type 
of adjustment, see Hornbrook's survey, 1982). 
(iii) A combination of both methods is also possible. 
This will be the approach finally followed in our estimation 
exercise (Chapter V). 
The use of-cluster-analysis to-increase Subsample homogeneity. 
---------------------------- 
Cluster analysis is a type of multivariate technique which searches 
for the partition of the overall sample of cases under consideration into 
groups, such that the degree of association is high between members of 
the same group and low between members of different groups. 
The purpose of cluster analysis in our context is, therefore, to 
establish whether there exists any systematic difference between groups 
of hospitals in the character of their outputs. This difference then 
justifies the use of subsamples of hospitals according to the classification 
criterion for greater similarity. 
This technique of sample selection for increasing output homogeneity 
must be regarded as an informal check on some prior views and expectations 
about the potential benefits derived from the grouping of Subsamples, in 
terms of the minimization of the variance within each subgroup and 
maximizing the variance between subgroups. These results can then be 
taken into account in the model-building process, for example, by splitting 
the data into blocks, the composition of which reflects some institutional 
factors (see Cooper and Weekes, 1983). 
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Cluster analysis is not, therefore, a technique free from value 
judgements. As we will see in the exercise presented in Chapter V, 
judgement is necessary at several stages. Nevertheless, this 
technique has some advantages over other multivariate techniques: 
Mainly, it does not require the assumptions of multivariate 
normality, linearity or additivity for the determination of the 
groups, neither of an explicit dependent variable nor a predetermined 
functional form for classification purposes. On the other hand, it 
avoids the need to set any fixed discrete interval for the utilization 
of the classificatory variable. Moreover, clustering techniques are 
computationally efficient compared with other multicross classification 
techniques. 
A set of variables which try to catch differences in the nature of 
the hospital output provided, are commonly used for these classification 
purposes. Examples of such characteristics include variables related 
to the allocation and extent of the hospital coverage; the territorial 
provision of care and the level of medical services offered-weighted, 
in case, according to some other quality aspects; the hospital manpower 
mix - within and between different staff categories; variety and 
clinical hierarchy of the hospitals se"vices provided, etc. 
In consequence, if it is found that, according to some 'a priori' 
views, such groupings seem to exist, that is, if it is found that 
hospitals with some particular characteristics appear consistently 
to have an output which differs from that of hospitals which do not 
posses this characteristic, then it makes sense to estimate different 
models for the two sub-sets of hospitals. 
Thus, in the context of the hospital cost analysis, such a finding 
would suggest that the instrumental variable in the analysis differs in 
character across the groups, and hence the recorded costs per unit of 
output refer to different outputs, and perhaps different models of 
hospital behaviour may then need be estimated. This point seems to 
have been neglected in the literature on hospital cost functions. 
Researchers have primarily focussed on the use of some dummy variables 
for catching the influence of those different hospital output charac- 
tersistics, on which a single cost per unit of output has been regressed. 
(See for example Culyer et al., 1978). 
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The specific consequence of using this second approach will 
be analysed in examining the econometric exercise presented in the 
next Chapter. 
The use of_a_direct output_mix_adjustment. 
This method for increasing hospital output comparability utilizes 
some internal factors to the hospital activity which are postulated 
to incorporate output-mix differences. Examples include: 
(i) indirect factors related to the effects of different output_ 
mixes on some utilisation variables, such as the use of a 
weighted measure of the average length of stay (e. g. for 
specific diagnosis categories); those types of proxy measures 
resulting from the application of Information Theory to data 
on hospital activity (see Evans and Walker, 1972); or the 
indicators resulting from the comparison of the mean of 
some hospital utilization variables with its predicted values 
according to the sample behaviour - that is, had the indivi- dual hospital performed as the 'average sample hospital' 
(see Johnson, 1977); and 
(ii) direct factors, such as an output-mix vector, based on the 
classification of hospital cases, per diagnosis or group 
of diagnosis, per specialties (see Feldstein 1967), clinical 
departments, etc.. 
The utilization of a case-mix vector requires, in practice: 
a) The definition and classification of the components of the vector 
in terms of some criterion of similarity (e. g. an iso-resource utilization 
criterion, the identity or similarity of the primary diagnosis, of the 
management path from the admission to the patients' discharge, or, 
ideally, in terms of changes in the patients' health states achieved). 
b) Some type of weighting for the different importance of each of its 
elements, either within each group or between several groups. For 
instance, in weighting with reference to an iso-resource criterion - 
weights could be derived on the basis of actual (average or predicted) 
costs or potential costs (such as defined from certain benchmarks). 
The first approach to the determination of weights has the obvious 
shortcoming of including actual episodes of "unnecessary" care, 
embodied thereby as elements of "unnecessary" output. The second 
approach involves, on the other hand, a high degree of arbiftariness, 
since it accepts the value assigned by a panel of experts, say, or that 
derived from the experience on costs as registered by some 'pilot hospitals' 
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for this purpose selected. 
Given the objective of constructing a cost-guide-line, for the 
analysis of relative efficiency, two aspects of the hospital 
output-mix , in particular, need to be captured with regard to 
their impact on costs: 
(i) From the resource utilizationpdint of view, the 'intensity' 
of the services administered (or their quantity per day of stay) 
and the 'duration'(length of stay). The 'intensity' component 
can be mostly related to the complexity of the case in itself, 
whereas 'duration' is affected by the degree of severity or 
criticalness of the case, which depends on the acuteness and 
prognosis of its disease stage. 
(ii) From a resource generation point of view, the actual condition 
of the patient 'and the treatment process employed are the 
relevant variables. The tirst aspect depends on the demographic 
characteristics of the patients and some other related issues 
(clinical history, secondary problems, etc. ). The second one 
depends on the nature of the treatment itself (therapy, secondary 
diagnosis, surgery, etc. ). 
On the other hand, the implications of both aspects (amount and 
cost of the treatment) in hospital expenditure have to be considered 
in the context of the characteristics of the hospital, that is, with 
reference to its specialization - in terms of the relative concentration 
of hospital care in certain type of treatments (hence greater 
sophisitication of the equipment available, medical competence, etc. ) - 
and of the complexity of the cases treated (e. g. hospitals coping with 
more of the less common specialties, etc. ). Both factors in the 
output-mix definition may have opposite effects on costs, and both 
need then to be analysed for an appropriate definition of hospital 
"relative efficiency". 
In sum, clustering strategies and direct output-mix adjustments 
are the two prominent methods utilized in the literature for capturing 
hospital output differences. 
In the next pages, we will introduce the rest of behavioural 
explanatory variables which have commonly accompanied the former 
output-proxies in the literature to date. 
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4.4.3. Operationalisation of the Cost Relationship: Behavioural 
Explanatory Variables used in the Literature to Date. 
A review of the existing literature from the seminal studies of 
MS Feldstein (1967) and JK Mann and De Yett (1970) on Hospital cost- 
Functions, can serve to summarize the following components of our 
basic cost relationship or behavioural explanatory variables (see 
Shuman et al. 1973): 
a) Locational characteristics of the hospital. These have been 
mostly incorporated through dummy variables, which take values of 
zero or one depending on whether the hospital is situated in a metro- 
politan, urban /non-urban, outlying area, etc. 
b) Size class, usually approached by the number of beds or some other 
variable related to the physical component or structural side of the 
cost relationship. 
c) Outpatient activity. The indicators commonly considered for this 
are the percentage of outpatient visits on total hospital activity, 
the proportion of staff input time employed in outpatient services 
or the ratio of expenses directly apportioned to outpatient clinics 
over the total hospital expenditure. 
d) Medical Staff (or hospital-based physicians; e. g. the full-time 
versus the part-time component; the staff composition per 
hierarchies, etc. ) and non medical manpower (e. g. nurses per bed, 
unqualified manpower per square meter, etc. ). This variable has 
proved to be particularly correlated to the case-mix factor and to 
the teaching status of the hospital. 
e) The range of services provided, or the number of routine and non- 
routine services, sophistication of the equipment, quality and technical 
level. (4) 
f) The research and teaching status. As before, its significance 
may be collected by a dummy variable, or some other continuous variable, 
such as the number of trained students weighted by the different 
educational categories. 
g) The output-mix variable. As we pointed out, this factor seeks to 
capture directly the "output" heterogeneity across hospitals, by 
measuring its differences, mostly in terms of the hospital complexity 
and specialization. 
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For these purposes, the following indicators have been used in 
the literature (see for instance, Barer, 1982). 
(i) The average length of stay, in simple terms or weighted by some other measure such as the relative bed occupancy 
rate. This is obviously the crudest of the indicators 
proposed. 
(ii) The share of the number of cases whose length of stay exceeds 
the average length of stay by a predetermined amount, or the 
length of stay which could be predicted from the average work- 
load figures. 
Variations in the incidence of chronic diseases between 
hospitals can obviously distort this measure. 
(iii) The ratio of single to multiple diagnosis per case and of 
surgical procedures over the total number of cases, given 
their postulated relation to the hospital output complexity. 
(iv) The service-mix component, accounting for the character of 
the services available and the supply of other related 
facilities. 
(v) An index of the actual case-load of the hospital, based on 
well identified diagnosis catergories (e. g. ICDA groupings). 
The diagnosis-mix vector can be also combined with an index 
of complexity (e. g. according to the radiological and surgical 
procedures). The weights required can be also assigned by a 
panel of experts, looking at some more complex treatments 
according to their experience. 
NO The construction of a single "resource index", derived for 
each particular hospital from summing the specific proportion 
of-cases in each group and weighting them by a set of, say, 
charge-based factors (Comission on Professional and Hospital 
activities, 1978). As we saw, these weights can be derived 
from the average cost or charges within a sample group of 
similar hospitals. 
(vii) A similar measure to the former one comes from the application 
of Information Theory to hospital data, in order to build 
an Index of the relative case complexity and hospital 
specialization (Evans and Walker, 1972). In brief, this 
method uses the information gain resulting from the observa- 
tion that a type of case j goes to be treated in hospital i 
rather than in hospital k. If we assume that complex cases 
tend to be handled in a few hospitals with more intensive 
facilities and more specialized staff, we could measure 
"complexity" via the degree of concentration of a case type 
across different hospitals. Hospitals containing more of the 
less common specialities would be given consequently a higher 
'complexity' rating. Otherwise, hospitals with a limited 
range of specialities would receive a lower specialization 
rating. 
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(viii) The use of Diagnosis Related Groups . 
(Mill et al, 1976). 
This approach groups the patient-cases that require a 
similar package of hospital services in terms of the 
utilization of resources, as measured basically by the 
variable length of stay. 
For this purpose, an algorithi is constructed to 
partition observations into groups. They are derived 
from the minimization of the total within group sum of 
squares with respect to thoseattributes considered to 
have significant impact in the hospital consumption of 
resources. (8) 
The following interaction is examined for this purpose: 
"Output" =f (length of stay and intensity of the hospital 
(DRG) services required) 
( ---A--- ) 
A=g (condition of the patient and treatment process) 
( ---B--- ) 
B=h (age, sex, primary-secondary diagnosis & 
primary-secondary surgery) 
( ---C--- ) 
The possibility of observing the 'C' type of attributes 
for each patient, allows a classification of the output-case 
mix on this basis. Although problems of generalization and 
of potential extrapolation of these results over time are 
still present, (6) the DRG classification represents an 
obvious improvement with respect to the former crude case- 
mix groupings. 
(ix) Other more-recent developments include the "Disease staging" 
-------------- technique, the split of "Patient management categories", the 
creation of "VA multilevel care groups", and the introduction 
of some other generic algorithms as the "AS-Scores", the 
"Index of severity of the illness", "MD-DADO" (see Bentley 
and Butler, 1980). 
h) Finally, some authors have pointed out the 'output-quality' component 
as a separate aspect of the hospital output, different from the output- 
mix variable in itself. In approaching this factor, proxy-measures in 
relation to the character of the hotel type of service facilities, some 
indicators on the activity of the hospital staff -trying to capture the 
human factor in the medical treatment- and certain quality enhancing 
type of services have been proposed. 
In brief, the former variables have been mostly used in the 
literature for the operationalisation of the conceptual issues identified 
earlier on in the basic cost-relationship, as defined in section 4.3. 
On the other hand, the rationality of the behavioural approach followed 
and the specification of the components usually included in the 
estimated cost functions have been also examined. in light of the 
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existing problems in measuring hospital output. The analysis 
has highlighted the need to increase hospital output homogeneity 
prior to compare hospital performance and how this has been 
pursued in the literature. Clustering strategies and direct 
output-mix adjustments have proved their major relevance for 
these purposes. 
In the following section we present the selection and measurement 
of the variables included in our basic cost relationship. They will 
be used in the empirical exercise of Chapter V. For this purpose, 
we will discuss first the implications of the utilisation of alter- 
native dependent variables for reimbursement purposes in view 
of the efficiency motivation targets to which they must serve as 
formulated in the previous Chapters. 
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4.5. THE SELECTION AND MEASUREMENT OF THE VARIABLES INCLUDED IN THE 
COST RELATIONSHIP 
A cost function which is linear in its parameters will be 
specified for our purposes, 
(7) 
as consisting of: 
Cost = ßo +ß 1 
(vector of institutional) +ß 2 (vector of behavioural variables characteristic variables 
+ß3 (vector of the output-mix)+ Ei 
This section analyses the selection and measurement of the 
variables included in the former cost relationship, discussing its 
implications in the design of a PRAP. 
We proceed from the selection of the average cost dependent 
variable (section 4.5.1) to the remaining institutional, characteristic 
and utilization variables (section 4.5.2). 
4.5.1. The Selection of the Average Dependent Variable. 
For the sake of econometric convenience (as is shown in 4.6.1), 
an average cost function (instead of a total cost function) is estimated. 
In performing this transformation we need to assume that the 
'case treated' constitutes the homogeneous unit of output in the sense 
specified before, and that variations in the hospital-mix can be 
explained by a systematic component in the cost equation. 
The choice of this output variable, and hence of the average 
cost dependent variable has, in addition to econometric problems, some 
implications for its utilisation as the prospective rate or reimbursing 
unit. It was precisely, in the light of these implications that we selecte( 
the number of cases, once the following alternative units were examined: 
a) A per capita value. This is, at first glance, the unit which seems 
to relate better to the concept of output defined as the individuals' 
health states in the community, once we take into account some other 
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influencial factors such as the morbidity differences in a natural catchment 
area. As a result of this definition, a payment to the agents through 
a fixed capitation value could provide a maximum incentive for efficiency, 
in so far as it discourages both inefficiency in production and excess of 
utilization, since reimbursement does not vary with increasing levels. 
However, it involves in practice a great deal of difficulty ir. its 
implementation: This depends on whether it is possible to group the 
population subscribed to this policy in panels attached to specific 
hospitals. In addition, it may tend to discourage any cost-increasing 
innovation in treatment methods to a greater extent than other altern- 
atives, due to its lesser flexibility with regard to the adjustment of 
the reimbursement figures to such changes. 
b) A per patient-day figure. This is probably the simplest measure 
to apply and is to some extent appealing, given its minor dependence on 
differences in the output-mix vector. Its utilization may have, however, 
a perverse impact on the utilization factor (e. g. occupancy rate and 
average length of stay), and to the extent that hospitals can influence 
the utilization of hospital inputs, its use may reduce the chances of 
attaining a cost-conscious performance. Furthermore, since the first 
days of a patient's stay are commonly more resource-intensive, and thus 
more costly, than the final days, the use of average 'per diem' rates 
creates incentives to keep patients longer, given that these additional 
days will tend to be "profitable". Moreover, if rates are paid identi- 
cally for each diagnosis, hospitals will also have an incentive to admit 
more patients that are less seriously ill, hence less expensive to 
treat, whenever the 'needs' constraint does not fully bind hospital 
admissions. (See Hornbrook and Rafferty, 1982). 
c) Having rejected the former reimbursing units, the number of patients 
or cases treated was considered as the more appropriate measure, 
(8) 
although it must be recognized that the hospital revenue allocation 
should not be based on this factor alone. 
The choice of this output unit is based on the fact that, in principle, 
a reimbursement per case can encourage efficiency in the supply of care, 
for instance, through reductions in the average length of stay. 
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It must be recognized, however, that it generally provides zero or 
perverse incentives concerning unncecessary admissions . Its utilization is then particularly acceptable if it is followed by quality-monitoring 
policies since they too, take into account the patient case as the unit 
of analysis. 
At any rate, the use of this measure will need to be accompanied by 
an adjustment for case-mix differences, since, otherwise, it could 
encourage discrimination in favour of the admission of short-stay cases 
and, hence, it may dilute 'output-quality'. 
On the other hand, the utilization of data on patient bases makes 
possible thereafter the construction of alternative values for hospital 
analysis at different levels of aggregation. In fact, research is being 
developed in the United Kingdom (see Magee et al. 1981) on clinical, 
speciality and departmental costing and budgeting, and in the United 
States on patient and diagnosis costing and reimbursement (see Thompson 
et al., 1982, on Diagnosis Related Groups). 
Although the use of values based on cost centres at the specialty 
or departmental level remains relatively attractive, in the sense that 
it makes decision-makers directly accountable for their financial actions, 
statistical problems oblige one to be cautious about its direct utiliz- 
ation here. That is, gaps in the information at present available 
rarely allow for such accurate attributions of costs required for the 
corresponding apportionment of responsibilities. (See for this purpose 
the recommendations of the Körner Working Group in England, 1983, in 
relation to changing in this direction the Hospital information system). 
These problems can be found, in particular, in using the patients' 
"diagnosis", even after taking into account the special characteristics 
of the hospital and the nature of the treatment process administered. 
Although this basic unit involves in itself the consideration of 
case-mix differences - given that its measurement can also be refined 
by patient related aspects, such as the inpatient demographic 
characteristics, the character of the diagnosis and therapeutic aspects 
of the treatment, etc. - its utilization raises, at some stage, the 
question 'of grouping and weighting. Since groups and weights are 
derived on the basis of existing information on actual utilization, 
they are unlikely to be valid for their utilization in contexts 
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different of those from which they have been initially derived. 
In short, there are both theoretical and empirical reasons on 
why an average cost per case value may be preferred as the unit of 
analysis (once one has accounted for hospital case-mix differences) 
and as the reimbursing unit for purposes of a prospective revenue 
allocation policy of the type described in this thesis. For these 
reasons, the total number of cases treated in the hospital will 
be taken as the output unit and used in the denominator of the 
average cost variable. 
In the remaining pages of this subsection, we will examine the 
measurement of the total hospital costs, which constitutes the numerator 
of the ratio defined as the dependent variable. 
Total hospital costs. 
Measurement problems stem here from the way in which capital costs 
and expenditure on outpatient services are dealt with within total operating 
cost figures. In fact, there has been in the literature to date no 
discussion about the need to include in the total operating costs the 
maintenance and normal replacement costs of the existing equipment. 
In general, the problem is whether hospitals apply in practice homogeneous 
criteria for the determination of depreciation rates on building costs 
and purchases of major equipment. If such criteria do not exist, it would 
seem advisable to deal just with the remaining operational costs for purposes 
of hospital cost comparisons. However, since total costs per unit of 
output reflect the influence of the rate of utilization of hospital facil- 
ities on additional capital expenditure the omission of capital depreciation 
might, in principle, bias over time hospital expenditure figures. 
The most significant result of omitting capital depreciation seems 
to be to underestimate the extent to which total cost per output rises 
with scale. This is particularly the case when the number of patients, 
rather than the number of bed-days, are used. In fact, to the extent that 
larger hospitals have lower cases per bed, they may consequently have higher 
capital costs per case, unless they achieve very substantial economies of 
scale from larger capacity production, etc.. This problem then also requires 
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-the use of an appropriate measurement of the institutional scale 
variable. 
But in our context, we can use total operating cost figures given 
that depreciation costs are at present homogeneously regulated by the 
central reimbursing Authority. This fixes the depreciation rates and 
determines across the public hospitals the values on which rates have to 
be applied. 
(9) 
Therefore, in ending this subsection, it should be pointed out 
that the total operating costs (in the way defined above) per number 
of cases treated in the hospital constitutes the average cost variable 
selected in our basic cost relationship. 
The remaining explanatory variables will be presented below. 
4.5.2. The Explanatory variables: Institutional, characteristic and 
Utilization Variables. 
Among the independent or explanatory variables included in a 
behavioural cost function, 'institutional', 'characteristic'and 
'utilization' variables have to be considered. 
Institutional variables: 
The "size" variable is the most widely used of those explanatory 
variables. In principle, it can be approximated by the 'output-productive' 
capacity, the hospital staff, or the 'physical' size of the hospital (e. g. 
beds, capacity, or square meters of floor). In practice, the interest 
in using some type of 'size' factor arises from the objective of tesing 
the existence of scale economies in the hospital production of care 
(see in this sense Appendix One to the next chapter). 
With regard to the proxy measures for hospital scale, some issues 
need to be noted. In this sense, Friedman(1o) has pointed out the 
potential presence of a 'regression fallacy' in the analysis of hospital 
costs. This is the case when output is used as the proxy for scale, and 
it would be due to the fact that depreciation costs from conventional 
accounting procedures will not be fully measured. In fact, when output 
rises, plant depreciation does not usually increase in the same pro- 
portion. Thus the unit cost of production will be, "ceteris paribus", 
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negatively correlated to the output-capacity ratio. 
On the other hand, if hospital size as indicated by the number of 
beds is used as the institutional indicator for scale, one must take 
into account the problems arising from the fact that this variable is 
typically correlated with several other explanatory variables in the 
behavioural cost function. In addition, there may exist a functional- 
relation problem of this variable with the dependent variable: as 
hospital size increases, the cost of acquiring and maintaining any 
increase in the types of care provided with specialized inputs will 
increase too. If, as is usually the case, this increase is not 
accompanied by a proportional rise in the number of cases treated 
within each specific category, those inputs will no longer be in - 
creasingly utilized. Therefore, the costs of acquisition and main- 
tenance will not be spread over larger volumes of output. When this 
is the case, an increase in hospital size will lead to an upward shift 
in the average cost curve rather than a movement along the same curve 
(Feldstein, 1967). 
In addition, the physical size variable may imply two different 
cost effects with regard to the hospital utilization factors: 
a) If larger hospitals assume responsibilities for referrals within 
wider geographic areas, or provide a more sophisticated type of care, 
the cost-distribution aspects of care provision may rise with size. 
This may be due, for instance, to the sparsity of the area served, from 
which higher costs result from greater hospitalization in avoidance 
of emergency risks on those territorially based services. This factor 
may then lead to the provision of inpatient care to persons who could 
otherwise have been treated as outpatients. 
b) Lower unit costs may be recorded, on the other hand, in so far as 
scale economies are significant, due to the advantages of larger plant 
capacity. They are likely to stem from existing output indivisibilities. 
Moreover, a wide range of indirect effects on other independent 
variables can appear too, for example, some collinearity problems may 
appear between (i) hospital size and the flow of cases per bed 
available and with respect to the quality aspects of the output(although, 
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in this last case, with a less unabiguous relationship), and (ii) 
hospital size and the case-mix variables, training programs and 
other utilization variables (average length of stay and bed 
occupancy rate), mostly with a positive association. 
Finally, a direct association between scale and input substitution 
may affect costs if: 
a) larger hospitals can afford greater opportunities for manpower 
substitution, given some rigidities among the factors of production, 
J 
or 
b) larger hospitals are less efficient in actually combining inputs, in 
adjusting themselves to different utilization rates with more difficulty 
than smaller hospitals, or if the incentives for efficiency steadily 
diminish with size. 
(11) 
In this sense, technical and economic 
efficiency may be pulled in opposite directions. 
Therefore, we can conclude that the entire effect of "size" on total 
average cost figures is, in general, rather ambiguous from an 'a priori' 
point of view. 
Among the institutional proxy variables, other external and 
enviromental factors can also be introduced, the most common of 
which are hospital structure, 'age', geographic location, inter- 
hospital cross-boundary flows and certain external factors affecting 
labour market conditions (i. e. cost-amount of the factor inputs). 
In addition, the teaching status of the hospital - which, as we saw, 
may present some indirect effects on hospital size and medical staff(11) - 
and some other general population attributes of the geographic area 
served can also be included. 
For our purposes, most of the institutional aspects mentioned above 
will be used as the basis for constructing Subsamples of homogeneous 
hospitals, following a cluster strategy. Thereafter we will select 
the hospital size variable ''number of beds' as the explanatory 
variable in the regression analysis for explaining actual variations 
in hospital costs. 
The utilization and characteristic_variables. 
The vector of utilization and characteristic variables are intended 
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to reflect the individual performance of the hospital, once we have 
accounted for the institutional factors which surround its management. 
This vector can include: 
a) The flow variables related to the actual utilization of the 
existing facilities and/or some direct estimators of the labour 
and capital inputs available. They try to reflect factors related 
to the under-utilization of the existing capacity, the over-provision 
of some services, inefficient levels in production, etc. They are 
of crucial relevance to the definition of an accurate base-line for the 
analysis of efficiency for comparing hospital costs. 
For these purposes, variables such as the turnover interval, the bed 
occupancy rate and the average length of stay are widely used as indicators 
of the actual performance of the hospitals. 
b) The case-mix load. The introduction of this factor is required given 
the use of an average cost per case as the reimbursing value. 
(13) 
it 
accounts for actual differences in the hospital case-load. 
The influence of these variables cannot be generally postulated in 
a single unambiguous manner. Existing collinearities between the 
variables included in the case-mix vector and other institutional, 
characteristic 
(14) 
and utilization variables prevent that identification. 
Moreover, the utilization variablesincluded in (a) are linked to one 
another by definition through a single relation. Thus flow of cases 
per bed equal the bed occupancy rate (x365) divided by the average 
length of stay. This relation requires then a careful selection of the 
variable included and the one which is omitted - and which is consequently 
allowed to vary in the regression - if a careful interpretation of the 
influence of each single variable has to be made. 
This last point implies important observations for the efficiency 
analysis in the utilization of the hospital facilities. In fact, from 
the relationship described, it is clear that an extra case can be 
treated by shortening the average length of stay or by increasing 
hospital capacity. Both can be legitimately termed, in principle, 
"changes in utilization", the first referring to changes in the 
utilization of the existing beds and the second to changes in total 
capacity. As we will see later, the way of achieving this apparently 
similar result has different cost consequences, depending on whether these 
changes relate to costs per case, per patient-day or per bed (see Appendix 
V. 1). 
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These differences will need to be taken into account in the analysis 
of the hospital relative efficiency. 
In addition, the following points can be made with regard to the 
utilization variables mentioned above: 
In relation to the average length of stay variable (LOS), we 
should note that cost per case is just the cost per patient-day adjusted 
by the length of stay. Therefore, the former utilization variable can 
easily be traded-off with average costs through changes in the length 
of stay. As a result, the average length of stay has the obvious 
drawback that it can easily be manipulated by hospitals for reimburse- 
ment pruposes, particularly if cost per patient-day is considered as the 
reimbursing unit. 
If the bed occupancy rate (BOR) were the variable chosen, we would 
need to point out the sources of variation in the ratio of utilization 
of beds with respect to the total number of beds available, before making 
any statements about relative efficiency in the utilization of hospital 
facilities. Thus, BOR may increase due to higher LOS, with a constant 
flow of cases per bed, having no positive implications for efficiency 
improvements if we assume that those extra-days in hospital make no 
differences to the patients' health. On the contrary, it may give an 
indication of "inefficiency" given the unnecessary utilization of resources. 
Otherwise, BOR may also increase because of higher values in the flow of 
cases per bed available, holding LOS constant. This change can be considered, 
in principle, as an efficiency contribution by improving the utilization of 
hospital facilities. This is due to the fact that it allows for the 
treatment of additional inpatient cases through the increase in the 
utilization of the already available hospital capacity. 
In conclusion, the Case-Flow variable (FL), or number of cases per bed 
available over the year, is, in our view, the utilization variable with less 
"perverse" 
. effects 
for reimbursement purposes, once the institutional factors 
and the hospital case-mix vector are taken into account. In this way, it 
will be incorporated in our estimation exercise as the second explanatory 
variable. 
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The second "characteristic" variable, 
case-mix load. As said, its inclusion is 
the decision to use an average cost figure 
in the estimated regression. This vector 
part of the information lost by the use of 
value as the dependent variable, by being 
explanatory variable. 
as advanced in (b), is the 
particularly relevant given 
as the dependent variable 
will try then to recover 
an average cost per case 
included as a separated 
Some authors have omitted this adjustment, by assuming that the 
"output-mix" of the hospital is already captured by the actual stock 
and flow variables (Carr and Feldstein, 1967). 
(15) 
It is not at all 
evident, in our view, that the case-mix complexity and hospital output 
specialization can be systematically captured by the hospital size in 
the way approached by those authors, 
(16) 
nor that all their effects on the 
intensity utilization of resources are collected by the hospital actual 
utilization rates. 
(17) 
Regarding the facts, the balance of the argument 
seems to support the explicit inclusion of the vector of the actual case- 
mix load, according to the nature of the endogenous variable previously 
selected for estimation purposes. 
As we will see later on, econometric problems will advise the 
use of a percentage version of this variable instead of absolute figures. 
i 
In sum, the size variable - proxied by the number of hospital beds 
available - the flow of cases per bed and the specialtyPase-mix vector 
in percentage terms, will be used as the set of explanatory variables 
selected for the estimation of the hospital behavioural cost function. 
Before going to the actual estimation exercise, we examine in the 
next section some methodological and econometric problems which arise 
from instrumenting this particular approach to the hospital relevant 
expenditure and from the use of multiple regression analysis techniques 
for its estimation. 
4.6. ESTIMATING THE COST FUNCTION: SOME RELEVANT ISSUES. 
In this section, we examine certain problems which are not always 
made explicit in the literature. They are commonly present in the 
estimation of the type of regression equations used for the calculation 
of a base-line for hospital cost analysis 
in the way proposed above. 
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In this sense, we will refer to those issues derived from the 
utilization of estimation techniques to predict hospital expenditure 
from the set of determinant factors assessed as relevants for 
reimbursement purposes. 
As we will see in the next pages, this sort of exercise contains 
methodological issues and involves econometric problems which need 
to be taken into account when examining the strengths and limitations 
of such an approach. 
4.5.1. General Methodological Problems and Responses. 
It should be noted that the definition of a base-line of 'standard 
expenditure' from a predicition based on the results of the estimation of 
equation will refer, in principle, to the figure that an hospital unit 
would spend if it conformed to the regression formula; hence, if it 
spent the average of the hospitals which have the same characteristics, 
such as approached by the set of exogenous variables considered. Therefore, 
it does not provide in itself an absolute 'efficiency locus' for theore- 
tical comparisons. 
For these purposes, the methodology of analysis is to some extent 
tautological, since the determinant component of what has to be spent 
is derived from what is already spent. In other words, the system 
contains a "backward looking" character, since it looks at the past 
to predict the future. In order to fully validate this method we need 
to assume that, 
(i) on average, hospitals are already providing services 
at a standard level - as defined for instance by ex- 
isting planning policies- and at standard values - 
as monitored respectively by the operational policies 
inforce. Hence, their expenditures on a cross-section 
basis are equally worthy of consideration; and 
(ii) the statutory obligation of the services which have to 
be provided is the same for all the hospitals. 
-159- 
In the second place, and as a result of the 'backward-looking' 
character, a cumulative causation effect may appear in the absence 
of specific measures of correction. In fact, those hospitals which 
have managed more resources in the past will obtain from the prediction 
relatively greater amounts for the future. Moreover, if the initial 
data system contain biases, these will be perpetuated, or even accent- 
uated, by the regression analysis (Godley, 1976). As; a result, in 
the case of underestimating, say, a cost difference through the regression 
formula - that is, if we fail to take into account that it costs more 
in certain areas than others to provide a given level of service with 
a given degree of efficiency, we will be introducing a p? sting 
pressure to reduce the level of services in these areas. 
In the third place, econometric problems, which we explore further 
in the next section, can affect the conclusions derived from the 
estimation and interpretation of the results obtained. That is, in 
addition to the caveats that the selection of the 'relevant' variables 
may offer themselves, the techniques utilized for their estimation may 
not lead to an unambiguous interpretation of the results (for instance, 
and typically, in terms of the marginal impact on costs from unit changes 
in the value of each explanatory variable). 
Viewed as a whole for reimbursement targets, these problems may 
not matter very much for an "average" hospital, since, by definition, 
overall expenditure will be largely accounted for by the coefficients 
of the estimated equation; that is, those predicition errors will be 
smaller for average hospitals as compared with other outlying hospitals. 
But for deviant hospitals, there could be no confidence that, say, a 
relatively low allocation because of one of the factors will be 
compensated by a relatively high allocation because of other factors. 
These problems should be then explicitly appreciated in considering 
whether or not the equation as a whole has the properties of generating 
the 'appropriate' reimbursement. 
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Finally, the uncertainty which may 
revenue allocation process formulated in 
argued to create certain risk-aversion - 
hospital technological innovations - and 
the running needs of hospital operation. 
recognized within a bargaining framework 
hospital revenues. 
surround the results of the 
these grounds could be 
for instance, in terms of 
a lack of planning against 
This caveat may be also 
for the allocation of 
In dealing with those points and providing operational responses, 
it should first be remembered what the objectives of the exercise are. 
They consist, in short, of providing an external outline for budget 
evaluation and revenue allocation, out of the pace imposed by past 
expenses and from existing political pressures and lobbies for its 
allocation. 
In this sense, with respect to the first observation, it can 
be replied that, "in general terms, what the decentralized average 
sample unit has found necessary to spend on the wholeý. is a sufficiently 
satisfactory measure of what it was needed to spend responding to a 
local view of the population needs". Moreover, this "backward- 
looking" character is common to all those methods based on data referring 
to actual values, which seem to be, after all, the only feasible alter- 
native given data limitationsc19) What we do in addition here is to 
redefine those values in some more appropriate ways. 
At any rate, the core of the limitation pointed out above for this 
type of exercise remains valid in general terms, but it has to be 
well understood. What one is going to obtain at best from the 
estimation is an average cost function instead of the locus of 
economically efficient input-output combinations. Nevertheless, if 
the objective is to use the estimated parameters to predict the amount 
that "on average" can result from the use of some given parameters, 
obviously, an average cost function can plausibly be used. If the 
objective were to obtain from the pure marginal costs that under real 
conditions derive from the increase in the use of one factor, then the 
average cost function would yield a valid answer only in a very rare 
case: This is, when at any rate of factor utilization, the slope 
of the actual cost function is the same as that of the hypothetical 
function along the slope of the line (e. g. as measured, precisely, by 
marginal costs). (20) 
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4.6.2. Econometric problems. 
In addition to the problems discussed above, which are fundamentally 
associated with the nature of the regression approach to the method of 
assessing 'relevant' expenditure, econometric problems may stem from 
the way in which the regression equation is estimated. 
In estimating the hospital cost function in a first step by 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) we need to deal first with those factors 
which may lead to violation of the basic assumptions underlying OLS. 
In a cross-section approach to the estimation of the overall sample, 
these factors are likely to be: 
a) The violation of the "zero mean" expected value of the random 
component of the expression. 
This violation may appear, in our context, when we incurr in 
misspecification errors in the systematic part (e. g. by omitting a 
variable which should be included in the basic cost relationship), in 
the functional form (e. g. indicating incorrectly the specification of 
an equation as linear in its parameters), or in the structural stability 
of the stated relationship (e. g. pooling observations which belong to 
different cost behavioural models, as may be the case from the inclusion 
of teaching and non-teaching hospitals in the same regressed sample). 
Potential bias, inconsistency and inefficiency of the OLS 
estimators are in this case the common consequences of this violation. 
b) The violation of the hypothesis of randomness or non-stochastic 
property of the regressors. 
This problem commonly appears when regressors are mutually 
correlated, as happens in the case of multicollinearity. As we have 
argued earlier this is the case in our context of some of the 
utilization and characteristic variables. 
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The violation of the non-stochastic property of the regressors 
may create large sample variances, and lead to imprecision in 
the estimated parameters. It has the effect that the partial 
regression coefficients cannot be interpreted any longer as a 
measure of the change in the dependent variable due to a change in 
the independent variable, other things being equal. (Obviously, 
"other things" are not equal due to the problem of collinearities). 
In brief, the following set of collinearities have been discussed 
in the literature estimating hospital cost functions: 
Case-mix 
Size 
Training programs Output quality Length of stay 
Output quality 
Bed Occupancy rate Case-mix . Length of stay Length of stay Flow of cases per bed 
Flow of cases per bed 
Therefore, if some linear relationship exists between those 
independent variables in the model set up earlier, given that most 
of the variation of the highly correlated regressors will be common 
to them, this will leave little variation unique to each variable. 
(21) 
This means that OLS procedures have little information to use, and 
any estimate based on little information cannot be held with much 
confidence. 
As a result, an econometric trade-off has to be made on these 
cases at some stage of the estimation between the colli-nearity 
problems arising from the inclusion of some of those variables, and 
the misspecification erros resulting from their omission. This invovles 
a compromise of whether we can reduce the variance of the remaining 
estimates, in omitting those variables suspected of being collinear, 
by enough to compensate for the additional bias which may be 
otherwise introduced. 
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The presence of multicollinearity has been particularly argued, 
amongst the elements of the output (case)-mix vector. In dealing 
with this specific problem, Principle Components Analysis has 
received most of the attention. 
The Principal Componens_ technique apppears for this purpose 
as an appropriate procedure, because it seeks to achieve a sufficient 
reduction in the number of parameters (say, case categories) by "comb- 
ining" instead of excluding variables, and thereby avoiding the result- 
ing potential bias from that omission. Principal components are 
created as linear combinations of those variables which explain the 
maximum variance and keep the orthogonality property among them. 
In this sense, this technique eliminates the problem of multicollin- 
earity and it offers an implicit solution to the problem of grouping, 
weighting and aggregating the different factors used in a case-mix 
measurement. However, the use of the regression coeficients, resulting 
from the inclusion of principal components as weights, can be made 
only with difficulty in our context. Indeed, they do not provide 
a clear-cut interpretation for building prospective rates of reimbursement. 
It seems then advisable to search for the diminution of the 
multicollinearity problem amongst the case-mix variables in some other 
indirect ways: for instance, through the use of the share of each case- 
diagnosis category in the total, since evidence is available of a 
substantial reduction in this way in the value of their correlation 
coefficients. 
(22) 
c) The violation of the assumption of homoskedastic disturbances. 
This violation occurs when the disturbances do not have constant 
variance. This has been currently argued to be the case when hospitals 
of different size are included in the same sample (Lave and Lave, 1972). 
The reason in this case for the violation of the assumption of homo- 
skedastic disturbances is that there seems to be more variation in the 
services offered, and hence in the output-mix, in larger hospitals 
than in smaller ones and, therefore, that the variance of the 
disturbance term in the estimated equation changes with hospital size. 
(23) 
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In these cases, an observation associated with a relatively high 
disturbance varience is likely, again, to contain less information 
about the deterministic relation between the explained and explanatory 
variables: than one with a minor disturbance variance. As we have seen, 
OLS will provide in these cases inefficient estimators in small and 
large samples, although they will retain the properties of unbias- 
edness and consistency. 
(24) 
This result is due to the fact that 
OLS procedures will place equal weight on the observations which 
have larger error variances than those with smaller ones. This 
missleading weighting occurs because the sum of squared residuals 
associated with large variance error terms is likely to be substan- 
tially greater than the sum of square residuals associated with low 
variance errors. It is then reasonable that the observations 
with large variance errors should be differentially weighted. 
This rationale is in the basis of the alternative Weighted Least 
Squares option selected in our estimation exercise, that offers 
a solution equivalent to the one resulting from the deflection of 
the whole equation by the value of the independent variable which 
causes heteroskedasticity in the disturbance term. A similar 
reason lies behind the estimation of the average cost value of the 
dependent variable, assuming that the level of output and hospital 
size move in similar directions. 
A second general issue is that of the identification of the 
equation. So far as behavioural costs collect supply aspects 
closely related to demand factors, this may cause an identification 
problem. 
The predominant view has come to postulate in this matter some 
sort of Say's Law: that is, that supply creates its own demand in 
the provision of inpatient health care and, in this sense, demand 
factors could be correctly ignored. It may not always be so absolutely 
clear that supply factors alone determine the quantity of care demanded, 
since, among other reasons, as Berki (1970) has pointed out, it may 
be difficult to distinguish between the aspects of creation of demand 
and those of elimination of the excess of demand. 
(25) 
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However, given the use in our context of a behavioural cost 
function instead of a conventional production function - which may 
raise additional problems of separability - we can plausibly assume 
that the influence of the resource constraint has an increasingly 
prominent role compared with that of the "needs" constraint. But 
if this is not the case, problems of error misspecification, and 
hence biased, inconsistent and inefficient estimates, will again 
stem from the results of a conventional OLS estimation. 
A final point can be made here with respect to the possibility 
of the existence of sample selection bias. 
In short, this problem may arise in our context from the 
construction of different subsamples. Although they exhibit in 
principle a higher degree of internal homogeneity, its grouping criteria 
may affect the functional form and structural stability of the overall 
regression equation. In these cases, the implicit variables which 
make for the interdependence among subsamples may need to be examined. 
For instance, when the "cluster" definition is based on the hospital 
size, variable factors such as the extent of the area actually covered 
by the hospital, the level of transfers of patients between hospitals -' 
belonging to different groups, and the influence of territorial indices 
of the cost of living on the voluntary allocation of labour inputs, and 
some other externalities in general, can cause that type of distorsion, 
given its association to 'size'. Although this problem does not seem 
to have been considered as extremely important in the literature, it 
may need to be taken into account in some cases. 
In sum, from the analysis of the problem involved in the definition 
and measurement of the variables selected in our basic cost relationship 
and of the econometric problems surrounding the estimation of the 
regression equation specified above, in the next and final section we 
will conclude some considerations and recommendationswhich will be 
taken into account in our estimation exercise presented in the next 
Chapter. 
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4.7. CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY 
The following considerations will be incorporated in the 
estimation exercise of Chapter V: 
a) Given the nature of the factors currently causing 
the violation of the hypothesis of homoskedastic disturbances, 
required for an OLS estimation - and which are likely to be present 
in our context - we need to test for heteroskedasticity. 
In fact, given the cross-section nature of the sample and the 
range of hospital size, a differential weighting for those observations 
with larger variance error terms may be required. 
According to the analysis performed in this Chapter, the number 
of hospital beds is the main candidate for weighting, and so for 
deflating the initial equation, opting consequently for a Weighted 
Least Squares type of approach. In addition, the use of an average 
cost function, as far as hospital output is related to size, may 
also involve an implicit deflation which can reduce the problem of 
heteroskedasticity too. 
b) In the final specification and estimation of the regression 
equation, a trade-off may be needed between the problems derived from 
multicollinearity and those resulting from the omission of the correlated 
variables - or specification errors; that is, between the possibility 
of reducing the variance of the remaining estimates by excluding those 
variables suspected of collinearity, by enough to compensate for the 
bias which otherwise will be introduced. 
The use of principal components, prior to applying clustering 
procedures(26), and the utilization of a percentage version of the 
speciality case-mix vector as the explanatory variable included in 
the regression equation, may serve too for dealing with the multi- 
collinearity problem. 
c) The problem of a potential sample selection bias will be 
considered by re-selecting the initial sample and searching for 
external institutional characteristics with a major effect on hospital 
singularity. The existence of a constant functional form and 
structural stability for the subsamples created will be consequently 
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validated, testing for misspecification errors. (Thereby, the 
greater internal homogeneity achieved for the subsamples may have 
also indirect effects in reducing the problem of heteroskedasticity). 
d) However there remains the problem of the potential 
simultaneous equation bias in the estimated regression. The lack 
of exogeneity of some independent variables will remain, in our 
view, as long as we are unable to define a more complete model of 
hospital behaviour, offering a better understanding of the full 
network of 'inter-relations'. Research is certainly required 
in this field. 
In consequence, the following variables will be considered: 
a) We will use an average cost per case as the value of the 
cost per unit of output dependent variable. 
b) The specification of the case-mix variable is bound then 
to have a crucial importance, given that most of the explanatory 
power in the variation of the dependent variable seems to rest in 
this factor. 
We should aim, in principle, to build a case-mix proxy for 
hospital output not tautologically defined only in terms of 
actual costs or performance levels, especially when grouping, 
weighting and aggregating the initial vector of values under 
postulates of functional homogeneity. The measure should be, 
in addition, sensitive enough to collect differences in the 
hospitals' output, and consistent in order to be used for 
reimbursement purposes. At present, the data available advise 
the use of specialty case-mix figures accounted in terms of 
percentages of the total, given the degree of multicollinearity 
otherwise involved among them and with respect to the rest of 
institutional and utilization variables. 
c) The flow of cases per bed available is, in our view, the most 
satisfactory measure for the actual utilization of the existing 
hospital facilities. At any rate, this single variable cannot 
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alone aim to capture fully the impact of the operational 
facture on hospital "efficiency", since its explanatory 
power depends on the specific assumptions made about the 
variation of the other related utilization variables. 
The variables described above will be considered in the 
estimation exercise, finally presented in the next Chapter. 
-169- 
FOOTNOTES: - 
(i) Under both systems, this required adjustment may be supported by an engineering analysis of activities at the micro-level 
or through an overall Functional Value approach, at a more 
aggregated one. 
The first method consists of the study of changes in the 
use of facilities, the introduction of new operational 
methods, coordination of clinical services, manpower 
assignments and equipment supplies, in order to increase 
output per unit of inputs, or to reduce inputs per unit 
of output - seeking in this way to reduce expenditure. 
Functional Value analysis is a technique to achieve 
restraint in overheads. For this purpose, expenses 
are broken down into cost centers under manageable budgets. 
Within these mini-budgets, percentage reductions or cost- 
savings are requested from each of the budget managers. 
These measures are further evaluated by the analyst in 
terms of 'risks and savings'. The results are ranked 
in this basis, asserting the most beneficsl ones with 
respect to their cost-saving targets. 
(2) This residual analysis has also been studied in other 
fields. ROSS and BURKHEAD (1974) have proposed this 
technique in a time-series context in searching for the 
specific contribution of changes in work-load, cost of 
factor inputs and productivity improvements from data on 
local public expenditure. They take the view that 
productivity is what is left once alternative explanations 
are eliminated (accounting for quality factors and measure- 
ment errors too). The rationale of comparing for productivity 
analysis a calculated or projected value to the actual 
expenditure figures has also been proposed by FARRELL. Farrell's 
functional approach consists of fitting a production (cost) 
function through all the points and use the deviations from 
fitted to the actual observed values as the criterion for the 
analysis of performance. 
(3) RUCHLIN searches for a measure of "relative value" from an 
index of 'relative service intesity' and a 'resource absorption 
coefficient'. The first component is derived from the ratio 
of registered staff in the particular area considered in 
relation to the total number in the medical area. The 'resource 
absorption coefficient' is taken as a multplicative function 
of the expected length of stay and the expected cost per day. 
Both factors are defined in terms of the particular activity 
with respect to the total. 
In a similar way, the College of American Pathologists have 
built a measure of this nature, the so called "Californian 
Relative-Value Scale". 
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(4) Some authors try to collect, in addition to the presence of some non-routine services those other postulated 'enhancing 
quality' services by weighting psychometrically its expected relative effects on costs. However, it should be clear that this variable aims to collect the potential supply of a set of services rather than the actual hospital case-load. 
(5) Major groups are split in a number of subgroups which are classified according to Primary and Secondary diagnosis, 
Primary and Secondary surgery, age and sex, in a recursive 
way through a step by step procedure. Groups are derived 
according to the percentage reduction in the explained 
variance of the dependent variable by minimizing the total 
within group sum of squares. 
For each of the resulting groups, the "classify algorithm" 
produces, afterwards the mean length of stay, the size of the 
sample and the number of observations for each included independent variable. The procedure stops when the character- istics of the groups do not show satisfactory properties, 
such as a certain minimum size. 
(6) Most of the problems involved in the application of a DRG 
classification stem from the need to revalidate its results 
in order to be extrapolated across the sample of different 
hospitals and over time, testing that similar patterns in the 
utilization of resources are held. 
Since DRGs are based on the actual length of stay and 
the actual utilization of resources, hospital "inefficiencies" 
are incorporated entirely. The fact that DRGs employ actual 
performance patters as characteristic variables, instead of those 
derived from a theoretical production function, leaves open 
the issue of the extent to which the hospital is accountable 
thereafter for its own efficiency. 
(7) Although still linear in the parameters, a cubic adjustment could 
be, in principle, postulated, in a consistent way with the theory, 
of the type: 
Total cost = constant +ý (Output) +ß2 (Output)+P 3 (Output)3 + error term 
It could expect that the value of the estimated signs of the 
parameters to be positive for ß1 and ý and negative for (3In 
addition, if a saddle shape has to app 
hr 
- and hence the 
positivity 
of the marginal cost at the minimum - the condition will be given 
by 2 B2 < 3B1 ` 
B3 
(8) We will quote here for illustrative purposes some defenders of 
each approach: "The number of cases - says M. S. Feldstein - 
is the relevant output-proxy, perhaps by exclusion, once we look 
at the potential 'trade-offs' of the cost per patient day variable 
and length of stay". An opposite view is held by Ingbar and Taylor 
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(op. cit) They argue in favour of the use of the number of patient-days as the output measure, facing their critics by pointing out that for the same reason that 'beauty' does 
not need to be regarded as the output of a beauty saloon, so the hospital output does not need to be specified in terms 
of its effects on the patients". Finally, J. R. and J. B. Lave seem to adopt the view that "the best measure of output 
cannot be set a priori and it should be, in principle, the 
one which proves most homogeneous across the hospitals, 
given the cost function specified". In a first paper (1966), the number of patient-days was selected as the output-proxy. Later, in a second paper, they seem to reverse their initial choice in favour of the number of cases as the proxy 
variable for the hospital output. 
(9) However, once implemented the Hospital Reform as today proposed, 
the former problem may raise, given that the new Bill aims to 
attribute an autonomous sphere of decisions to the hospital 
management in the field of these economic issues. 
(10) Therefore, the regression of unit costs on output (scale) will 
be based downwards towards constant marginal costs. M. S. FELDSTEIN 
points out, however, that the problem of higher utilization rates, 
which appear to decrease unit costs, may be due tiot so much to 
the problem of defining costs as to the question of defining an 
appropriate unit of output. 
(11) In this sense, CARR and FELDSTEIN (1967) postulate that utilization 
and scale move together: small hospitals would operate more 
efficiently at lower than average relative occupancy in order 
to adjust to demand fluctuations more economically. 
(12) See DUSANSKY R. M. and P. J. KALMAN (1974) 
economic model of the teaching hospital". 
Theory, no. 7. 
(13) For a good summary on this 
adjustment in Hospital cost 
Economics, no. 1- 1982. 
in "Towards an 
Journal of Economic 
issue, see M. L. Barer "Case-mix 
analysis". Journal of Health 
(14) According to the empirical evidence available, these collinearities 
can be summarized in the following terms: 
a) An inverse relationship for the flow of cases per bed (FL) 
is usually found with respect to size (number of beds) and 
the complexity of the output-mix, here mainly related 
to its characteristic variable "average length of stay". 
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b) with reference to the length of stay (LOS), a positive relationship is often derived with respect to size and the case-mix complexity vector(especially if a 'diagnosis related group' type of approach is followed). c) The bed occupancy rate (BOR) variable usually shows its correlation to some other institutional variables, although here the evidence is less unambiguous. 
(15) In this sense, see W. J. CARR and P. J. FELDSTEIN: "The 
relationship of costs to hospital size" Inquiry - 1967. In fact, they argue that the output-mix effect is already 
captured by the hospital size and the range and scope 
of the service facilities available. 
(16) In the literature, some evidence has been pointed out for 
each of these suggestions. But it seems that if hospitals deäliing with chronic diseases are excluded ui the 
sample, "complexity" seems to increase with hospital 
size. This seems to agree with the data available about the cross-boundary flow of patients, moving from hospitals 
of different size for more complex treatments. The effects 
of the "specialization" factor does not appear to be, however, 
so unambiguous. 
(17) Longer average length of stay can be, in fact, associated with 
those hospitals providing a more complex output-mix. But 
hospitals specialization may reverse the initial effects by 
reducing the turnover interval or by increasing the flow of 
cases per bed available. Moreover, "complexity" and 
"specialization" may not be contemporaneous for all the 
hospital inputs. But if this is not expected to be the 
case, the results of applying Information theory to the 
case-mix measurement can provide a more relevant approach. 
(18) In the Spanish case, the study of the interterritorial 
differences in the provincial index of cost of living gave 
a ratio of 1.70 between the mini-max values. This proves 
the importance of the factor indicated. 
(19) Some authors - see W. GOODLEY, 1980 - have argued for the need 
of a "client-group approach". This view requires the definition 
of some standard units for the services provided and their 
associated costs, independently of the actual levels provided 
and the amounts spent; hence, the definition of a minimum, 
average or standard value; the assessment of the objective 
in terms of inputs availability or outcome results, and the need 
to account for the influence of cost variations on a geographic 
basis. 
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(20) This condition may be approximately met if for any input factor 
combination, the average absolute differences between the ideal 
output corresponding to that combination, and the actual observed 
rate of output is the same for all the input combinations. Otherwise, if the unit deviates from the ideal output rate by 
an equal percentage for all the input combinations, the 
empirical cost function would tend to understate the 
hypothetical cost-efficient allocation of the inputs used. 
(21) Some of the collinearities resulting Rothe estimation exercise 
presented in Chapter V can be here advanced for illustrative 
purposes. They show the following correlation values: 
a) Hospital size - number of beds has a positive coefficient 
of 0.487 with respect to the average length of stay. 
b) 'Size' has also a significant negative correlation coefficient 
with respect to the ratio of physicians to nurses. 
c) The number of hospital beds has a positive correlation: coefficient 
of 0.411 with respect to the flow of cases per number of beds 
available ratio (against what it appears to be asserted in the 
literature). 
d) Finally, no significant correlation seems to exist between the 
bed occupancy rate and the number of beds available. 
(22) See footnote 32 on page 230 - Chapter V 
(23) We will examine this assertion and the acceptance of this 
assumption in the econometric exercise and Appendix of the next 
chapter. 
(24) The OLS estimation will, in fact, overestimate the variance of the 
errors, increasing the precision of the estimators otherwise 
required (see J. JOHNSTON "Econometric Methods", 2nd. edition 
McGraw Hill (1972). 
(25) In this way, S. E. BERKI ("Hospital Economics", 1972) has pointed 
out the need to use an interaction function for the aggregate 
demand of each output category and the number of hospitals 
prepared to provide each particular type of care in a given area 
in order to introduce demand factors into the final determination 
of output. 
(26) Cluster techniques have been afiso used, aiming to achieve an 
aggregate measure of the case-mix vector, in the sense, for 
instance, of grouping those categories with similar impact on 
costs. However; ýagain, this clustering procedure cannot solve 
the problem of collinearities becauseso far as the marginal 
costs derived are based on the original estimators, they retain 
the basic structure of the collinear variables. Hence, it reduces 
the number of parameters to estimate but it does not reduce its 
multicollinearity. 
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CHAPTERV 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF A COST BASE LINE FOR PURPOSES OF ANALYSIS OF 
RELATIVE EFFICIENCY IN HOSPITAL EXPENDITURE. 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
We have presented the basic elements for the setting of a 
PRAP. It now remains to show the mechanisms through which this 
policy can be constructed in practice. This will be done in 
this Chapter. 
This Chapter also aims to test some of the basic hypotheses 
about hospital behaviour put forward in the previous pages. 
Outline of the Chapter. 
The exercise will be undertaken with reference to a set of Spanish 
General Hospitals, amongst the Spanish 'Health Residences' selected for 
this purpose. Although they have already been chosen according to certain 
external characteristics (section 5.3.1. ), cluster analysis will be used 
in order to increase internal subsample homogeneity with regard to those 
factors that are thought to refer to differential characteristics of 
the hospitals output (section 5.3.2. ). 
Once the clusters are derived, according to the resulting 
classificatory variables, subgroups will be incorporated into a 
multiple regression analysis in a first estimation of the predicted 
cost-base line, or 'relevant expenditure', for the analysis of 
relative efficiency in allocation of hospital expenses (section 5.4. ). 
The series predicted from the estimation of the regression equation 
for each different subsample will be analysed with a view to making an 
appropriate 'relative price' adjustment on geographical bases (S. 5.1. ). 
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Once this is made, we will explore potential patterns of 
variable productivity, testing the hypothesis of the absence of 
self-correcting mechanisms in relatively high spending hospitals. 
In the context of system-inefficiency in the allocation of resources 
(Section 9.6. ). 
We will describe in the next section, the hospital data available 
in Spain. After pointing out the characteristics of the present 
hospital information system, we will indicate some directions for 
reform. 
5.2. DESCRIPTION OF AVAILABLE HOSPITAL DATA 
There does not exist in Spain an integrated system of hospital 
information (HIS from now) designed specifically for purposes of 
monitoring and analysis of hospital activity. In general, it can 
be asserted that Spanish Health Authorities have followed an accountancy 
approach of a French type, which tentatively incorporates some analytical 
information, but mainly this is for administrative purposes. This 
has been collected mostly at the aggregate hospital level, and only 
partly on specialty-departmental bases. 
In short, the Spanish HIS is characterized today by the following 
features: 
(i) The fragmentary composition of the statistics available. 
In this sense, at least six different reports are required 
for attaining a comprehensive view of hospital activity. (1) 
For instance, with regard to the study of hospital expend- 
iture, three different statistical sources need to be 
consulted; similarly for the anlysis of hospital indicators 
of activity, and for data on hospital manpower. 
(ii) The system lacks a goal orientated definition for data 
collection, (i. e. from viewing sources rather than just 
usages). Up to the present, too many indicators of 
doubtful relevance are requested to hospitals from 
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different Authorities (Department of Health, National Institute of Statistics, INSALUD), often without 
explicit feedbacks for hospital management. For example, 
up to 71 indicators are requested for the analysis of the hospital "profitability", most of which are also filled for other sources that do not seem well related to the former uses. In this sense, the problem is not to request new indicators, but to rationalise the 
utilization of the existing ones and reinforce the 
implementation in practice of some others (as in the 
case of the Bills dated 25th of April and 2nd of 
September of 1978 about budgetary and performance 
indicators, or more recently, those related to the 
General System of Accountancy or 'Plan General de 
Contabilidad' - which should have been implemented from 1st January of 1983). 
(iii) Gaps in the coordination of the information due to the 
actual process of decentralization of the Health Care 
organisation can also be found. For example, the 
complete time series data on INSALUD hospitals, 
collected in the Economic and Functional Reports 
from 1977, stops at 1981, since data referred to 
hospitals now depending on the Catalan Health Institute 
are not now included in the series. This problem can 
become especially important with the generalization of 
the decentralization process. 
Regarding the former picture, an indication on the bases for the 
reform of the Spanish HIS can be presented next. 
(i) In general, there exists the need to provide a goal 
orientated definition of the hospital statistics (e. q. 
from the view of hospital management, utilization 
review, medical audit, health care planning, special 
research projects, accreditation requirements etc. ). 
In addition, they should supply information at the 
most disaggregate levels, capable of being used 
thereafter for several purposes, such as external 
financial accountancy (e. g. the determination of 
'allowable' and 'non-allowable' expenses on a 
national or a more decentralized funding basis) or 
internal hospital management (e. g. for cost-effectiveness 
analysis, profiles of performance comparisons, etc. ). 
They would enable different levels of attribution of costs 
for programs, resource area units or other cost-evaluation 
centres, etc. ) and, correspondingly, of accountancy in 
the allocation of responsibilities. 
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(ii) The definition of the basic unit of the HIS in 
each of those broad areas considered for analysis, 
such as the department (e. g. at the administrative level) and the patient (for costing purposes), or the ward inventory per unit of nursing management 
and speciality costing for evaluation purposes, 
as in the English case according to recent 
recommendations. (2) Specialty levels should 
recognize moreover the need of greater functional 
homogeneity (e. g. according to the notion of group 
disease or some other clinical functions), in view, 
for example, of the high degree of variation within 
specialties in terms of patients' clinical charact- 
eristics or their associated patterns of resource 
consumption. Some authors (Thomson et al. 1982) 
recommend the definition of the statistics for 
costing at the patient level, since they keep 
afterwards greater possibilities for further 
aggregation at different levels (such as disease 
stages, treatments, consultants, wards, client- 
groups, age and patients' characteristics and 
medical specialties). This can be done on the 
basis, for instance, of the implementation of the 
ICDA (International Classification of Diseases), 
complemented, when possible, by some medical 
notes conveniently coded. 
(iii) The need to group data and to apportion consequent 
expenses for the design of responsibility centers of 
decentralized management units. For this purpose, 
we need to improve the present classification of 
hospitals for increasing 'output comparability' and 
to use the accreditation system for updating over 
time the levels of the health care provided. 
(iv) Finally, some more detailed recommendations refer to: 
a) the need to develop a complete computerized network 
coordinated at the national level for a more regular 
provision of information (e. g. monthly), supplying 
hospital profiles of activity, sample comparisons of 
cost and performance indicators, etc.; 
b) the convenience of complementing the existing in- 
formation with data related to waiting lists, transfers 
of patients among consultants of different specialties 
and the levels of readmissions resulting from past 
discharges; 
c) the inclusion of variables related to patients' 
social class and to the overall utilization of the 
health care system. 
Since we are constrained at present by the existing information, 
we will use the available hospital statistics 
for the construction of 
the basic cost-line of our approach to hospital 'relevant expenditure'. 
For these purposes, the selection of the sample is presented 
below. 
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5.3. THE SELECTION OF THE SAMPLE FOR THE ANALYSIS. 
The overall sample of general hospitals initially selected 
comprises 90 hospitals. Although all belong to the common category 
of "Health Residences" (and in this sense they can be distinguished 
from the "Health Cities" - or Regional Hospitals - and from the 
"National Centres" which provide a more specialized set of care), 
they differ from one another in several respects, such as: 
(i) The size of the hospitals included, which ranges from 
50 to 1050 beds; 
(ii) the level of provision of care. That is, the sample 
includes some hospitals which do not provide maternity 
care, due to their proximity to maternity hospitals; 
(iii) the location of hospitals. In fact, the sample contains 
general hospitals which are able to rely on the high 
technology of neighbouring hospitals, and also general 
hospitals which are not in such a position, and which, 
therefore, are forced to purchase at least some high 
technology equipment themselves; 
(iv) the fact that the sample includes hospitals with more 
easily identifiable "catchment" populations than others; 
and finally, 
(v) the geographic variation in the public-private hospital 
mix, this factor should be taken into account when attempts 
are made to estimate relative health care provisions. 
The need to select a more homogeneous sample for purposes of 
studying the hospital cost functions became obvious, in view of the 
impossibility of fully adjusting for all the relevant exogenous factors 
given the set of hospital statistics available. This conclusion is 
supported, in addition, by three other considerations which prove the 
complexity of the adjustment required for an accurate comparison. 
First, relatively small hospitals may cover services with staff under 
part-time or some other specific agreements with other hospitals in the 
area; second, general hospitals which are located far from larger ones are 
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less likely to refer complex cases to these hospitals, being 
forced instead to treat these cases themselves. As a result, 
such hospitals are likely to provide a wider range of services 
than general hospitals located close to regional hospitals. Third, 
there may be a downwards bias in the hospital average length of 
stay and turnover interval for those general hospitals which provide 
maternity services themselves, as compared with those which are close 
to other maternity hospitals and which provide this type of care on a 
separate basis. 
5.3.1. Some initial groupings 
An initial exploration of the overall sample was undertaken, 
looking at some territorial factors, such as: 
a) The geographic location of the hospitals. According to this 
criterion it became clear that 14 observations could be analysed on the 
basis of the correspondence between one general hospital-one province. 
P) 
A second Subsample was obtained as a result of grouping those observations 
with more than one general hospital in the province. Residually, another 
more heterogeneous subsample was determined, which mostly included those 
general hospitals close to regional and/or maternity hospitals; and 
b) some geographic variations in the public-private hospital mix. 
(4) 
The overall sample and the subsamples described above were used to 
study the existence of scale economies and the impact on average costs 
of changes in the utilization variables. This ana'ysis was constrained, 
however, by the amount of information available and the number of degrees 
of freedom. Its results are presented in Appendix V. 2. 
The search for a consistent cost-line on which to base a revenue 
allocation policy led us to the exploration of a more homogeneous sample, 
resulting of the application of the following criteria: 
1. Exclusion of those hospitals with less than 300 beds and 
more than 650. Although these were, to some extent, arbitrary boundaries, 
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the aim was to capture a similar scale of management and range of 
organisational problems which could be related to hospital size. 
2. To drop those "Health Residences" geographically close to 
regional hospitals (see the illustrative map presented in the 
Appendix to this chapter), given the potential distortions of 
geographic location on standard set of care as described earlier 
on. 
3. To control for the criteria related to the function, extent 
and level of inpatient care, such as it is established in the 
Spanish Catalogue of Hospitals (in the way we will explain later). 
A second and final sample of 50 observations was selected as 
a result of the application of these criteria. For these obser- 
vations we managed to obtain the unpublished 'raw' data referring 
to each individual hospital from the National Survey of Hospitals 
(EESRI) (5) compiled by the Spanish Institute of Statistics (INE). 
This information includes data about the structural character- 
istics of the hospitals (buildings, departments, utilization of 
materials, etc. ), existing equipment, clinical specialties provided, 
staff and resources allocated (per specialties) and the range and 
category of the medical services available. 
Data about expenditure were also taken from the EESRI Survey, 
although given its degree of departmental aggregation, they had to be 
complemented with some other sources. These were taken from the 
Budget requests sent each year to the Department of Health by each 
individual hospital, and on the expenditure finally settled, through 
the statistics published in the INSALUD Functional Economic Report. 
(6) 
(A summary of the data used in other alternative hospital 
groupings - such as the 'Catalogo Nacional de Hospitales' - or 
for hospital accrediation and planning purposes, can be seen in sub- 
appendix -2 to this chapter). 
We will use then our second sample of fifty observations in order 
to estimate the behavioural cost function as the basis for the prospective 
revenue allocation policy designed earlier on. In order 
to achieve 
greater intra-sample homogeneity, separate cost analysis will 
be 
undertaken for each subsample derived from the results of cluster 
analysis. 
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5.3.2. Resulting subgroups from cluster analysis. 
As advanced in the previous Chapter, the object of the cluster 
exercise here is that of grouping hospitals with similar 'output' 
characteristics from which similar performance could be expected 
'a priori'. According to this objective, the variables selected 
for adjusting the former comparisons should aim to capture those 
aspects of hospital activity which represent legitimate differences 
in hospital output. In other words, they must reflect those 
factors related to planning policies in operation (e. g. in terms 
of the scope of services available, status of the hospital, extent 
of the provision and the characteristics of the population served), 
() 
and those factors which refer to enviromental or structural aspects 
which make for legitimate differences in the way in which services 
are actually provided. 
Selection of the variables. 
According to the former view, the factors below are thought to 
account for differences in the character of the 'hospital output' provided. 
The following variables were selected for this purpose: 
(i) 'Age' of the hospital: 
:A dummy variäb7e (DVJ equal to one if the hospital had been 
reformed during the last ten years (i. e. since 1973), and 
equal to zero otherwise. 
:A dummy variable referring to the Administrator's subjective 
appreciation on whether the state of conservation of the 
building was 'good or very good' versus 'just regular or bad'. 
(ii) 'Structure' of the hospital 
: Rospitäl fToör space In square meters. 
: The difference, if any, between the number of licensed beds 
of the institution and those actually utilized. 
: The number of beds in rooms of one or two beds as a proportion 
of the total number of beds. (8) 
: Ditto for the proportion of rooms with four or more beds. 
(iii) 'Status' of the hospital: 
/ý-d-ummy väriable -'or -teaching status (doctors) and zero otherwise. 
: Ditto for nurses; 
: dummy variable equal to one in case of provision of ambulatory 
services together with inpatient care in hospital, and zero 
otherwise.; 
: dummy variable equal to one if the hospital is classified as a 
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District General Hospital according to the Spanish 'Catälogo 
National de Hospitales' and zero otherwise. 
(iv) Locational aspects of the hospital: 
DV to reflect its relative proximity to the most complex 
set of care provided by a Regional Hospital - or Health City - using as the criterion its location or not in the 
same province (if so DV=1 and 0 otherwise). 
: DV regarding the urban concentration in the province 
(equal to one if more than one third of the population in 
the province lived in the place of location of the hospital, 
and zero otherwise). 
: DV equal to one if the Hospital is located in the capital 
of the province, and zero otherwise. 
: DV equal to one if the density of population in the province 
is greater than the national average, and zero otherwise. 
(v) Population characteristics, or nature of the population served: 
Number of population covered per total beds available. 
: Family mean income of the province. 
: DV equal to one if the hospital is located in an area 
considered according to some economic indicators, as having 
a relatively high standard of living and zero, otherwise; (9) 
(vi) epidemiological 
- 
'environmental' characteristics: 
---------------------- : A-dummy variable for perinatal mortality in the province 
where hospital is located, with value equal to one if figures 
are above the national average values and zero otherwise. 
: Ditto for the incidence of morbidity (as defined in the 
corresponding survey on this matter (10) on reported cases). 
: The child-mortality rate in the province per one thousand 
inhabitants. 
: The total mortality rate per one thousand inhabitants in 
the province. 
(These last two variables were introduced once it became clear 
that 'morbidity' did not necessarily move in a similar direction 
to 'mortality'); 
(11) 
(vii) 'geographical context' of provision of health care. 
The total number of beds available 1n the province 
(including private and other local public sector beds) per 
thousand inhabitants. 
: Number of habitants per total number of physicians in the 
province. 
: Ditto, but in relation to specialist consultants; 
(viii) 'nature of the hospital 
Percentage of hospital 
cases admitted. 
: Percentage of patients 
inpatient admissions. 
: Percentage of patients 
over the total number o 
supply mix' (12) 
childbirths over the total number of 
with surgery over the total number of 
discharged and sent to other hospitals 
f cases treated; (13) 
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Ox) 'scope' of services a) regarding the inputs and the degree of specialization of the hospital medical staff. 
: The ratio of physicians over the total number of personnel. 
: The ratio of nurses over the total number of personnel. 
: The ratio of ancillary workers over the total number of personnel. 
: The percentage on total hospital expenditure of payments 
referring to 'part time' components in the total wage bill. 
: The ratio of physicians in higher hierarchical service 
categories ('Chiefs of Departments', 'Service' or 'Section') to the total number of physicians. 
b) Regarding hospital facilites, 
: Number of operating theatres. 
: Total number of medical specialties. 
: Total number of surgical specialties. 
: Percentage of medical specialties with the category of 
'services' over the total number of medical specialties. 
: Ditto, with respect to surgical specialites. 
: Number of medical administrative services. 
c) Regarding hospital equipment related 
to 'quality enhancing' services. (15) 
: Dummy variable (DV) for the existence of heart surgery. 
: Ditto for neurosurgery. 
: Ditto for intensive care. 
: Ditto for preventive medicine. 
: Ditto for rehabilitation services. (14) 
The use of cluster analysis to increase subsample homogeneity. 
Cluster analysis is performed on the basis of the former variables to 
partition the observed sample of hospitals into disjoint groups in such a 
way that the degree of association is low among the memebers belonging to 
different groups and high among the members of the same group. This 
analysis aims, finally, to construct an operational classification 
based on hospital output characteristics. 
Methods, 
-procedures, -criteria 
and measures. 
There are two basic kinds of clustering techniques: those based on 
fusive methods, and those based on divise methods. Both start from the 
calculation of measure of similarity or difference (in other words, a 
'closeness' or distance measure) amongst the observations. The fusive 
(or aglomerative) methods start by thinking of each observation (or case) 
as a'cluster of one' in order to fuse similar observations into clusters of 
larger size. They then fuse, at a new stage, similar clusters obtained 
into yet larger clusters, and so on until only one cluster remains. 
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By way of contrast, the divise methods start from a cluster of all the 
observations, to partition succesively this cluster until there are 
n clusters of one. 
Amongst the fusive methods, hierarchical procedures, as opposed 
to nested ones, are mostly utilized. 
(15) 
Differences among them arise 
from differences in the way of defining the distance or similarity 
measure either between one ovservation and a group containing several 
observations, or between the groups of observations as a whole. This 
hierarchical procedure fuses observations, or groups or observations, 
which are closer or more similar at each particular stage, according 
to criteria such as the nearest neighbour or minimum distance. 
The sqaured euclidean distance is usually taken as measure of 
the dissimilarity type, and the Wards' computational method - based 
on the calculation of the error sum of squares - as the similarity 
measure, internally compatible with the basic hierarchical procedures. 
This second method measures the loss of information at any stage of the 
analysis which results from the grouping of individual units into clusters. 
The measure used is the total sum of squared deviations of every 'point' 
from the mean of the cluster to which it belongs. Thereafter, the union 
of every possible pair of clusters is considered, selecting for fusion 
those two clusters whose results imply the minimum increase in the 
error sum of squares. 
Prior to the application of the clustering techniques, we standarise 
our data in order to remove its scale and the range of its absolute 
variation. 
(16) 
On the other hand, the technique of Principal Components 
allows us to cope with the problem of multicollinearity among the 
included variables, in order to eliminate any potentially unwanted 
weighting of some factors. Otherwise, we would need to assume that some 
of the factors - those affected by multicollinearity - are more 
important 
than others for the pruposes of the cluster exercise, since they would 
be 
unevenly weighted due to their major influence through 
the remaining 
collinear variables. 
(17) 
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Some other considerations about the use of cluster analysis. 
Some observations need to be made in order to make an accurate 
use of this technique. 
1. Cluster analysis is not a technique free from value judgements. 
On the contrary, judgement is necessary at several stages. This is 
mostly due to the fact that: 
a) We need to choose the'shape'of the cluster. The 
problem here is that one cannot be sure a priori which 
shape a cluster may have. In two dimensions we could 
plot the data (as a scatter plot) and decide by inspection. 
What we have to do here issomething more complex since this 
search for "shapes" has to be done in a multidimensional 
space. 
b) We need to define the measure of similarity. That is, 
whether the units are required to be similar as a whole on 
average for each group of variables or whether similarity 
has to be established for each variable. This choice is 
involved in the selection of the arithmetical criterion 
of similarity. 
c) We need to establish some mini-max group boundaries to 
achieve a balance between conflicting demands for internal 
homogeneity and a manageable number of groups. For this 
purpose, we do not necessarily know how many groups of 
clusters there ought to be. One can only proceed experi- 
mentally, bringing all of one's prior knowledge to bear 
on the interpretation of the results. 
2. In addition, clustering procedures are argued to be just a useful 
tool for the analyst looking at the experiences of several cases (i. e. 
hospitals) simultaneously. The method appears to be less useful for an 
analysis looking at the reality of each specific case. 
They provide a 
convenient method of handling large 
data sets and of comparing in a 
systematic way the operation of some 
decentralized units, whenever the 
objective of the comparison can 
be made highly precise. 
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3. This technique has some advantages over other 
multi-cross classification techniques, since it does not require the 
assumptions of multivariate normality, linearity or additivity for 
the determination of the groups, neither of an explicit dependent 
variable nor a pre-determined functional form, nor any fixed 
discrete interval for the classificatory variable. 
(18) 
The sequence of the exercise. 
Having recognized these limitations, we will proceed to summarize 
the stages of the exercise. 
We begin with the initial selection of the 240 variables available 
(cost, structure and quality-related variables) for each of the 50 
hospitals included in the sample, 
(19) 
according to the initial 
expectations that hospital size and status are likely to be the 
primary grouping criteria for increasing hospital output homogeneity. 
(20) 
This expectation was reinforced by a glance on the behaviour of the 
basic statistics and on the findings in other countries studied. 
We selected from these 240 variables, those variables to be used 
for the cluster exercise on the basis of the following criteria: 
(i) To proceed from the full set of variables (using the 
maximum information available) to a more restricted 
subset. This was selected in pursuing an easier 
interpretation thereafter of the results. 
(ii) To take into account continuous and binary variables. 
However, since CLUSTAN (21) could not handle a mixed 
data set of this nature, we had to transform those 
continuous variables into binary ones. We did this 
by assigning for each variable values equal to one 
to all those observations equal or greater than the 
average, and zero otherwise. Attempts were made to 
use multidimensional scaling techniques to convert 
binary variables into pseudo-continuous variables, 
but they proved impossible. (22) 
The use of binary variables is bound to suffer 
the problem of the 
impossibility of removing any implicit weighting unvolunlarily 
introduced. 
In fact, whereas the former problem could 
be faced optimally in the case 
of the continuous variables through 
the use of standard scores and the 
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technique of Principal Components, this cannot be done for the binary 
variables. 
Given the nature of the difficulties arising from the use of cluster 
analysis, and those related to its subjective nature in particular, the 
issue of the validation of the results derived will also need to be 
considered. The following systems of validation will be used: 
a) By showing that the groupings which emerge from the exercise are 
stable (or approximately so) under different clustering strategies 
(i. e. using agglomerative and divide procedures), and 
b) by appealing to a visual exploration of the derived plots of the units 
which are in each group and their respective 'minimum spanning tree'. 
This is, looking at the 'dendogram' and the plot of the two first principal 
components derived, 
(23) 
with regard to their jointly explained cumulative 
variance (see, for this, the Appendix One to this Chapter). 
c) In addition, we will examine the value of the F and t statistics for 
those variables included. In fact, the F value gives for each variable 
the ratio of the variance of the subset of cases included in the derived 
cluster to the variance of the overall sample. Hence, small F ratios 
will indicate those variables having comparatively low variation within 
the cluster and being, therefore, good diagnostic indicators. 
Otherwise, if no clusters appear, the expected value of F will be close 
to one. 
T values are defined as the ratio of the difference between the 
mean of each continuous variable in the subset of cases included in the 
derived cluster and the overall mean in the sample for that variable, 
to the standard deviation of this variable in the sample. Therefore, 
large t values will indicate variables having cluster means which are 
substantially different of the population sample mean. Note that 
the expected value of t with no significance for the variable in the 
cluster will be zero, since the two defined members of the nominator 
should be identical. 
A good cluster diagnosis variable could then be considered as one that 
has a small F value and a high t value in one cluster and a large F value 
and a low t value in the other clusters. The case of variables with t 
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values of opposite signs in two different clusters will indicate 
the inclusion in one group of all those observations of the variable 
above the mean, with respect to that other grouping of all the other 
units below. 
In sum, hierarchical procedures - (nearest neighbourhood and Ward's 
method) - and product moment correlation and squared euclidean distance 
as their respectively consistent coefficients, are used in the 
first approach for checking the validity of the results. Thus, in 
order to validate the robustness and stability of the clusters obtained 
with respect to the method used, the RELOCATE and DIVIDE procedures are 
additionally performed. 
(24) 
In both case, the F and t tests are also 
analysed. 
The results of the exercise. 
The first 59 continuous variables initially considered were a mix 
of structural cost-related and quality variables. 
As it can be seen in diagram A-1, the first cluster appears to 
group the first 25 observations with hospital size between 100 and 
320 beds. Only 4 violations are recorded with respect to this 'size' 
diagnosis variable. 
(25) 
The second cluster comprises the observation 
25 up to 44 (320 - 500 beds) with only two violations. 
(26) 
Finally, 
a third cluster seems to be present, grouping the six largest hospitals 
(from 500 to 650 beds) and including one observation which refers to a 
hospital of special characteristics. 
(27) 
In correspondence with these size brackets, the F and t statistics 
suggest that hospital size appears to be the best clustering diagnosis 
variable (i. e. number of cases, total existing manpower and total number 
of members of the medical profession in higher hierarchical positions). 
It can be observed, on the other hand, that variables such as the average 
cost per case, per beneficiary, per bed and per patient-day contained 
within the groups show values highly dispersed. The same is true 
for 
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those variables related to the average length of stay and the bed 
occupancy rate. 
In graphs A-2 and A-3, we plot the first against the second 
principal component factors and the minimum spanning tree. 
In a second step, and more in line with our initial aim of not 
basing the cluster formation on the specific way in which hospitals face 
the provision of inpatient care, we dropped all the cost-related variables 
from the selected set. 29 continuous variables were then analysed. 
We proceeded as before, performing identical procedures and operational 
transformations (correlations, standarisation and principal component 
analysis). Two clusters seem to appear (see A-4, A-5 and A-6) as a 
result of this more specific approach, mainly defined by the two following 
variables: the ratio of inpatient to outpatient cases and that 
referring to the proportion of higher medical hierarchies in the medical 
profession over the total number of physicians. The results are 
reproduced in Table V. 1 below: 
TABLE V. 1 
First cluster 
F ratio 
(i) Proportion of outpatient 
cases/inpatient cases: 0.304 
(ii) Number of surgical 
specialties over total 0.153 
(iii) NLrnber of nurses over 
the total nu ter of 
hospital staff : 
(iv) Nuiber of ancillary 
workers over total 
hospital staff : 
(v) Proportion of higher 
medical hierarchies 
over total nuriber 
of physicians: 
0.365 
0.541 
0.599 
t ratio 
-0.553 
-0.384 
0.653 
-0.654 
-0.550 
Second Cluster 
F ratio 
1.130 
t ratio 
0.427 
1.369 
0.942 
0.990 
0.978 
0.221 
-0.228 
0.250 
0.310 
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The robustness of the clusters derived were indirectly tested by 
dropping from the analysis diagnostic variables (i) and (v) and 
performing again the corresponding agglomerative procedures. When 
this was done, the former clusters disappeared and no other significant 
diagnostic variable took their place. 
(28) 
The third stage in our research in hospital groupings was based 
on the selection of 7 variables considered to be quality proxies. 
(On page 241 , A-8 plots the two first principal components which 
account for a 52% of the cluster variance). The results seem to 
suggest that from the use of this information, a single overall cluster 
could be considered. This cluster is particularly homogeneous if we 
drop the observation 1 (which is a rather old hospital and was going 
to be reformed in 1980, number 9 (one of the few hospitals included 
in our sample with a local extent of care), number 34 (a hospital 
operating on the basis of 130 beds instead of 400 beds initially 
licensed) and number 47 (which is in fact a regional hospital). 
It can also be suggested from the visualization of the dendogram, 
that observation 40 (the hospital in the Canary Islands) and the last 
five hospitals involve a more complex set of hospital 'quality' output, 
reducing then the range of hospital size to be considered for increased 
homogeneity irr between 100 and 500 hospital beds. 
Finally, in order to arrive at a more manageable number of variables, 
we selected 9 continuous variables which were thought to be most 
relevant for our initial purposes of defining homogeneous subsamples 
for hospital performance comparisons. The two first principal components 
already account for a 50% of the cluster variance and the first four of 
them for 75%. The following variables were selected once we checked 
that they satisfied the classification rules and were normally 
(29) 
distributed: 
-192- 
(i) -The percentage of beds in rooms of only one or two 
beds over the total number of beds available. 
(ii)-The number of patient days per ancillary worker. 
- If 11 " inpatient cases per total number of hospital staff. 
-The ratio of physicians to nurses. 
(iii) The proportion of beds in intensive care over the total number 
of beds. 
-The number of medical and surgical specialties over the total number of cases treated. 
-The number of medical and surgical specialties with the 
higher medical rank ('services' in our case) over the 
total number of doctors. 
-The proportion of outpatient cases over the number of 
inpatient cases treated. 
-The proportion of Junior physicians over the total number 
of doctors. 
Two clusters appeared with rather well defined diagnosis variables, 
with the following statistics (see also A-9): 
TABLE V. 2 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 
F ratio t ratio F ratio t ratio 
1-Percentage of junior 
physicians over the 
total number of doctors: 0.019 -0.852 0.997 0.331 
2-Percentage of outpatient 
cases over the inpatient 
cases treated in the 
hospital: 0.376 -0.25 1.226 0.097 
3-Ratio of the total 
number of physicians 
over the total number 
of nurses: 0.597 1.12 0.483 -0.435 
Variables 1 and 2 can be considered proxy variables for the 'teaching' 
attribute of some hospitals and for the relative importance of 
the 
outpatient work-load on inpatient activity, respectively. 
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We explored then the possibility that both variables were appropriate 
diagnosis variables for our classification purposes. In doing this 
we searched for the robustness of the classificationsobtained 
in order to establish whether the groups emerged from the analysis 
Were stable under different cluster strategies. RELOCATE was first 
run for this purpose. In fact, RELOCATE is an iterative procedure 
with a hierarchic fusion method which optimises the error sum of sqaures 
as the dissimilarity criteria selected. From a random assignment, 
it starts with a classification of the population of n hospitals into 
.k 
clusters. During one 'relocation' scan, each object is considered in 
turn, and its similarities with all k clusters are computed. 
(30) 
The population is repeatedly analysed until no objects are relocated 
during one full scan. The similarity coefficients between all pairs 
of clusters are computed in---each step, the two more similar clusters 
being subsequently fused. 
However, whether this classification provides a global or local 
optimum cannot be established precisely. (For this purpose, several 
different starting points should be alternatively attempted. If the 
resulting classifications are similar, then the probability that the 
global solution has been achieved is higher). 
We confined the search for two final clusters to 10 iterations 
for each relocation cycle, using standard scores to replace the numeric 
data, and calculating the error sum of squares as the criterium of 
dissimilarity type. 
The two final clusters derived were defined by: 
TABLE V. 3 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 
F ratio t ratio F ratio t ratio 
Teaching status 0.00 -0.852 0.967 0.401 
Outpatient/inpatient 
work-load 0.437 -0.371 1.188 0.175 
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These results are highly similar to those derived from the use 
of the hierarchical procedure- Ward's method - after selecting as the 
similarity coefficient the euclidean distance. (Only two cases failed 
to hold this correspondence). 
The use of binary variables 
The relevance of the teaching attribute appeared again from the 
utilization of the set of binary variables selected. The following dummy variables 
tried to capture the different aspects of hospital output: 
(i) Hospital 'status': - DV=1 for the provision of outpatient 
services. 
- DV=1 for the case of teaching doctors 
and training programs. 
- DV=1 if teaching nurses. 
(ii) 'Extent' of provision of care: - DV=1 if the extent of provision of care 
is classified in the National 
Catalogue of Hospitals at the 
'provincial' level. 
- DV=1 if the hospital is located close 
to a regional hospital (providing so, 
in principle, a less complex set 
of care). 
(iii) 'Quality' aspects: - DV=1 if the last reform of the building 
was made in the last ten years. 
- DV=1 if the condition of the building 
was judged to be 'satisfactory' by 
the hospital administration. 
(iv) 'Sophistication' of care: - DV=1 if microcomputer. 
- DV=1 if CAT-scanner. 
(v) A 'distinctive' set of supply: - DV=1 if provision of intensive care. 
- DV=1 if Neuro-surgery. 
- DV=1 if Preventive medicine. 
- DV=1 if Rehabilitation services. 
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The results (see A-12) seem to support the grouping of observations 
into two main clusters according to the presence of the Dummy variable 
for the 'teaching doctors' status. That is: 
TABLE V. 4 
Percentage of occurrence of Ratio of occurrence of DV-teaching 
the DV per teaching status in the cluster over its occurrence 
in the overall sample. 
Cluster 1 16.1 0.35 
Cluster 2 94.7 2.06 
In fact, all 19 observations grouped in the second cluster had the 
characteristic of being teaching hospitals. Regarding the 31 cases in 
the ftrst cluster, only 3 observations appeared to violate this diagnosis 
variable. 
A similar result was also found when other 20 binary variables were 
selected on the basis of the values of the continuous variables judged 
as relevant in the previous grouping exercises. Given that, as we 
explained, the mix of data was not possible in the CLUSTAN version used, 
those continuous variables were transformed into binary variables. The 
results are reproduced in Table V. 5. 
TABLE V. 5 
(i) DV per ratio 
Cluster 1 
% frequence -ooccurrence in 
occurrence of the the cluster/% 
binary variable occurrence in the 
overall sample 
Cluster 2 
% frequence of % occurrence in 
occurrence of the the cluster/% 
binary variable occurrence in 
overall sarrpl e 
of ng, physicians 57.6 1.15 35.3 0.71 in higher hierar- 
chical positions 
over total. 
(ii) DV per percentage 
of outpatient 12.1 0.51 47.1 1.96 
cases treated over 
no. inpatient 
cases 
(iii)DV per percentage 
of junior physicians 27.3 0.62 76.5 1.74 
over no. doctors 
DV =1: ratio > average; 0 otherwise. 
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In conclusion, the results of the cluster analysis seem to 
support the view that 'size' and 'teaching status' are the two most 
relevant 'classificatory' variables for grouping subsamples with a 
higher internal homogeneity, in terms of hospital output and in the way 
in which this is approached here by the set of variables selected. 
However, these results have to be interpreted with care in light of 
the caveats and observations pointed out before. 
In short, the exercise shows that if a wide range of variables are 
selected - searching for a full information approach, that is, including 
structural, cost and quality factors - those variables related to 
hospital size appear as mostly relevant for classification purposes. 
The number of beds appears in the evertto be the most relevant diagnosis 
variable. Subgroups are formed for 100-320 and 320-650 hospital beds. 
In addition, a third subsample with six observations (those between 
500 and 650 beds) could be also considered. 
If a more reduced set of variables is re-selected, (most related 
to the nature of hospital output, independently of the way in which this 
is actually provided - dropping consequently the cost-related variables), 
the 'characteristic' variables related to the hospital teaching status 
appears as the best diagnosis component of the subgroupings. The 
relevance of the teaching attribute appears then robust enough given 
the application of alternative cluster procedures. 
The influence of the 'structure' variables was also indirectly tested, 
once these variables were dropped and only quality-related variables were 
used. No significant clusters appear in this case. A rather 
homogeneous sample for the fifty observations selected seemed to be 
acceptable from the point of view of those specified quality related 
variables. 
Since the object of the exercise is to predict an average cost per 
case figure, which being appropriately adjusted could be used with 
sufficient reliability for building our Prospective Revenue Allocation 
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Policy, hospitals were grouped according to those last two diagnosis 
variables. For these subsamples of increased homogeneity, we 
undertook separate cost analysis. 
The second part of the exercise consists of performing this 
separate cost analysis within each subsample considered using multiple 
regression analysis techniques. We will search in this way for a more 
accurate prediction of the average cost value to be used as the basis 
of the reimbursement policy, once we have controlled for those exogenous 
factors which give rise to legitimate differences in the utilization 
of the existing service facilities. 
5.4. DESCRIPTION OF THE COST EQUATION AND RESULTS OF THE ESTIMATION. 
The structure of the exercise earlier on presented, can be summarized 
in the following diagram: 
Cluster 
structural and environmental hospital characteristics 
analysis: and quality proxy variables for the facilities available. 
efficiency in flow of bed occupancy 
Multiple total cost operation cases rate 
regression number of hospital 
cases size average length 
analysis: complexity of" 
of stay 
the cases 
In order to make the aim of the exercise clear, we should 
remember the following: 
(i) We wish to estimate something which can be used in practice for 
asserting a cost-base line for purposes of revenue allocation and/or 
a budget review evaluation. We must avoid then any adjustment which 
incorporates variables which may be unilaterally manipulated by the 
hospitals. On the other hand, we do not need to go further into the 
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analysis of the hospital production function, since we are interested 
here mainly in the performance of cost-related behavioural factors. 
(ii) According to the previous discussion, the specification of 
the behavioural cost equation incorporates: 
a) The average cost per case as the dependent variable. The 
output unit is in fact the number of cases. Since "cases" are 
the counting measure, we need to incorporate the specific features 
associated with the case-mix characteristics. This is, as a work- 
load component for a further adjustment, in addition to those external 
or 'structural' factors considered in the cluster exercise. This 
we will do by including a specific "specialty case-mix" vector. 
Total costs are defined as total operating costs (including capital 
depreciation costs). 
b) The right hand side of the equation includes the following 
explanatory variables: - The size of the hospital. (Other 
institutional and external environmental variables have been 
previously taken into account for purposes of cluster analysis). 
Given, as we will see, the presence of heteroskedastic disturbances, 
the size variable will also be used as the weight factor for an 
alternative estimation using the Weighted Least Square option. 
(31) 
-Characteristic variables and those related to the actual 
utilization of facilities: The specialty case-mix vector and the 
flow of cases per bed available are included for this purpose. 
The case-mix variable tries to recuperate some of the information 
lost by using an aggregate unit of output. It was decided to use 
the proportion of the cases in each specialty in view of the 
evidence available suggesting the presence of multicollinearity. 
(32) 
The flow of cases per bed - defined as the number of cases treated 
per number of beds available - will be taken as the most appropriate 
utilization variable (since it appears to be the less easily 
manipulable amongst the utilization variables studied). 
(33) 
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In short, our specification follows, in general, Feldstein's 
approach on hospital cost analysis, as presented in "Economic Analysis 
for Health Service Efficiency" (1967). 
5.4.1. Empirical results of the estimation of the cost function. 
The results of the exercise are summarized in Table V. 6. The 
appendix gives the key of the variables used. Figures are in thousand 
of pesetas. 
The initially estimatedequation corresponds to the overall sample 
of 50 hospitals. (1') includes the equation as initially formulated, 
whereas (2') accounts, in addition, for scale economies in hospital size 
and throughput variables, and it incorporates two dummy variables collecting 
the presence of teaching programs and the supply of outpatient services in 
the hospital. 
Regarding the R2 value, it can be seen that about two thirds of the 
variance of the dependent variable in (2') is explained by the variation 
of the explanatory variables. The value of the F statistic did allow 
for the rejection of the hypothesis of the null coefficient vector at 
conventional levels of significance. However, the statistic calculated 
according to the Goldfeld and Quandt's test, did not allow for the 
rejection of the null hypothesis of homoskedastic disturbances at the 
99 per cent interval of confidence - although it did at the 95 per cent. 
The equation passed the Chow test for structural stability and the test for 
hypothetical alternative functional forms, as specified in the Ramsey 
modified RESET test. (See Subappendix one). 
From the results in (2') it can be also noted that the estimated 
value for the constant, throughput and throughput square variables, teaching 
status and the variables included in the case-mix vector referring to the 
proportion of Obstetrics and Gynaecology cases over the total, have at 
ratio statistically significant at the usual levels of significance. 
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In addition, it has to be noticed that, although not statistically 
significant, the number of beds and beds-square appeared with the 
expected signs, according to what can be postulated from the hypothesis 
of economies of size. Similarly, the expected signs also appear for 
the utilization variable (flow of cases per bed), for the dummy 
variable for outpatient services - although in this second case was 
not statistically significant - and for the specialty case-mix vector, 
with the exception of the percentage of cases in intensive care units 
which appear with an unexpected negative sign). 
Given the impossibility of rejecting the null hypothesis of 
homoskedastic disturbances at the 99 per cent interval of confidence, 
we took into account the possiblity of having estimated inefficient 
Ordinary Least Squares estimators - although still unbiased and 
consistent. For this purpose, we considered the Weighted Least 
Squares option, using the hospital size (number of beds) as the 
weighting factor according to some initial expectations, and dropping 
consequently this variable from our initial estimation. 
(34) 
The 
results of the estimation are presented in equation (3') and (4'), 
respectively, in Table V. 6. 
According to them we can point out that: 
(i) The relatively high value of the intercept, which comes 
to indicate the influence of the fixed-costs on the 
average cost per case treated, once we take into account 
the rest of explanatory variables. 
(ii) The negative sign, as expected, for the "flow" variable. 
In fact, as a result of a marginal increase in the ratio 
of the number of cases per bed available, a cost-saving 
of 7558 pesetas (see (3'))could be made, once we account 
for all the other factors included' in the regression. 
Moreover, the positive sign for the statistically 
significant square value of the throughput variable 
seems to indicate the presence of scale diseconomies on 
the flow of cases per bed, once reached a turning point 
at a value of 46 cases per bed/year. (This would affect 
only a small number of non-teaching hospitals which show 
values with a maximum of 49). 
-204- 
The teaching status, as conventionally approached by the 
introduction of a dummy variable, shows an overall positive 
impact on the average cost per case of 10164 ptas. This 
represents an extra 14% above the mean average cost per 
case of the overall sample of hospitals and a 10% higher 
than the figure which results from the comparison of the 
actual values of the two separate subsamples; and, finally, 
(iv) the low t statistics usually derived for the varialbes 
included in the specialty case-mix vector, with the 
exception of the proportion of cases in the Obstetrics 
and Gynaecology Departments over the total number of 
cases, with a marginal impact on the hospital average 
cost of about one hundred thousand pesetas. 
(Note that (4') is the same equation as (3') but 
reinserting the dummy variable for outpatient services). 
Nevertheless, in using the Weighted Least Squares option it has 
to be remembered that the weighted regression coefficients become just 
the OLS coefficients for the regression with the weighted data, and that 
the constant for the unweighted data becomes a variable which now takes 
on different values for different observations. Therefore, the R2 has 
to be interpreted with caution since, strictly speaking, it includes 
the explanation achieved by this 'new' variable. 
On the basis of the equation (4'), we incorporated the results of 
the cluster exercise in the regression estimation. 
The teaching status of the hospital was considered first. 
As it can be seen in (5'), we replaced the binary variable for teaching 
by the actual number of junior physicians in teaching hospitals. Since 
'size' still ranged from 208 to 655 beds, we kept the Weighted Least Squares 
option and, given that no evidence was found of scale economies - see (6') - 
for this disaggregated subsample, the squared values of the size and 
utilization variables were dropped from the regression. We considered then 
the F test of the vector of null coefficients for the included explanatory 
variables and the Ramsey's modified RESET test for the specified functional 
form. 
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We proceeded similarly for the Subsample of non-teaching hospitals. 
The result can be seen in (7'). In this second case, we could not 
reject the hypothesis of an alternative functional form as given by 
the square value of the fitted dependent variable, according to the 
Ramsey's modified RESET test. In fact, the t ratio for this variable 
appeared to be statistically significant at the usual intervals of 
confidence (with a value of 3.747). 
We explored consequently, the introduction first of the squared value 
of the throughput variable (FL2) - see (8') - and, alternatively, 
given that non-teaching hospitals showed a reduced range of size 
(between 101 and 496 beds), we reinserted the size variable in the OLS 
option 
(35) 
- see (9'). In both cases, although the value of the former 
t ratio decreased, it still remained significant at the usual levels of 
significance. 
We alternatively specified to these functional forms the simple and 
double logarithmic functions and an inverse function fitting a rectangular 
hyperbola to our data. Only this last functional form implied a 
substantive drop in the t ratio of the squared value of the fitted 
dependent variable, with values then not statistically significant at 
the usual levels of significance. This can be seen in (10'). 
Therefore, according to this result, it appears that, whereas a 
quadratic function on the utilization variable (adjusted for the specialty 
case-mix vector) linear in the parameters seeris appropriate for the 
overall sample of hospitals, a rectangular hyperbola which does not meet 
the axes fits better the data for the specific sample of non-teaching 
hospitals. 
(36) 
In graphic terms, this involves the following hospital functional forms: 
FIGURE V. 1 
A výzcaýe 
cle'cge 
der 
tt vw, a4 
OU ecao 
" Sat,. ple 
plo 
hAopýta(s 
atof Vectoc ýexýles 
vaýý 
-206- 
This result has the implication that to pool in a single model 
the different subsamples, using afterwards a dummy variable to collect 
the postulated influence of the relevant factor considered, can come 
to restrict unlegitimately the data to a single functional form and 
the whole set of parameters included in the model to remain constant 
for the two subsamples, when not affected by a 'slope' or 'shift' dummy 
variable. 
In light of this result, we re-examined the other estimations, 
according to the alternatively derived functional form, in order to test 
for the presence of heteroskedasticity in the overall sample (and hence 
to check whether the WLS instead of the OLS option should be considered) 
and whether, in consequence, the Ramsey's modified RESET test before 
applied, for the specific subsample of non-teaching hospitals was invalid 
because of the minorated power of the test due to the presence of hetero- 
skedastic disturbances. 
From these results we can point out the following: 
(i) The set of variables selected for our estimation 
exercise seems to explain a greater part of the 
variation of the dependent variable in the case of 
the non-teaching hospitals than of the teaching 
hospitals. It can be argued that some relevant 
factors for explaining the cost-behaviour of 
the sample of teaching hospitals might have 
been omitted. Thus, although restricted by the 
hospital data available, we tried to incorporate 
other additional variables which did not come to 
improve substantially the goodness of the fit. 
This was particularly the case when we used the 
absolute number of junior physicians, or its 
percentage in the total number of physicians of 
the hospital. It has to be noted, however, that, 
in both cases, the influence of the number of 
junior physicians on costs appeared with a 
negative sign. The reason for this could be that 
this manpower component represents ultimately 
a form of cheap labour which outweighs the 
influence of some other factors which can make 
for a more expensive output, once we have 
adjusted for their different specialty-case mixes. 
(ii) The value of the intercept shows a value 15% greater in 
the case of teaching hospitals than of non-teaching 
hospitals. This result is very similar to that also 
found earlier on. 
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(iii) The value of the utilization variable shows a similar 
marginal impact on the average cost dependent variable 
in both Subsamples analysed. 
Finally, we took into account the influence of the size variable 
and of the proportion of the supply of outpatient services over the number 
of inpatient cases provided in the hospital. 
With regard to the hospital size variable, the results of the 
estimation for the first 29 observations (up to 320 beds) 
are collected in (11'), whereas for the last 25 cases (up to 650 beds) 
the results are in (12'). Finally, the last six observations were 
dropped according to the plot examined in A-3; the results are 
summarized in (13'). 
Therefore, with respect to the initial subgroupings, the following 
results can be pointed out: 
(i) The increase in the 'goodness of the fit' from the higher 
sample homogeneity achieved, as seen from most of the 
conventional statistics: 
Overall sample First subsample Second subsample Third subsample 
(100/320 beds) (320/650 beds) (320/500 beds) 
R2 0.4969 0.621 0.735 0.744 
R2 0.4130 0.456 0.631 0.5951 
(ii) The increase in the size of the economies which can be achieved 
from increasing the case flow variable as hospital size increases. 
This is particularly the case for the second and third groups. 
(iii) The significance at the conventional intervals of confidence of 
most of the estimated coefficients for the specialty case-mix 
vector in the second subsample of larger hospitals. 
The relatively high values before found for OBGIST are repeated 
here. 
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In similar terms, our initial regression equation was estimated 
separately for the two subsamples derived from the previous cluster 
analysis according to the 'outpatient/inpatient care' attribute. 
The first subsample includes those observations with the proportion 
of outpatient cases over the total number of impatient cases greater 
than the sample average, and the second, those with a value of 
the proportion less than average. 
The results of breaking down the overall sample according to the 
value of that attribute can be seen in (14') and (15'), respectively. 
From them, it can be pointed out that: 
(i) As could be expected, the reduction in the average cost 
per case from a marginal increase in the 'flow' variable 
was greater in the second than in the first subsample 
with values for the ratio of the 'classificatory' variable 
greater than the average. 
(ii) With regard to the second subsample, the expected negative 
sign of the coefficient for the proportion of paediatric 
cases over the total is statistically significant at the 
conventional intervals of confidence, as it is the large 
value for the coefficient of the proportion of cases in 
intensive care units over the total (as could also be 
expected). 
(iii) The evolution of the R2 and R2 adjusted for the degree 
of freedom was as follows: 
Overall sample First subsample Second subsample 
R2 0.4969 0.5307 0.743 
R2 0.4130 0.394 0.593 
On the basis of (41), and the subgroups analysed in (5') and (10') , 
we construct the prediction series for further analysis and hypothesis 
testing. 
This is done in the next sections. 
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5.4.2. The results of the prediction. 
Although the significance of the estimated coefficients 
was not evenly acceptable at the usual intervals of confidence, we 
opted for the utilization of all the included regressors and not 
only of those which were statistically significant. 
(37) 
On the base-line given by dose estimated parameters we predict 
a value to which corresponds a reimbursement figure for each individual 
hospital) according to the characteristics taken into account in the 
regression. The exercise is repeated for the two . main subsamples 
derived according to the two main classification criteria. The results 
can be seen in table V. 7. 
The series will be analysed first in the next section with a view 
to making appropriate relative price adjustments, before those 
figures are supplied as the input source for the final simulation exercise. 
We will test thereafter on this basis the pattern of variable productivity 
and the hypothesis put forward before of the absence of a self- 
correcting mechanism for relatively high-spending hospitals and, in case, 
of a potential cumulative causation effect in a context of generalysed 
system inefficiency in the allocation of hospital expenditure. 
5.5. ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS OF THE PREDICTION. 
In analysing the results of the prediction series we consider 
first the argument for the need of a geographical relative price 
adjustment. The purpose of this adjustment is to achieve a similar 
impact in terms of the purchasing ability amongst the different 
reimbursed units, in order to provide the same amount of health 
resources through the financial allocation of any "peseta" no matter 
where this is spent. 
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TABLE V. 7 
ACTUAL AND PREDICTED REVENUE ALLOCATION (1979) 
Total Actual Revenue Total Predicted Revenue Total Revenue 
Allocation-1979 Allocation-1979 Predicted-1979 
(4') (5'J and [101 
1 243065 253026 263176 
2 309556 265832 272872 
3 354395 342317 347057 
4 381943 398239 395571 
5 400574 388189 395334 
6 354194 381339 387776 
7 508114 430688 411583 
8 504649 468420 479942 
9 348366 423461 410158 
10 491140 502861 477634 
11 537108 542732 572679 
12 606723 588835 618591 
13 614578 716551 696549 
14 447576 474407 447673 
15 647219 637791 594364 
16 918061 892566 897988 
17 476231 670958 565150 
18 553536 612223 567205 
19 868760 837481 681309 
20 532478 619110 572320 
21 629878 588376 556224 
22 728641 823968 820426 
23 699504 537872 627076 
24 523198 539126 545576 
25 798617 861282 872159 
26 836916 775555 901397 
27 831700 795579 806009 
28 605636 506067 569522 
29 1013270 1047620 1019972 
31 1004040 1003660 964322 
32 1007470 1080460 1105095 
33 1002700 1055510 1002700 
334 571041 407825 581014 
35 802277 913791 895811 
36 961056 934976 868228 
37 986430 1247600 1177931 
38 1226010 1076800 1183885 
39 1247830 1071800 1198423 
40 1426940 1075300 1067880 
41 1884840 1446250 1406762 
42 1022760 1306400 1327957 
43 1024460 1129490 1162970 
44 1211960 1193380 1060050 
45 1291240 1490860 1504741 
46 1611390 1650020 1643697 
47 1897130 1672840 1782639 
48 1516070 1562810 1527676 
49 1631060 1571060 1604565 
50 1614090 1700800 1684782 
51 1271750 1464070 1390515 
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5.5.1. The need for a geographical relative price adjustment. 
For our purposes, the factors which make for the need of an inter- 
territorial adjustment have to be due, in principle, to labour market 
conditions exogenous to the internal policies in operation. 
Following Bennett (op. cit. ), geographical variations in the costs of 
provision of public services can stem from the following factors: 
(i) Enviromental factors (of the type of pollution costs, stress, 
safety, influence of the climate... ) ; 
(ii) technical factors, such as "density" (costs of land assembly, 
water and sewage services, heating, etc. ), scale of economies (e. g. from 
horizontal and vertical integration) and productivity differences 
(in the sense analysed in Chapter II); 
(iii) 'locational' costs (e. g. cost of land and labour, -transport 
costs, cost of living, etc. ); and, finally, 
(iv) 'sunk' costs, derived from decisions in the past with 
implications for resource allocation in the present, such as those 
derived from the design of plants with excess capacity - failing to 
appreciate accurately the existing levels of demand - or the effects 
of technological change on the investment in 'social capital'. 
For our purposes, the factors which indicate the need for a 
geographical adjustment have to be due, in general, to external market 
conditions exogenous to the internal policies in operation. This 
excludes those technical factors related to variable productivity and 
perhaps some other "sunk" costs which are the result of the shortcomings 
of policies which could have been redressed in practice. Data availability 
does not allow, however, for a complete adjustment for all those factors 
(such as in the case of the environmental aspects surrounding the 
activity) and, for this reason, most of the studies focus only on the 
adjustment of the so called 'locational' costs. 
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Thus, the cost of living index is, in practice, the main factor 
in adjusting for territorial price differences. With respect to the 
cost of labour inputs (which account almost for two thirds of the 
hospital health care expenditure), differences in unit labour costs 
may arise due to the territorial level of unemployment (and, in our 
context, to the different extent of the possibility of exercising some 
forms of compatible medical practice) and to the lack of free movement 
of labour between geographic areas (e. g. given some scaricities and other 
locational preferences which require incentives to move). With respect 
to the cost of non-labour inputs, geographical cost differences may arise 
from locational aspects (e. g. transport costs), differences in the degree 
of competition and opportunities supplied by external markets for cost 
savings (e. g. for efficient contract services). 
In approaching empirically the relevance of geographical price 
differences, we will examine first the extent of the variation in the 
cost of living index in a provincial basis in Spain. According to our 
own calculations (updating for 1979 the current statistics available), 
provincial differences in the cost of living ranged from 72.4 up to 
123.2, taking the index of Madrid as the bases of 100. The distribution 
of these differences can be seen in Table V. 8 below: 
TABLE V. 8 
Distribution of the relative index of cost of living (1979) 
(Number of provinces) 
- <80: 2 91 -95: 10 101 - 105: 10 ->110: 
1 
81- 85: 5 96 -100: 7 106 - 110: 4 
--------------- 
100 = Madrid; 
Source: Own calculations, updating for 1979 the original source INE, 1973. 
In sum, 33 of the 50 provinces had values under 100 - half of 
them less than 90 - wheras the other 14 provinces had a value 
between 
100 and 110. 
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In addition, as could be expected, there existed a quite 
high correlation between provinces under value 'one hundred' and 
those provinces which could be considered rural areas, and viceversa 
for those provinces with values over one hundred and highly populated 
urban areas. 
In testing, in particular, for the influence of the location factor 
on hospital costs, we used data made available by one of the larger 
private health insurance companies in Spain. These data are the only 
existing - although unpublished - statistics in which costs and 
utilization variables are referred to some disaggregated treatments. 
No other information related to patient and diagnostic characteristic 
variables is available. 
The sample refers to 34 private hospitals of Catalunya, which 
can be clearly identified as located in urban (Barcelona) or non-urban 
areas, according to the National Catalogue of Spanish Hospitals. 
We selected then, according to the opinion of two expert physicians 
on the subject, those observations which could be referred to more 
similar patient population characteristics, amongst more than 300 
treatments. We took for this initial selection, those Gases with 
sufficient degrees of freedom for their analysis, through a cost- 
regression approach and for their utilization in a cross-section basis. 
A priori, we could expect that hospitals in urban areas would 
be affected by higher costs of living (food, travelling and housing 
expenses), higher unit labour costs (and land prices) and higher 
distribution costs. On the other hand, they could be expected 
to have greater cost-saving opportunities (due, for instance, to 
the potential supply of more efficient services and to a greater 
degree of competition for their contracting, although the first 
aspects were expected to dominate over the second. 
DVLH, the dummy variable collecting the location of the hospital, 
received a value equal to one for those hospitals located in urban 
areas and zero otherwise. 
The results can be seen in Table V. 9. 
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TABLE V. 9 
The influence of the hospital location_variable on average costs. 
Average cost constant DV location of Length of R2 F 
per... term the hospital stay 
Appendice- 17211 8380 4161 0.39 (2,26)= 8.35 
ctomy (1.866) (1.513) (3.983) 
Caesarean -23092 35107 9552 0.54 (2,13)= 7.80 
operation (-0.663) (3.758) (2.452) 
Phimosis 832 6979 6629 0.35 (2,21)= 5.65 
(0.17) (2.36) (3.32) 
Hysterectomy 18987 32427 4274 0.37 (2,12)= 3.46 
(0.67) (2.577) (1.737) 
D&C (post 4928 4044 5777 0.63 (2,14)= 12.01 
abortion) (1.84) (2.177) (4.836) 
Normal child 9343 18403 3943 0.47 (2,24)= 10.84 
delivery (0.80) (4.65) (1.695) 
Allab we cases 8849 18104 8059 0.797 (3,158)=207.3 
(3.40) (7.95) (24.9) 
(*) = t-ratios. 
The results of the OLS estimation prove, in fact, the significance 
of the dummy variable for all the cases analysed except for the first of 
the treatments seen (although the degree of existing multicollinearity 
of this variable with the average length of stay could be the reason of 
its minor influence on average costs). 
Moreover, the correlation coefficients 
(18) indicate that the 
non-urban hospitals seem to be associated with higher LOS. 
(This can 
be due to the influence of a'precaution element'in discharging patients). 
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The 'location' factor shows then, an inverse association 
with the average cost per patient day. This higher utilization 
aspect of the treatment do not seem, however, to be finally 
reflected on higher average costs per case. 
Therefore, we can conclude the necessity of a relative price 
adjustment for territorial 'price' differences of the type 
proposed. 
First, the analysis of the prediction and simulation exercise 
will be presented. 
5.5.2. The prediction and simulation exercise (1979-1981). 
From a detailed analysis of the results summarized before, the 
following features can be pointed out (see Table V. 10): 
(i) The group of relatively high-spending hospitals includes 
12 of the 50 observations analysed. Their values exceed, on average, 
by 17% from the figures predicted according to our adjusted regression 
estimation. These values range from 6.5% - Ciudad Real ('Nuestra Sra. 
de Alarcos') - to 34% - Las Palmas de Gran Canaria ('Nuestro Sra. del 
Pino'). 40% of these observations correspond to teaching hospitals. 
They show the larg est deviations between the actual and predicted 
expenses, averaging at 20% of the actual expenditure figures. All 
of them range within the higher spending bracket. 
(ii) The application of the relative price adjustment to the 
hospital sample suggests that some initial conclusions need to be 
modified. Thus, the observation corresponding to the regional 
hospital of Valladolid should be dropped from the relatively high 
spending group. On the contrary, another five hospitals should be 
incorporated in the group: The hospitals located in non-urban areas 
and their inclusion in the relatively high spending group depends 
crucially on the effect of deflating the initial expenditure figures by 
the level of provincial prices. Therefore, the inclusion of these 
five hospitals has to be taken with caution. (Note that, in as far as 
at least two thirds of the hospital expenditure is committed at the 
national level, the deflation of the full amount comes to exagerate the 
adjustment). This issue is moreover difficult to overtake given the 
problem of finding another appropriate index for the required adjustment. 
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TABLE V. 10 
Relatively high spendinq 1979 1981 
Hospital Group: % DI BOR LOS % DI BOR LOS 
"Virgen de Vbntetoro" 13.4 66 * 16.5 67.5 
-Vahon, Baleares 
"Virgen de los Lirios" 23.5 * 9.05 12.8 77.6 11.1 
-Alcoy, Alicante 
"General Moscard6" 8.9 * 9.21 7.4 - - 
-Lerida, Cataluna 
"Gneral Alvarez Castro" 27.4 * * 18.3 - - 
-Gerona, Cataluna 
"Ntra. Sra. del Rosario" 13.2 50 10.92 - 71.8 11.6 
-Riano-Langreo, Oviedo 
"San Agustin" 11.6 54 * - 57.7 
-Avil4s, Oviedo 
"Ntra. Sra de los Alarcos" 6.3 74 * 13.7 7.4 
-Ciudad Real, Castilla 
"Perpetvo Socorro" 10.7 * * - * 
-Albacete 
"General Sanjurjo" 33.6 78.5 11.5 15.3 73.3 11.7 
-Valencia 
"Ntra. Sra. de los Pinos" 34.0 76.3 * 11.3 69.2 
-Las Palmas, Canarias 
"J. Gö ez Sabugo" 14.3 75.8 10.6 14.7 71.1 9.8 
-Gijon, Oviedo. 6.4 * 11.1 5.3 79.3 11.13 "Onesimo Redondo" 
-Valladolid, Castilla 
...... after the Relative Price Adjustment, 
the follovMing hospitals should be incorporated: 
"Obispo Polanco" 
-Teruel, Aragön - * 11.5 - * 10.3 
"Virgen del Camino" 
-Ponferrada, Leön - * 10.8 - 77.8 10.4 
"Virgen de Sonsoles" 
-Avila, Castilla - 64.1 11.5 - 
64.4 10.5 
"Virgen Blanca" 
-Leon - 
* 9.4 - * 9.5 
"San Juan de la Cruz" 
Jaen, Andalucia -Ubeda - 57.3 
* - 69.2 , 
...... correspondingly 
"Onesimo Redondo" - Valladolid, should be dropped from the initial group. 
DI Deviation index between predicted and actual expenditure (ratio in percentage terms) 
* BOR' 80%; " LOS G9 days. 
- Statistic unavailable. 
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(iii) A geographical inter relation of the former results 
shows that the group comprises the two hospitals located in the 
Spanish islands, 10 hospitals located in the capital of rather 
rural provinces and the other six observations correspond to old 
industrial areas - (Gijon, Ponferrada, Aviles,.... ) 
The corresponding 'institutional' exploration of the results 
in higher spending groups reveals that five of the seventeen hospitals 
could argue some sort of reason for their poor performance, mainly 
referring to the extent of the health care provided and other related 
reasons (as in the case of the hospitals in the islands), such as 
their design in principle for a larger provision and being forced there- 
after to close some wards for operational reasons, or being in urgent 
need of reform. But a more detailed exploration would also show that 
all hospitals, except one, record values for the average length of stay 
well above 9 days (up to 11.5) and bed occupancy ratios well below 80% 
(down to 66%). Comparing these values with those of the relatively 
"low-spending" hospital sample, we can note that, whereas for the 
former group the average length of stay is 10.46 days, for the latter 
group it was just 8.36. 
An analysis of some basic work-load indicators is also presented 
in Table V. 11. From these calculations we can clearly see the relevance 
of the deviations between the actual values and the sample mean for most 
of those measures in all except three hospitals. This result itself 
suggests a specific control policy for hospital manpower which can 
be explored further in the light of the Table presented in Subappendix - 
Two. 
The analysis was completed with the estimation of the initial 
regressions over the period comprised between 1979 and 1981 and by 
predicting an individal figure for each of those years. In so doing, 
we had to assume that the specialty case-mix vector of the hospitals 
remained constant over the three year period. This is because hospital 
data on 'specialty' bases are collected in Spain. only every four 
years, and the values corresponding to 1983 are not yet published. 
Nevertheless, the assumption required for our initial test, although not 
fully satisfactory, is not entirely inplausible in our context, at 
least 
for a short term view. With respect to the other tests, we proceed as 
indicated in the formulation of the simulation exercise. 
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with regard to 
TABLE V. 11 
Analysis of some work-load indicators 
the relatively high spending Biospital group. 
Actual Sample mean Actual Sample mean 
2 -Mahön 
Beds per HPS 4.7 8.3 Beds per hospital 2 4 3 3 
physician . . 
Patents assisted 
per HPS 177 269 Patients assisted 92 107 
per physician 
7 -Alcoy (Alicante) 
Patients assisted 173 269 Beds per total 0.45 0.51 
per HPS hospital manpower 
Beds per registrar 4.7 6.1 Patients per total 10 16 
hospital manpower 
Patients assisted 
per registrar 111 196 
Beds per ancillary 1.3 1.7 
wormers 
Beds per total no 2.6 3.3 Patients per 29 54 physicians ancillary workers 
Patients per total 61 107 Patients per 49 68 physicians clinical auxiliar 
Patients per nurse 47 56 
15-Lerida (Catalunya) 
Beds per HPS 6.7 8.3 Patients per 39 54 
Patients per HPS 163 269 ancillary worker 
Patients per 142 196 
Patients per 
total hospital 13 16 
registrar manpower 
Beds per physician 2.9 3.3 
Patients per 70 107 
physician 
19-Gerona (Catalunya) 
Beds per nurse 1.6 1.8 Beds per ancillary 1.4 1.7 
worker 
clinical 1.8 2.2 
auxiliar 
21-Riano-Langreo (Oviedo) 
Beds per registrar 5.5 6.1 Patients per nurse 51 56 
Patients per " 137 196 clinical 53 68 
auxiliar 
Beds per physician 3.0 3.3 Beds per ancillary 1.5 1.7 
Patients per 74 107 worker 
physician Patients per 37 54 
ancillary worker 
Beds per total 0.38 0.51 Patients per total 12 16 hospital manpower hospital manpower 
HPS = Highest Physician statu s 
("Chief"of Department, Service or Clinic) 
Source: Own cal culation from Appendic the information es 
to th e 
dpcpntralized Budget o79 Requests. (979) 
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Actual Sarrple rrean Actual Sample Mean 
23- Aviles (Oviedo) x V 
28-Ciudad Real x 
36- Albacete 
40- Valencia (Valencia) 
Patients per HPS 210 269 Patients per nurse 48 56 
" 11 180 196 Patients per ancillary 46 54 
registrar worker 
Patients per 97 107 
physician 
41 -Los Palmas (Canarias) 
Beds per HPS 6.7 8.3 Beds per nurse 1.27 1.75 
Patients per HPS 230 269 Patients per nurse 44 56 
Beds per registrar 3.8 6.1 Beds per clinical 
Patients per auxiliar 
1.02 2.15 
registrar 
132 196 Patients per 35 68 
clinical auxiliar 
Beds per physician 2.4 3.3 Beds per total 
Patients per 84 107 auxiliar personnel 
0.55 0.93 
physician Patients per total 12 16 
Beds per total 0.36 0.51 hospital manpower hospital manpower 
44 -Gij6n (Oviedo) 
Beds per registrar 5.8 6.1 Beds per total 0.79 0.93 
auxiliar personnel Patients per 
registrar 152 196 Beds per ancillary 1.6 1.72 
worker 
Patients per 89 107 
physician Patients per ancillary 43 54 
worker Beds per nurse 1.45 1.75 Beds per total hospita l0.46 0.51 
Patients per nurse 38 56 manpower 
Beds per clinical 1 95 15 2 Patients per 
total 
auxiliar . . hospital manpower 12 16 
Patients per 51 68 
clinical auxiliar 
47 -Valladolid (Castilla) 
Patients per 82 107 Beds per total 0.72 0.93 
physician auxiliar personnel 
Beds per nurse 1.33 1.75 Beds per ancillary 1.06 1.72 
Patients per nurse 32 56 worker 
Beds per clinical 1.66 2.15 Patients per 26 54 
auxiliar ancillary worker 
Patients per 40 68 Patients per 
total 9 16 
clinical auxiliar 
hospital manpower 
Beds per total 0.38 0.51 
hospital manpower 
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5.6. TESTS. 
With respect to the hypothesis of self-correcting mechanisms 
in hospital performance, only 5 of the 12 relatively high spending 
hospitals proved some type of self-correction over time: that is, 
their over-expenditure centrally moved towards their predicted values 
according to our results from the estimation. Four of them followed 
this approximation with a stable character over the period. 
With regard to the whole sample, 15 observations seem to lose 
over the period their initially close fit to the predicted values 
estimated from the regression. Amongst the rest, 6 remained as high- 
spending hospitals over the whole period, and 3 showed a cumulative 
causation effect, with values progressively moving away from their 
postulated targets. 
However, half of the sample stayed in the inital classification group 
and a quarter of them kept their expenditure close to the predicted values 
over the three year period. 
Finally, 5 hospitals (3 of them teaching hospitals) showed rather 
erratic patterns, fluctuating above and below the 5 and 3 per cent 
margins around the estimated values postulated as the benchmark figures. 
The institutional analysis on the utilization variables over the 
three year period also gives support to the hypothesis of system ineffi- 
ciency or absence of incentives for improving efficiency over time. In 
fact, with respect to the 'high spending' group, 6 of 7 observations with 
low bed occupancy ratios kept these values over the whole period, showing 
no effort to adjust to the capacity available. Similarly, 
8 to 10 
hospitals with relatively high average lengths of stay 
did not show 
any change in shortening the length of stay. With respect 
to the other 
two, only one represented an actual improvement. 
With regard to the remaining sample, all except one observation with 
values for the bed occupancy rate below 
80% recorded improvements in 
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their ratios over the period. In similar terms, 7 over 10 hospitals 
with average lengths of stay greater than 9 days displayed a relative 
improvement at the end of the period, with substantially shorter length 
of stays. (The composition of both groups can be seen in table V. 10). 
Finally, we supplied the results from the more accurate estimation 
performed for the 1979 period (Table V. 7) as the raw data for the simulation 
of the PRAP. Having fixed as the relegation criterion the inclusion of 
hospitals with the 30% highest relative deviations between actual and 
predicted values (sequentially calculated over the three years in which 
the designed policy we postulated to be in operation), 20 hospitals were 
submitted to the incentive reimbursement policy. Only 4 amongst those 
observations showed, over the period, actual values moving close to those 
calculated according to the incentive reimbursement policy (although one 
of the hospitals did not seem to follow the adjustment on a permanent 
basis). 
This result appears to be independent of the weighting factor established 
for defining the speed of the adjustment through which the revenue formula 
proposed was required to move towards the predicted targets. (In fact, 
a loop in the program enabled us to supply values for the weighting 
factor between 0.1 and 1). 
In conclusion, the following points can be summarized: 
(i) The presence of system inefficiency seems to be proved, particularly 
in relation to the results of the estimation of the hospital behavioural 
cost functions over time and in the hospitals performance in terms of 
the pattern followed by some relevant utilization variables over the 
period studied. 
(2) The absence of self-correcting mechanisms is proved specifically 
with respect to the figures predicted on hospital expenditure, according 
to the estimated values for each corresponding year over the period considered. 
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and in view of the results of the simulation exercise. 
(3) However, the hypothesis of cumulative causation seems rather 
doubtful since it is supported by only 3 observations amongst the 20 
hospitals analysed. 
SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER. 
In this fifth Chapter we have examined the actual construction of the 
proposed cost-base line for the analysis of the relative efficiency of the 
hospital expenditure in Spain. 
According to the hospital data available today in Spain, we have 
selected an initially homogeneous sample for purposes of analysis, which 
has been further refined according to the results of the cluster 
exercise. From the application of the corresponding clustering techniques, 
the teaching characteristic of the hospitals has proved its major 
relevance amongst the derived 'classification'or 'diagnosis' variables. 
On the basis of this latter result, we have run separate cost 
regression analysis for the overall sample and each of the derived 
subsamples. The residuals between the actual and fitted values have 
been then explored in order to assert some initial inferences on 
the relative efficiency of the hospital expenditure. This analysis 
has shown, moreover, that the assumption of an identical functional 
form amongst hospitals with different status and, likely, of an 
identical behavioural model, needs to be tested by the researcher. 
In fact, the results of the estimation of the overall sample and each 
of the subsamples considered shows, in our case, that those assumptions 
would impose illegitimate restrictions. 
After adjusting the results of the estimation in view of the need 
to account for geographical price differences on institutional 
expenditure, we have examined the deviations between actual and 
predicted figures (according to the'PRAP') in an institutional and 
provincial basis. Having performed some initial tests 
for the 
- 223 - 
period 1979-81 under the unsatisfactory, but necessary assumption 
at this stage, that the specialty case-mix vector of the hospitals 
remained constant over the period, we have supplied the results of 
the more accurate estimation for the exercise 1979 as the input 
data for the simulation exercise, such as specified in Chapter Four, 
for implementing an incentive reimbursement policy. 
In both cases, the results have been analysed in view of testing 
the hypotheses of system inefficiency and the absence of self-correcting 
mechanisms in the pattern followed by sequential hospital expenses. Both 
hypotheses can be widely accepted in light of the results provided. 
However, those results would not seem to support the tentative 
hypothesis of a cumulative causation effect in absence of a 'PRAP of 
the characteristics described in the thesis. 
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FOOTNOTES-. - 
(1) They are: "InformaciOn Economico-Funcional de las 
Instituciones Sanitarias" (INP), INSALUD; "Encuesta 
de Establecimientos Sanitarios en Regimen de Internado", 
INE; "Encuesta de Morbilidad Hospitalaria" INE; 
"Memorias provinciales del INSALUD" (INP); "Anexos 
estadisticos a la elaboraciön de los Anteproyectos 
Presupuesarios de las Instituciones cerradas de la 
Seguridad Social" (unpublished), and "Anuario 
Estadistico de Espana", INE. 
(2) Körner Report - Working Group F on Health Services Financial Information (1983). 
(3) For this Subsample, a greater amount of information was 
available, in addition to those statistical data published 
on a provincial basis. 
(4) We explored this question through some regression estimations. 
The following results are summarized here: 
(i) The high dispersion in the variable collecting the 
interprovincial range of variation of the beds supplied per 
population covered (coef. of variation = 50.20) diminishes 
once we analyse public provision in regional basis. However, 
Canarias and Catalunya show still coefficients relatively low 
and Aragön and Extremadura relatively high (approximately, 
60% over the average). 
(ii) According to the results of the estimation, a 
25% of the variation in the total number of beds per capita 
could be explained by variations in the crude level of 
provincial income. 
(ii) Once the total number of beds (public and private) 
per capita are added, the utilization of the mean value 
produces the following relations at the provincial level: 
a) provinces with lower than average public beds per 
capita ratio and greater than the average ratio of private 
beds per capita. These provinces are mostly those with the 
highest per capita income. 
b) Provinces with a higher than average ratio of public 
beds per capita and lower than average private beds per 
capita ratio. These provinces can be mostly identified 
as those with a per capita income less (kan the average. 
c) Finally, those provinces with low values for both ratios, 
or provinces historically less well endowed in terms of 
inpatient care supply. 
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Finally, it could be noticed that almost all the 
provinces with only one public hospital covering the total 
provincial population showed a value of the bed per capita 
ratio higher than the average. This may suggest some 
problems on the hospital minimum size with respect to the 
provision of health care in territorial bases. 
(5) We refer here to the "Encuesta de Establecimientos 
Sanitarios en Regimen de Internado", published in Spain 
every four years. 
(6) This was due to the fact that, for example, the first 
Survey, but not the third, includes those expenditure 
items on disaggregated bases for clinical and laboratory 
inputs; the second, and not the third - includes the 
specific components of the manpower wage bill; the third 
and not the first, presents the figures in a more 
homogeneous or standard manner. 
(7) In order to validate a satisfactory adjustment for those 
exogenous aspects related to the provision of services, 
we need to assume that there are not unwanted effects between 
the planned and the available scope of services. This mono- 
thetic relation between actual and potential levels should 
be in fact proved rather than just assumed. 
(8) Alternatively, it was introduced ; &, Dummy variable accounting 
for whether or not the hospital had a complete refrigeration 
system (as the structural quality-proxy variable). 
(9) Data on provincial population under 15 and over 65 years, 
even when they were regarded as particularly relevant for 
the purposes of our analysis, acenoiavailable. Data referring 
to the age of the patients can be taken in Spain only partly 
from the hospital morbidity statistics. 
(10) From "Encuesta sobre Morbilidad Hospitalaria". This Report 
is published every four years. Since the last data avail- 
able for those indicators are referred to 1976, we will need 
to assume that their relative imJrtance for cross-sectional 
studies has not varied very muchYrespect to 1979. 
(11) As in (vi), all these data refer to 1976, last year 
available. 
(12) A more detailed analysis can be performed here with the 
utilization of data on the number of beds, patients, patient- 
days and outpatient visits per specialties. This is, in 
relation to Internal Medicine and Medical Specialties; 
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General Surgery and Surgical Specialties: Obstetrics; 
Gynaecology; Psychiatry; Paediatrics (New-borns' units, 
General Medicine and Surgery); Intensive care; Rehabilitation; 
Tuberculosis and 'others'. Due to the ultimate reference 
of most of these figures to the actual use of the existing 
facilities, it was thought that their utilization was not 
convenient for our purposes. 
(13) Ideally, we should measure all these values as average figures 
over a certain number of years, in order to get a more accurate 
structural measure independent of any fortuitous practice. 
This was not possible, however, in our case due to lack of 
data. 
(14) The variables selected in (ix) were chosen with the help of 
two physicians. Although it was recommended, the inclusion 
of the extent of the services within 24 hours coverage in the 
Casualties Departments - as considered in some systems of 
Hospital Accrediation - was not possible as no published in- 
formation of this nature was available. 
Other variables can be added to achieve the same objective. 
For instance, with regard to whether an "organ bank" exists, 
if nuclear medicine, plastic surgery, level of radium-therapy, 
etc. is provided. As a whole, they were thought not to add 
very much to what it was already collected by the included 
variables. 
(15) Hierarchical cluster techniques have the general disadvantages 
of containing no provision for the reallocation of entities 
which may have been poorly classified at an early stage of the 
analysis. 
(16) No specific treatment was, however, applied to tackle the problem 
of the bias towards finding spherical clusters. This is a common 
problem to most of the clustering techniques. No definitive 
procedure exists to deal with the problem of imposing, without 
empirical grounds, a particular shape on the structure of data. 
(17) An additional problem could arise from the potential bias 
introduced by the group size. This bias appears when two 
groups fused at a given stage are very different with respect 
to size. The centroid of the small group under a cluster 
spherical shape can result that is very close to that of the 
large group, and even perhaps, remaining out of the group. 
However, and contrary to what happened before, median 
cluster analysis can be specifically used for dealing with 
the problem, since this method makes the clustering strategy 
dependent on the group size. 
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(18) See Klastorin, Watts and Trivedi: "A Study of the Classification 
of Hospitals tor Prospective Reimbursement", prepared for by 
Health Care Financing Administrations Report nQ. 10, DHEW, 
Washington. Seattle U. S. Department of Commerce. 
National Technical Information Service. Jan. 1978. 
(19) For most of the cost and functional variables, figures from 
1977 to 1981 were available. However, for "structural" and 
"quality" related variables (basic factors for our purposes of 
cluster analysis) and for the specialty case-mix vector (number 
of cases, of patient days and number of beds devoted) only figures 
for 1979 were available. With regard to this data already 
available, we selected the measure of similarity or distance 
which suited mostlthe data. HIERARCHY performed the corresponding 
fu sions according to the prior specified method (median, 
nearest neighbourhood, group average, Ward's method etc. ). 
Finally, procedure RESULT printed the overall ouput in the form 
of classification arrays and PLINK produced the corresponding 
plots. 
(20) In fact, this is the basis of most of the existing hospital 
classifications. For instance, in Great Britain, Acute 
hospitals are split according to the number of beds: less than 
50 beds, between 51 and 100,101 and 300 and over 300 beds. 
The teaching status attribute has also been commonly considered 
relevant in the literature, being incorporated in the estimation 
exercises of hospital cost functions. However, it has to be 
noted that when it is really the case that two groups of 
hospitals have different 'outputs', it is clearly unsatisfactory 
to pool the two groups and account for the apparent difference 
between them by inserting a dummy variable in the regression 
analysis. 9h This point is expounded'vlater in the text. 
(21) The third edition of David Wishart's version of CLUSTAN 
has been used, mainly through the conversational command 
generator CLUSCO. Procedure FILE was performed for the 
standarisation of the raw data, product moment correlation and 
principal component analysis. The similarity and distance 
matrix was constructed by CORREL. A maximum of three (i. e. size 
brackets) and a minimum of two groups (i. e. regarding the existence 
of a certain binary attribute) were requested in such a way that 
they could be used thereafter for further regression analysis 
(this is, having to keep hence some minimum degree of freedom). 
(22) The MDS (X) package was not, at that moment, in operation in York. 
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(23) A spanning tree results from joining the n points (individuals) 
in ap dimensional space (numerical variables) by straight 
lines such that: 
ti) none of the lines form a closed loop; 
(ii) each point is visited by at least one line; and 
(iii) the resulting collection of lines is connected 
(that is, there is a path which possibly passes through a 
number of intermediate points, from one point to any other 
point). 
The 'minimum sparlning tree' is that in which the sum of the 
length of the lines which comprises it is minimized. This 
provides some evidence about the nature of the many dimensional 
scatter: Two individuals who appear close together in the two 
dimensional representation of a principal component analysis 
plot, may, in fact, be some distance from each other. This 
will be indicated by the fact that the minimum spanning tree 
does not link them directly. 
A'dendogram'is the representation of a hierarchical cluster in 
which the vertical scale of the diagram shows decreasing levels 
of similarity (If this is the measure selected) as one moves 
from downwards to upwards. The coefficient gives the 
similarity levels, say, to which each cluster fuses. (Cooper 
and Weekes, 1983) 
(24) DIVIDE is a procedure for association analysis, which can be 
used only for binary data. It consists of the division of a 
set of data, depending on whether the units possess some 
specified attributes. On the other hand, RELOCATE proceeds 
from an initial classification from which it reconsiders each 
identity in turn for reassignment to another cluster, with 
this taking place if it causes an increase (or a decrease 
in the case of minimization) in the criterion measure 
selected in advance. The procedure continues until no 
further relocation of a single entity causes any improvement. 
(25) They are(i)the case 33 - which is an hospital with 400 licenced 
beds but with only 130 beds available (this has been the case or 
some time), (i, ) the observation 34 - which is a 403 hospital beds 
not yet in full operation- (týý) the observations 27 and 28 
(with no clear explanation). 
(26) These are, (1) hospital no. 16 - which is grouped in the 
National Catalogue within a different category to that of 
the "provincial level", given its extent of care - and() 
na. 19 - without apparent reasons. 
(27) This is the hospital located in the Canary Islands, which, 
for obvious reasons, must supply a more self-contained set 
of inpatient care. 
- 229 - 
(28) The direct validation of this test consists in reality 
of repeating the analysis, after deleting a small number 
of variables. If this does not greatly alter the clusters 
found, those clusters can in fact be thought as "real" and 
not merely artifacts of the particular technique used. 
(29) We ran for this objective the iterative package (1980- 
version) of STATPACK, and we used the histograms produced 
for visualizing the distributions. The assumption that 
the elements of the population were distributed by a multi- 
variate normal density function is required for our 
parametric tests of statistical validity (t and t ratios). 
(30) For example, suppose that the criterion of similarity 
between X and any other cluster Q is given by S (Q, X). 
If S(Q, X) exceeds, say, S(P, X), the method moves X from 
cluster P to cluster Q. The centroids of clusters 
P and Q are recomputed to account for this change at 
the time that the switch occurs. The relocation phase 
is repeated to obtain a local optimum for (k-1) clusters 
and the fusion phase re-starts to yield k-2 clusters. 
(31) In fact, for the initial equation in which total costs appear 
as the dependent variable and just hospital size an flow of cases 
per bed as the explanatory variables, the application of the 
Goldfield and Quandt test gave an F calculated value of 
3.160. Consequently, at the 95% interval of confidence we 
could reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity (3.160 > 
F(0.05; 16,16) = 2.34). 
The application of the test for the average cost per 
case value for the same simple equation gave an F value inferior 
to the critical one at the conventional levels of significance. 
This was, 1.2932< F(0.01; 17,17)=3.28 and < F(0.05; 17,17)=2.30. 
Therefore, we could not reject for this modified equation the 
null hypothesis of homoskedastic disturbances. 
(32) From a simple regression analysis point of view, the case-mix 
vector adds 23% to the variance of the dependent variable 
already explained by the rest of variables, as seen from the 
improvement in the R2 statistics for the goodness of the fit. 
The utilization of the percentage figures in the total 
number of cases instead of the absolute ones for the specialty 
case-mix vector was due to the fact that there exists empirical 
evidence about the collinearities of "size" and other institut- 
ional and characteristic variables with respect to the specialty 
case-mix vector (absolute figures). For instance, with regard 
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to size, as measured by the number of beds available, 
these were the correlation coefficients: 
BA-MIEC= 0.694 
-CGEC= 0.730 
-OBSC= 0.650 
-GINC= 0.625 
BA-PENEC = 0.458 
-PEMEC = 0.476 
-CUIC = 0.564 
-OTRC = 0.259 
However, in using these variables in percentage terms, 
the correlation coefficients were: 
BA-MIECST e -0.148 BA-CGECST = -0.072 BA-OBGIST = 0.027 
BA-OTRCST = 0.104 BA-CUICST = 0.322 
(33) A conveniently modified 'bed-occupancy rate' benchmark could 
be also considered for these purposes. This modification 
could consist of the definition of a minimum occupational target 
- or some average one - from which the number of cases 
corresponding to each hospital size could be derived. This 
figure would be used then to adjust the average cost amount 
for purposes of performance evaluation. This system has, 
obviously, to allow for a controlled reduction in the number 
of beds according to a planning policy which could enable 
hospitals to face thereafter, in this manner, recurrent 
problems of overspending. 
An approach of this type has been used in the New York 
formula-based Prospective Reimbursement System (1970). In 
this way, the New York Reimbursement formula set up certain 
lower limits for the bed occupancy rate variable (i. e. 60% 
for Maternity, 70% for Paediatrics and 80% for Medical and 
Surgical departments). Hospitals above these limits were 
reimbursed according to their actual number of patient-days 
(since this was, in that case, the reimbursing rate used). 
Hospitals below those percentages were reimbursed according 
to the number of days corresponding to that occupancy rate 
at the limit. 
(34) In fact, after ordering the sample according to hospital size, 
as measured by the number of beds, we estimated a subsample 
of smaller hospital size (postulated as having lower variance) 
and a sample with larger hospital size(and higher variance 
group), leaving 20% of the observations between both subgroups 
our of the analysis. We then performed the Goldfdtd - and 
Quandt test in the way specified in Subappendix one. 
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(35) Given the small number of observations in each specific 
Subsample and the total number of variables included in 
the regression, we could not test specifically for 
heteroskedasticity within each subsample, because of 
the lack of the appropriate degreesof freedom. 
(36) This effect was partly visualized by drawing 
the bed size and the throughput variables, alternatively, 
against the dependent variable in a two dimensional 
space. (See Graphs Appendix I). 
(37) In this sense, Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1976) - page 161 - 
point out that this is a point of choice. "A single 
equation regression model can have significant t 
statistics and a high R2 and still forecast very badly. 
(... ) Good forecasts, on the other hand, may come from 
regression models which have relatively low R2's and only 
one or more significant regression coefficients. 
This may happen because there is little variation in the 
dependent variable, so that although it is not being 
explained well by the model, it is easy to forecast". 
See also in this subject Cox and Snell (1974), 'The Choice 
of Variables in Observational Studies', Applied Statistics. 
no. 23, no. 1 page 51. 
(38) These were some of the correlation coefficients calculated: 
(i) Appendicectomy: DVLH- LOS = -0.568; DVLH- AC =-0.132; DVLH- ACPD 
= 0.467. 
(Yi) Caesarean operation: DVLH- LOS = -0.350; DVLH- AC =0.597; 
DVLH- ACPD = 0.731. 
(iii) Phimosis: DVLH- LOS = -0.574; DVLH- AC= 0.098; DVLH-ACPD 
= 0.483. 
(iv) Hysterectomy: DVLH- LOS =- 0.498; DVLH- AC = 0.454; DVLH- ACPD 
= 0.734. 
(v) D and C (post abortion) DVLH - LOS = -0.293; DVLH-AC=0.129; DVLH- ACPD = 0.551. 
(vi) Normal child delivery: DVLH -LOS = -0.423; D VLH- AC_ 0.642; DVLH- ACPD = 0.748. 
(vii) All the cases: DVLH- LOS = -0.269; DVLH-AC = 0.046; DVLH- ACPD 
= 0.508. 
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A dendogram is the representation of a hierarchical cluster in which 
the vertical scale of the diagram shows decreasing levels of similarity 
(if this is the measure selected) as one moves from downwards to upwards. 
The dendogram below shows the result of clustering 59 continuous 
variables, refering structural, cost-related and quality proxies of 
hospital units. 
Note that "size" proves to be relevant. (Numbers below the dendogram 
involve the ordering of the hospitals according to number of beds). The 
first cluster groups mostly hospitals between 100 and 320 beds. The second 
one comprises hospitals between 320 and 500. A third cluster may be also 
pointed out, grouping the six largest hospitals. 
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Plot of the first against the second principle component factors as 
derived from the cluster exercise pointed out in A 1. 
The spanning tree is the result from joining the n points in ap 
dimensional space by straight lines (see footnote 23) 
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Minimum Spanning Tree derived from the clusters performed in A 1. 
It results from the minimimization of the sum of length of the lines, 
and it provides some evidence about the nature of the p dimensional 
scatter (see footnote 23). 
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The dendogram below (see footnote 23) shows the result of clustering 29 
continuous variables. This second set of variables excludes any cost- 
related observation, since they may reflect factual differencies in 
inpatient care provision making for 'unlegitimate' differences in 
hospital output. 
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Note that at least three clusters can be considered. 
The ratio of inpatient to outpatient cases (and mainly whether the hospital 
prDvides outpatient services) and the proportion of higher medical 'hierarchies' 
övEr, the total number of physicians appear as the two best classification 
variables for that grouping. 
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Plot of the first principal component factor against the second one, and 
minimum spanning tree as derived from the former cluster (A 4). (See 
footnote 23). 
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Minimum Spanning Tree (see footnote 23) of the three clusters, as 
plotted in A 5. 
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The dendogram below results from applying hierarchical procedures-. 
on 7 selected variables, taken as quality-proxies for hospital output. 
The result seems to suggest that, f rom the use of this information, 
a single overall cluster can be considered. 
I11 
N -ý 
BBG 
CD N) 
m U1 
N 00 
f -' N WW 
WV' o 
CD 
V, 
CC) WN --26 
1IJII 
9 
2 
s 
10 
1i 
13 
20 
43 
22 
37 
34 
24 
42 
33 - ----, 36 
3 
a 
12 
18 
7 
16 
40 
21 
29 
23 
35 
15 
19 
17 
27 
44 
5 
11 
28 
25 
36 
50 
39 
45 
8 
26 
32 
41 
30 
46 
ä 
44 
- 240 - 
7' 
-Aý. - 
Plot of the two first principal components, accounting for 52% of 
the cluster variance (see footnote 23), from the former cluster 
exercise A 7. 
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Minimum Spanning Tree (see footnote 23) corresponding to A 7. 
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-A9. - 
Dendogram (see footnote 23) corresponding to 9 continuous variables finally 
selected as a result of restricting information to those variables which were 
1 vant for definin homogeneity of hospital outputs. 
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Note that two clusters appear, with the teaching status and the relative 
importance of the outpatient work-load on inpatient activity as the two 
diagnostic variables. 
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Plot of the two principal components and spanning tree (see footnote 23) 
corresponding to the result of clustering the 9 continuous variables 
finally selected. 
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-A 11. - 
Minimum Spanning tree (see footnote 23) pointing out the two main 
clusters which appear from the cluster exercise of A 9. 
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-L 12. - 
The Dendogram below (see footnote 23) shows the result of applying 
hierarchical procedures on the selected set of binary variables. 
The results seem to support the grouping of observations into two 
main clusters according to the presence or absence of the Dummy variable 
for the 'medical teaching' status. 
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Dendogram corresponding to a second set of binary variables including 
the transformation of those continuous variables judged as relevant 
in the previous grouping exercises. (See footnote 23). 
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FULL SET OF BINARY VARIABLES FINALLY SELECTED 
This result is similar to the former one, validating the relevance of the 
'teaching status' as the 'est 'classificatory' variable in grouping 
Subsamples with higher internal homogeneity in terms of hospital output 
(in the way approached by the variables selected). 
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- GRAP"5 - 
The Graph below plots total operating cost against hospital size (number 
of beds) for the ninety observations initially selected. 
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The Graph below plots total operating cost against hospital size 
(number of beds) for the fifty hospitals finally selected. 
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The Graph below plots total operating costs against total hospital 
manpower for the sample of fifty hosp itals. 
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The Graph plots the average cost per case against hospital size 
for our sample of fifty observations. 
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The Graph below plots the average cost per case against the flow 
of cases per bed year for our sample of fifty hospitals. 
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This Graph plots the residuals from our estimation exercise against 
the hospital number of beds. No pattern can be derived unambiguously 
for the overall sample. 
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elm 
This Graph is identical to the former one but it only refers to the 
subsample of teaching hospitals. Note that a positive association 
seems to be suggested between 'residuals' and hospital size. 
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Ditto, for the Subsample of non-teaching hospitals. 
Note that the pattern suggested from the former Graph seems to 
vanish. 
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APPENDIX V. 2, 
A research on hospital economies of scale 
The question of whether economies of scale could be reached 
from alternative variations in the hospital capacity has attracted 
the attention of the literature on hospital costs. The search for 
a turning point from the results of the estimation of a quadratic 
'U-shaped' cost function involves conventionally in setting equal 
to zero the first derivative, and checking for a positive value for 
the second derivative, given the estimated parameters of the regression 
equation. 
Figure 1-A 
LRAC z SRAC = short run average 
Average SRAC4 SRQcfl 5RACAC cost. 
cost 1 
LRAC = Long run average 
sRAý. cost function. 
At 
Optimum plant and scale economies 
----------------- 
With respect to the former approach, some points need to be 
emphasized: 
(i) In principle, the use of the standard multiple regression techniques 
comes to determine the parameters of the empirical cost (production) 
function so that the deviations of the actual from the predicted values 
tend to sum to zero. It follows that one obtains (at best) an average 
cost function, instead of the locus of a technically efficient input- 
output combination. Its results are, therefore, a simple statistical 
summary of the 'cost-experience' of the hospitals in the sample. 
The predicitions about "optimal size" can be then related just to this_ 
'experience'. 
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(ii) It has to be noted that, in reality, economies of scale are 
studied commonly with regard to the signs and coefficients of a 
quadratic function in which hospital size, approached by the number 
of beds, is regressed on average costs. That is, we are looking 
at the impact, in the long run, of hospital capacity changes on 
costs, assuming that the rest of variables remain constant. Therefore, 
we have to fully account for these latter factors, since some 
evidence seems to exist in the literature that the 'bed occupancy 
rate' is positively related to the size of the hospitals, that 
larger hospitals commonly offer a greater variety of services, keep 
their patients longer and have a higher throughput, at the same time 
as they offer medical training programs. Otherwise, if the claim 
that larger hospitals have to tackle a more complex output is 
substantiated, this may imply that the right hand side of the 
average cost per unit of output has a more steeper U shape once 
reached a certain minimum size (i. e. LRAC2 with respect to LRAC1 
in figure 1A), and then it may result in invalidating the estim- 
ation procedure. 
(iii) Irl, addition, the operation at full capacity with an adequate 
size on the minimum of an observed average cost curve may not 
necessarily mean "full efficiency", because, for instance, in- 
efficiency in actual resource management may prevent the hospital 
from operating at the lowest possible cost level. This can be seen 
in the case of A' of figure 1-A. 
As a result, the examination of efficiency aspects of hospital 
operation from the single point of view of scale economies offers in 
itself some caveats. 
In addition, for some cases, even when no evidence may appear 
of a "turning point" on the long run average cost curve, we cannot 
rule out categorically a 'U-shaped' cost curve for hospitals of all 
sizes. TIi s may be due to the fact that after a certain hospital size, 
the presence of managerial diseconomies, and/or a decreasing labour 
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efficiency, may violate the "ceteris paribus" assumption which 
supports the type of regression analysis performed. In this way, 
those factors may indeed outweight the economies which would stem 
otherwise from the postulated optimal size of the hospital. 
Bearing these points in mind, we can proceed now to examine 
the presence of scale economies for Spanish General Acute Hospitals. 
As explained in the Chapter, we will take "size" as the plant 
scale variable, such as defined by the number of beds in hospital. 
In addition, we will introduce the output-proxy variable, as 
reflected from the use of the total number of patient-days and the 
number of cases (with respect to the average cost per patient-day 
and per-case respectively), as the output scale variable. 
For the overall 90 observations (ranging from 50 to 1050 beds), 
we run an initial regression with number of beds as the independent 
variable and cost per patient-day as the dependent one. These were 
the results of this sample estimation. 
(values in pesetas): 
CE = 10397.6 - 9.85 BA + 0.0084 BA2 (17.253 (-2.689) (1.87) 
R2 = 0.09 F(2.87) = 5.174 
Thus, the coefficients of the estimate show the expected signs 
for the existence of scale economies. The 'U shape' appeared for 
all the subsamples specified according to the geographical criteria 
with a turning point around the 586 beds. 
Although the F test enable us to reject the null hypothesis of 
zero estimated coefficients, the low value of the adjusted R2 suggest 
that, by omitting other variables in the equation, we left unexplained 
the major part of the variation of the changes in the dependent 
variable. 
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We tested for the structural stability of the systematic part 
of the regression through the CHOW's test (see subappendix 1), and for 
the specified functional form of the equation formulated through 
the RAMSEY's modified RESET test, by introducing the square value 
of the predicted dependent variable as an additional independent 
variable in the initial equation. (*) 
In addition, we tested against the violation of the 'homoskedastic' 
assumption through the Goldfeld and Quandt test, according to certain 
initial expectations. These were, that the varience of the 
disturbances among the different subsamples decreased once we moved 
from the first Subsample - for which the observations included a 
larger variation in hospital size - to the third one - with a lower 
range. Arbitrarily, we left out in the middle 20% of the observations 
in order to get an appropriate power for the test. This exclusion 
affected most of the second and more homogeneous subsample. (**) 
The use of the average cost per case as the dependent variable 
gave some weaker results. Although the parameters appeared again 
with the expected signs, the value of the adjusted R2 was still rather 
(*) - The t statistic for the squared value of the predicted 
endogenous variable was 0.945. The calculated value for the 
F statistic was 0.606 which was inferior to 3.05, or critical 
value for F(0.05; 2,86). 
In both cases, these results allowed for the acceptance of the 
null hypothesis such as specified. 
(**) - As we explain in the chapter, we later tested more 
appropriately for heteroskedasticity by ordering our second 
selected sample by the number of beds, thereby validating 
this test for the hypothesis of homoskedastic disturbances. 
For this second exercise, F showed a value equal to 1.448 which 
was inferior to the critical value of F(0.05; 33,33) 1.739. 
We could not reject, then, the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. 
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low. Moreover, we could not reject the hypothesis of a null 
coefficient vector irk the regression esiiw, at i on . 
(* ) 
Finally, although there existed an obvious risk of mis- 
specification (**), we used some measure of output as the proxy- 
variable for the hospital scale. 
We took first the cost per patient day ( CE ) as the dependent 
varld ble, on which we regressed the total number of patient-days 
( TE ) as the explanatory variable. These were the results 
(values in pesetas): 
CE = 10514.2 - 0.0386 TE + 0.00000012 TE2 (19.73) (-3.261) (2.225) 
with R2 = 0.14 and F(2,87) = 7.93 (>F*(99; 2,87)--. e4.95) 
As was the case before, the 'U shape' appears again unambiguously, 
with a turning point around the 161,000 days. Some caveats can be 
expressed, however, about the exact amount of this figure, given 
the low adjusted R2 statistic - even when we could reject the null 
hypothesis of zero estimated coefficients at the 99% level of 
confidence. 
(*) - We could : r. ejeck . the null 
hypothesis for the presence 
of homoskedasticity, but'not- the hypothesis of an alternative 
functional form. Although the power of the RESET test is lower 
in presence of heteroskedastic disturbances, the t ratio for 
the square value of the predicted dependent variable was 2.497. 
(**) - Since a case-mix adjustment was not possible 
for the overall 
sample, we had to assume that there was no systematic influence 
of the case-mix on average costs. 
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The result of the test for the functional form allowed for the 
non-rejection of the already specified functional form, at the 
usual levels of significance. (*) In similar terms, the null hypothesis 
of structural stability across the two subsamples was not rejected. (**) 
We regressed thereafter on the average cost per case ( AC 
the number of cases (C). A similar 'U-shaped' short run cost 
function appeared with significant t- statistic values despite 
the low adjusted R2 for the equation. 
AC = 329,941 - 79.44 C+0.00032 C2 
(5.902) (-4.153) (4.146) 
R2 = 0.15 F (2,87) = 8.623 
(Values in pesetas) 
However, for this specified regression, problems of heteroskedasticity 
could be present according to the results of Goldfeld and Quandt's test 
(***). It did not pass either the test for the functional form not 
for structural stability, except for the second and more homogeneous Ohce 
subsample (****). (However, it has to be noticed\again that the 
power of these tests was already reduced by the , 
presence of 
(*) - The value of the t statistic for CE was 1.116. 
(**) - The values for the calculated F were 0.901,0.728 and 1.102 
for each of the subsamples considered; all of them result inferior 
to the critical value F(0.05; 2,86)-"- 3.65. 
(***) - The value of the F calculated was 65.04 
(>F (0.05; 33,33)' 
1.739). 
(****) - The value of the t ratio for 
ÄC2 
was 2.292 and the F calculated 
values for the Ramsey's modified Reset test were 16.67 and 15.91 for 
the first and third subsample (> F*(0.05; 2,86)-' 2.51) and 0.308 
for the second one (< F* (0.05; 2,86)-' 2.51). 
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heteroskedasticity. This is due to the lack of efficient properties 
of the OLS estimates. 
In_sum, the results pointed out above for the overall sample have to 
be taken with care. Theoretical and econometric difficulties prevent 
a clear-cut evidence of scale economies through the conventional 
regression estimation approach. In addition, lack of data availability 
does not allow for pursuing a more accurate adjustment. However, 
some evidence for economies of size seem to appear, particularly with 
regards to the pattern of the 'U-shaped' average cost function for 
the overall sample of 90 observations, which includes the largest range 
of variation in hospital size. This seems to be especially the case 
when the number of patient-days is the proxy-variable considered for 
the hospital-output scale. (Whether this is or not a good measure 
for the output capacity of the hospital has been already discussed in 
earlier sections of this chapter). 
For the second and final sample selected for increasing hospital 
---------------- 
output homogeneity according to some external factors of provision 
- sample which records a smaller range of variation in hospital size - 
and for the subsamples resulting from the clustering exercise, scale 
economies can be seen from the examination of equations (1'), (2'), 
(6') and (9') in table V. 6. 
The questions of functional forms has been already analysed 
and they will not be discussed further here. 
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The impact on costs of the utilization variables. 
Two lines of research have been followed with regard to the 
study of the impact on costs of the utilization variables: 
a) The first one considers the impact on the average cost per case 
of an extra day of a patient in hospital; 
b) The second line looks for the impact on total costs from 
increasing the number of cases treated in the hospital. 
We will examine first a). 
The study of a) responds to the question of whether the marginal 
rather than average cost per day provides a more accurate measure of 
changes in hospital utilization, as measured by the number of stays. 
(In fact, some indications seem to point out that`the pace of the 
average cost over time involves a sequential decrease as length of 
stay increases). 
The result of the estimation of the equation (. 1] indicates that 
for 1979, the average cost per patient day is above the marginal cost 
for the average LOS of the "sample" hospital. 
This is, a AC / LOS = 7358 ptas., a 82.3% of the average 
cost per patient day (8940 ptas. ). 
Diagramatically, this effect can be seen through the following 
figures: 
I 
Cost 
per 
case 
0 LÖS LOS 
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this being likely to be due to the following relationship: 
II 
Average 
cost per 
day 
0 
LOS 
(Note that for any particular stay, the average cost is shown in the 
graph by a ray from 0 up to the point of stay on the distribution, 
whereas the cost of an additional day, by the slope of the distribution 
at that point on the stay distribution). 
Therefore, as HURST (*) points out, average costs fall with stay, 
approaching marginal costs as stay increases. (In this sense, whereas 
average costs are not a close measure for marginal costs in an acute 
short-term hospital, they may be in long stay hospitals). 
Equation [13 also allows to calculate the effect on average cost 
per case of an increase, say, in the bed occupancy rate (BOR) - due 
to an increase in admissions per bed (FL) - holding constant the 
average length of stay (LOS), or resulting from variations in LOS, 
pushing down BOR, but holding FL constant. 
In fact, according to our results, if LOS increases by half a 
day and, as a result, occupancy goes up from 77.7 to 80.4%, holding 
FL constant, the average cost per case would raise according to: 
() - See J. W. HURST: "Saving hospital expenditure 
by reducing 
inpatient stay". HMSO, 1977. London 
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AC = 0.5x 7358 - 0.396x(80.4-77.7) = 2610 ptas. 
In similar terms, the effect on the average cost per case of an 
increase of BOR from 80 to 85%, due to an increase in admisions (FL), 
holding LOS constant, would involve a decrease of total costs 
amounting 317.700 ptas. 
TOC = -0.396 x(85-80)+ ý0.173)x 5x 365 (thousand ptas. ) 
(Note that, in this case, since we do not know the exact amount in the 
variation of FL, we infer its value from the relationship FL=(BOR/LOS)x 36c, 
taking into account the constancy of LOS). 
Equations [1) , 
(2) 
, 
[3) 
, imply different types of 
interpretations 
of marginal changes in utilization variables on the average cost per case. 
Thus, (2) has to be interpreted as the effect of an increase in FL, 
once we account for changes in BOR (this is, being accompanied by 
variations in LOS, since the number of bed days must remain constant) and 
(3) can be interpreted as the effect of an increase in FL with LOS 
constant (this is, through an increase in BOR). 
In sum, we can conclude that, in general, the use of the average cost 
per day of staying in hospital as the basis for estimating the likely 
magnitude of savings in hospital expenditure would overestimate the 
true marginal costs a 17.74$(this is the type of effect indicated in 
figures I and II). 
The line b) of analysis tries to answer the question of whether actual 
average costs could be reduced by the increase of the admission rates, 
in making a better use of the hospital capacity and resources available. 
The short run analysis is based on the specification of the following 
equation: 
Total Cost = constant +PNurber of beds +ý,, Nutber of cases + 
ß-, Case-mix adjustment 
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The first derivative of total costs with respect to the number 
of cases (ft) gives us the marginal cost of treating an extra case 
with a given number of beds. This can be done in two ways: 
a) By increasing the percentage occupancy of the available number of 
beds (resulting in an increase in BOR, holding LOS constant, e. g. 
'filling spare capacity'), or 
b) by increasing the number of cases treated witha=given number of 
patient days (decreasing the average duration of stay per case, 
holding BOR constant). 
For deriving the a) type of result, our empirical estimation 
should account for the LOS variable if efficiency implications have 
to be derived from changes in hospital utilization. In the case of 
b) the specification can be stated as in (2'] . 
As it can be seen from comparing [21 and [3') , the marginal cost 
per case of a new admission represents a higher value in 
[2'] than in 
t3') 
, as it could be expected 
from an efficient allocation point of 
view. This last marginal cost represents a 93% of the actual average 
cost per case. Therefore, we can conclude from this result that 
average costs overstate slightly the marginal costs per case treated. 
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SUBAPPENDIX0NE 
The tests referred here are linked to two crucial assumptions 
in an Ordinary Least Squares type of estimation. They are: 
(i) The absence of heteroskedasticity. That is, that the 
variance of the disturbances in the regression does not 
vary among the observations, and hence OLS estimators are 
the best linear unbiased estimators, being efficient in 
small and large samples. 
(ii)The absence of misspecification in the systematic part 
of the functional form and/or with regard to the 
structural stability of the model specified for the 
overall sample. 
(i) - We have seen in this Chapter that there are reasons for 
expecting the violation of the assumption made in (i) in a cross- 
section analysis, and, Particularly, with respect to the estimation 
of the total cost function. 
We test for the presence of heteroskedastic disturbances following 
the Goldf0 d and Quandt's test. 
This test requires the calculation of the ratio between the squared 
sum of errors between the first and third subsample, once we have made 
explicit our hypothesis about the order in the variance of the 
disturbances and we have left out some observations in the middle 
(sd4!, 20% of the observations of the sample), in order to get an appropriate 
power for the test(*). 
(*) - In fact, the power of the test depends on the value of these f 
observations. For a very large f it will be small. On the other hand, 
as f is reduced, the residual variance will likely move close together 
and this will tend to offset the added power that comes from the extra 
observations. 
This test has otherwise the problem that because no restrictions are 
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This is, 
SSE (higher variance sample) 
F= rv F*((n-f-2k)/2) , 
(n-f-2k)/2) 
SSE (lower variance sample) 
where n represents the total number of observations; f, the number of observations considered as the central values; 
1, the number of parameters estimated; 
SSE, the Error sum of squares. 
Afterwards, the sample value of F is compared to its critical value. 
The null hypothesis of the presence of homoskedasticity will be rejected 
if the value of the F calculated is largely greater than the critical 
value. 
(ii) - The test used in this thesis for checking each of the specified 
functional forms is the RAMSEY's modified RESET test. 
This test consists of setting up a fitted value for the dependent 
variable which has to appear thereafter as a separate independent 
variable in its second or higher degree (depending on which is the 
alternative form otherwise thoug it as more acceptable). If the value 
of the t ratio for this new variable proves to be insignificant at 
the conventional levels of significance for a certain interval of 
confidence, we can accept the original functional form; otherwise 
we can reject it. 
Given the characteristics of the test, it will require an initial 
check for the presence of heteroskedasticity, since, if this is 
the case, the power of the test will be minorated. 
- Finally, in order to detect any potential structural change in the 
(... ) made on the regression parameters, as well aOrsýtthe error variances, 
in each of the two regressions run, statistical power is lost. 
A more powerful test would then take into account the information 
that the regression parameters are identical for both sets of data 
and that only the error variance has changed. 
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specified regression equation or, more in general, the structural 
stability of the systematic part of the equation, well3 w- useäthe 
CHOWttest. 
As it is known, infabsence of structural stability Ordinary 
Least Squares will provide biased and inconsistent estimators. 
For purposes of the CHOW's test, the overall sample is 
split according to the postulated factor which is though to 
attempt aga. i. nst the structural stability of the model. If, for 
example, two groups can be suggested, we need to calculate the Error 
Sum of Squares for each of the groups i (ESS1) for the n1 observations, 
say, ESS2 for the n2 observations (being n1 + n2 = n), and ESS0 
for the total number n of observations. 
The statistic is then calculated as: 
F= 
ESS0 - (ESS 1+ ESS2) n- 2k 
(ESS 1- ESS2) 
k ,v 
F*(k, n-2k), 
where k is the number of coefficients in the model. 
If the F sample value is greater than the critical value of F 
*with 
(k, n-2k) degrees of freedom, we can reject the hypothesis of a stable 
structure for the n observations and the subsample of nT observations 
considered. If it is less than that value, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis. 
This test is also affected by the presence of heteroskedasticity, 
since the F statistic will be calculated in this case on the basis of 
inefficient estimators even for large samples. 
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SUBAPPENDIXTW0 
Other alternatives of hospital grouping were also considered, 
1- The actual Spanish system of Hospital Classification (or "Catälogo _ 
Nacional de Hospitales") - 1980. This system is based on cross-tabulation 
techniques, using some variables in pre-determined discrete intervals in 
order to group all the hospitals (public and private) in the following 
terms: 
-Local, Provincial - or District - and Regional Hospitals. 
-Level of health care (A, B, C). 
-In functional terms as: General, Surgical, Maternities, Psychiatric, 
Paediatric and 'Other' hospitals. 
-Status and ownership (Central or Local Public Administration, 
'Institutional' Administration, private-for-profit and private- 
for-non-profit). 
Since our sample is in itself the result of an initial scrutiny among 
all the existing hospital units, we came to identify a 90% of the 
observations within the category of 'District Hospitals', 'Generals' in 
the functional sense, belonging to the Central Public Sector and with 
'A' levels of health care provision. 
In relation to the 'A', 'B', 'C' levels of health care provision, the 
"National Catalogue of Hospitals" follows again a cross-tabulation 
technique, without any additional validation of the size brackets used 
for the variables considered. These were the selected variables and 
their value intervals chosen for classification purposes: 
-the number of medical and ancillary personnel per bed: 
intervals of 1.0,1.20 and 1.40. 
-regarding some services judged as relevant for the 
definition of the levels of health care, and mainly 
those referred to the existence of medical heart 
services, digestive system, nephrology, rheumatology, 
hematology, premature new-borns unit, levels of 
radiotherapy, and the existence of laboratory services 
dealing with microbiology, biochemistry, hematology 
and pathological anatomy. 
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2. - The present system of Hospital's - 
accreditation 
- 
in 
- 
Spain. 
--------------- 
The system is commonly applied to private hospitals which provide 
services on behalf of the public sector, in order to determine the 
appropriate 'per diem'rates to be reimbursed. 
In principle, after 1980 they should be based on similar criteria 
to those stated for the "Cat&lcgo". These are, the extent of the 
provision, function and level of the inpatient care provided. 
But in reality, a special body of "Auditors" is encharged with 
monitoring those aspects so that some variations may exist between 
the two sources. 
3. - Finally, and mainly for planning purposes and scrutiny of the by 2NSA LVD 
existing manpower requests, hospitals are classifiedfaccording to 
bed size and other throughput measures of personnel per bed. These 
are the figures used at present: 
ý. 
Physicians 
Nurses 
Aux iliars 
-subtotal (1) 
up to 250 
0.23 
0.45 
0.40 
Clerks 
Ancillary workers 
(qualified) 
Ancillary workers 
(unqualified) 
-Subtotal (2) 
-Total personnel 
Junior doctors 
1.08 
0.18 
0.09 
0.33 
0.61 
1.68 
250-500 
0.25 
0.50 
0.43 
1.18 
0.19 
0.09 
0.34 
0.62 
1.80 
0.05 
500-1000 
0.28 
0.55 
0.45 
1.28 
0.19 
0.09 
0.34 
0.63 
1.90 
0.10 
>, 1000 
0.30 
0.58 
0.48 
1.36 
0.20 
0.10 
0.34 
0.64 
2.00 
0.10 
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CODE of the variables used. 
AC = Average cost per case. DVTD = Dummy variable per teaching 
FL = Flow of cases per number 
of beds available. 
LOS = Average length of stay. 
BA = Number of beds available. 
BOR = Bed occupancy rate. 
CE = Average cost per patient-day 
C= Total number of cases. 
TE = Total number of hospital 
patient-days. 
TC = Total costs. 
MIEC = 'Internal Medicine' and 
medical specialties. Number 
of cases. 
MIECST = idem, but in percentage 
terms over the hospital number 
of cases. 
doctors. 
DVCS = Dummy variable for the provi- 
sinn of outpatient care in 
the hospital. 
DVHP = Dummy variable equal to one 
if the proportion of physicians 
with the higher hierarchical 
positions over the total number 
of physicians in the hospital 
was greater than the sample 
average; 0 otherwise. 
DVNCET = Idem as before, but for the 
proportion of outpatients over 
the number of inpatient cases 
treated in the hospital. 
CGEC = General Surgery and surgical specialties . Number of cases. 
CGECST = idem, but in percentage terms over the total number or cases. 
OBGINC = Obstetric and Ginaecology cases . Absolute figures. 
OBGIST = idem, but in percentage terms over the number of cases. 
PED = Paediatrics (New borns, internal medicine and surgery): no. of cases. 
PECST = idem, but in relative terms over the total number of cases. 
CUIC = Number of cases in the Intensive Care Units. Absolute figures. 
CUICST = idem, but as relative values in p Centage terms. 
OTRC = "Other cases", as a residual category, in absolute figures. 
OTRCST = idem in percentage terms. 
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OVERALL SAMPLE OF SPANISH PUBLIC HOSPITALS 
('HEALTH RESIDENCES'. 1979) 
1 Valdepenas (C. Real) 'G. Ortega'. NT 
2 Mahon. (Baleares) 'V. Montetoro'. NT 
3 Mieres (Oviedo). NT 
4 La Linea. (Cädiz). NT 
5 Palencia 'L. Ramirez' NT 
6 Teruel 'Obispo Polanco'. NT 
7 Alcoy (Alicante) 'V. Lirios' NT 
8 Cuenca 'V. Luz'. NT 
9 Puertollanco (C,, Real) 'Sta. Barbara'. NT 
10 D. Benito-Villanueva (Babajoz) NT 
11 Tortosa (Tarragona) 'V. de la Cinta'. T 
12 Guadalajara 'F. P. Rivera'. T 
13 Talavera Reina (Toledo) 'N. S. Prado'. T 
14 Plasencia (Caceres) 'V. Puerto'. NT 
15 Lerida 'Gral. Moscardd'. NT 
16 Cartagena (Murcia) 'N. S. Rossell'. T 
17 Ubeda (Jaen) IS. J. de la Cruz'. NT 
18 Ponferrada (Ledn) 'V. Camino'. NT 
19 Gerona 'Gral. Alvarez Castro'. T 
20 Huesca 'San Jorge'. NT 
21 Riano-Langreo (Oviedo) 'N. S. Rosario'. NT 
22 El Ferrol (Coruna) 'Arq. Marcide'. T 
23 Aviles (Oviedo) IS. Agustin'. NT 
24 Algeciras (Cadiz) 'Punta Europa'. NT 
25 Pontevedra. 'Montecelo'. T 
26 Lugo 'Hnos. Pedrosa'. NT 
27 Segovia 'Licinio de la Fuente'. T 
28 Ciudad Real 'Ntra. S. Alarcos'. NT 
29 Jerez (Cadiz) 'Gral. Pr. Rivera'. T 
31 Tarragona 'Juan XXIII' T 
32 Leon 'Virgen Blanca'. T 
33 Almeria 'Virgen del Mar' NT 
34 Zamora 'R. Ledesma Ramos'. NT 
36 Caceres 'S. P. Alcäntara' T 
35 Avila 'Virgen Sonsoles'. T 
37 Albacete 'Perpetuo Socorro'. T 
38 Logrono 'A. Coello Cuadrado! T 
39 Salamanca. 'Virgen Vega' T 
40 Valencia 'Gral. Sanjurjo'. T 
41 Las Palmas 'N. S. del Pino'. T 
42 Castellon. 'N. S. Sagr. CorazOn'. T 
43 Elche (Alicante) NT 
44 Gijon (Oviedo) 'J. Gomez Sabugo'. NT 
45 Huelva 'Manuel Lois'. T 
46 Vigo 'Almirante Vierna'. T 
47 Valladolid 'Onesimo Redondo'. T 
48 Alava 'Ortiz Zärate'. T 
49 Pamplona (Navarra) 'V. Camino'. T 
50 Toledo 'Virgen Salud'. T 
51 Burgos 'Gral. Yague'. T 
T= Teaching hospitals 
NT = Non-Teaching hospitals 
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CHAPTER VI CONCLUSION 
6.1 CONCLUSION 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
Conclusion 
Regarding the ultimate aims of this thesis and the particular 
intents advanced in the introduction to this research, and completing 
those partial conclusions already put forward at the end of each 
Chapter, the following conclusion can be now outlined. To this 
can be referred, therefore, the contribution of this thesis: 
(i) If health care targets are to be achieved in an age of financial 
restraint - as in Spain and in some other European countries at 
present - there exists the need to improve the efficiency with 
which resources are allocated in the health sector. 
(ii) The effort for a more cost-conscious management of resources, 
which is particularly recognized in the public hospital sector 
in Spain, requires a change in the present budgetary arrangements 
set up between the reimburser and the spending units, if efficiency- 
promoting incentives are to be generated. 
(iii) In addition, our analysis shows that an alternative budget 
policy needs to link, in some way, differentiated levels of 
reimbursement to the observed levels of differential 'p. erformance', 
instead of the application of across-the-board increases on 
individual hospital past expenses. 
(iv) This strategy needs to recognize, moreover, that an Agency type 
of relationship, rather than a hierarchically structured network, 
is the appropriate setting for monitoring and control of hospitals' 
operation, and that the allocation of global budgets and attribution 
of overall value responsibility are, consequently, more reallistic 
policies. 
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(v) In this context, a budget-based contract, prospectively advanced 
under verifiable conditions by both parties of the relation, 
with respect to the prior commitment of the resources available 
for distribution within the sector, can prove to be 'optimal' 
for our purpose; that is, capable of inserting incentives for 
the implementation of efficiency-guides in the internal allocation 
of resources and for improving hospital performance over time. 
(vi) The operationalisation in the Spanish context of a Prospective 
Revenue Allocation Policy (PRAP) of the former characteristics, 
need to be accompanied by some other institutional changes at 
some more disaggregated steps in the hospital decision-making 
process, in order to make those financial arrangements not only 
necessary but also sufficient conditions for a behavioural change. 
(vii) The specific design of PRAP for a selected sample of Spanish 
hospitals on the basis of the prediction of a 'relevant 
expenditure' line from a multiple regression analysis, enables us 
to point to some relevant factors for the study of hospital 
efficiency -such as the need to increase'within Subsample 
hospitals' homogeneity, and to undertake separate cost analysis 
according to those cluster attributes. 
(viii) Moreover, the actual construction of this "expenditure line" 
allowed us to validate in the empirical arena some hypotheses 
advanced on 'system-inefficiency', and mainly, the absence of self- 
correcting mechanisms in hospital performance. However, the 
results of the test for the hypothesis of a cumulative causation 
r* effect on 
hospital operation over time did not seem to suport it 
unambiguously. 
Finally, in implementing a PRAP of the nature designed in this 
thesis, some additional research should likely need to be 
undertaken in future, mainly (a) in the theoretical field, by- 
modelling in a more comprehensive manner, the hospital decision- 
making process and hospital behaviour, and (b) in the empirical 
arena, by working a more appropiate data set, mostly orientated 
to refine the techniques for comparing hospital performance, in 
view of a more satisfactory definition of health and hospital 
output. 
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